Art and Otherness: Tragic Visions in Modern Literature by Karamally, Hamza Ali
  
Art and Otherness: Tragic Visions in 
Modern Literature 
Hamza Karam Ally 
 
A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
 
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HUMANITIES 
YORK UNIVERSITY 
TORONTO, ONTARIO 
 
AUGUST 2018 
 
© Hamza Karam Ally, 2018 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
My dissertation is entitled Art and Otherness: Tragic Visions 
in Modern Literature. The two main subjects of inquiry I take up 
are the figure of the ‘other’—both as an expression of 
phenomenological alterity and as a postcolonial subject—and the 
representation of this figure in modern literature. I 
investigate the intersections between these two subjects, i.e. 
whether art is an especially insightful medium or discourse to 
discuss the subject of otherness in the sense that it represents 
a disruption within the nature of experience that resembles the 
encounter with the ‘other’.  
As a basic rationale, my dissertation also accordingly 
attempts a self-reflexivity grounded in problematizing both the 
formulation of and interaction between competing conventions of 
otherness. More succinctly, I attempt herein a methodology that 
reads across discourses whilst remaining on their margins, with 
the dual purpose of avoiding the self-confirmation of each 
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ratiocination and finding, specifically in art (and in 
particular literature), a discursive practice that seeks to 
avoid, or perhaps transcend, a stable definition of otherness. 
To effectively probe the various political, psychological, 
existential and phenomenal aspects of otherness, my project and 
chapters are organized around these separate but overlapping 
dimensions. My selected texts are predominantly from the 
nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with a 
particular focus on Modernist literature, as the latter’s 
anxieties about the nature of art and of the other are 
particularly useful to probe these and other relevant questions.  
I focus primarily on fiction by Joseph Conrad, E.M. Forster, 
Mary Shelley, Virginia Woolf, Salman Rushdie, Anita Desai, 
Albert Camus, Kamel Daoud, Don DeLillo, Saadat Hasan Manto, Yann 
Martel and Herman Melville, to which I apply a variety of 
theoretical lenses. I juxtapose these texts from different 
literary canons and maintain a correspondingly interdisciplinary 
critical approach in order to disentangle the figure of the 
other from various competing ontological and theoretical 
systems. My premise for this methodology is that pairing and 
reading these texts in unusual contexts allows for a drawing out 
of shared symbology, themes and metaphors and opens up a space 
for a more robust conversation about the relationship between 
art and otherness. 
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Introduction 
 
As an ontological construct, ‘otherness’ is so pervasive 
across various disciplines and discourses that the term itself 
seems to behave as a placeholder, taking on and discarding 
meaning depending entirely on rhetorical context. It is perhaps 
only a slightly oversimplification to claim that the extremities 
of ‘other’ are by definition self-referential, in that they are 
affixed, sustained and confirmed by the epistemological systems 
that draw them. A project that departs from or takes for granted 
the existence of otherness as a meaningful, let alone stable, 
category thus faces an immediate challenge in its rationale, 
namely how to discursively probe otherness without invoking all 
the hidden dimensions of the word and, more difficult still, 
contending with what remains of the appellation of otherness 
outside (or rather beyond) its innumerable ideological 
appropriations.    
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Alterity, that is otherness as all that is opposite to or 
not ‘selfsame’, is an essential component within the 
philosophical tradition of German Idealism, especially in the 
work of Georg Wilhelm Hegel and later the phenomenological 
ideations of Edmund Husserl, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and others. Hegel’s dialectic considered otherness a part 
of awareness necessary both to the self’s realization and 
sustained constitution of itself; i.e. for the I of self-
consciousness to identify itself and with itself, it needs an 
other to continually demark its own phenomenal boundaries. 
Husserl imagined the other as a kind of alter ego, in ordinary 
language, myself were I in the other’s place, in an 
intersubjective, symbiotic relationship with my ‘self’ as 
transcendental ego. For Levinas, meanwhile, the relationship 
with the other is the beginning of ethics, a metaphysical 
encounter—beginning with the appearance of other’s face—which 
compels the self away from dominance and toward justice.  
Phenomenological alterity exists a priori, in the space 
‘before’ identification with I and (therefore) also before the 
many social relationships that comprise identity. This 
definition of otherness thus by its very nature pre-empts 
notions of collectivism; the other whom the self encounters in 
metaphysical relation is not, so to speak, a social quantity, in 
that the other cannot be ‘reduced’ to a set of coordinates that 
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are definable or repeatable outside of each experience. This 
sharply juxtaposes alterity in phenomenological discourse 
against views of otherness which imagine it as a sociopolitical 
(or historical etc.) category.  
The latter, by taking into account the ontological (i.e. 
that which is not strictly experiential) already presupposes the 
other as a distinct convergence of social relationships which—on 
the basis of identity—either belongs to a collective or else is 
excluded from it. The other of postcolonial scholarship, 
Orientalism for example, is a figure created by the interaction 
of societies, cognisant of historical exploitation and defined 
by bringing to bear the weight and deep currents of historical, 
racial and ethnological ‘othering’, data that is in a formal 
sense secondary to the phenomenal experience of alterity.1 The 
‘referring’ of the self/ other as exemplifying (or being 
represented by) a proxy separates the postcolonial other from 
the phenomenological, while also (thereby) opening up problems 
of representation and essentialism.  
Still, significant areas of interaction and intersection 
exist between these separate paradigms. Frantz Fanon’s critical 
                                                             
1 Simone Drichel explains the insistence on the other as a singular, unrepeatable being in Levinas thusly: “Just 
as he never proposes maxims for a collectivity of ethical subjects, Levinas never talks of the other as a 
collective term uniting groups of people on the basis of shared class or other affiliations. He is adamant that 
this otherness is always singular rather than collective otherness. In fact, he is known to be highly suspicious 
of any notion of collectivity and its inherent assumptions of community, dismissing it, as he does, on the 
grounds that it is tied to the language of ontology” (23-24). 
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race discourse is equally a psychoanalysis and phenomenology of 
race. For Fanon, the subjugation of colonized peoples is enacted 
within consciousness and in bodily experience; self-awareness 
(of one’s own body) is formed and sustained through the 
internalization of racial inferiority, and is thus inseparable 
from basic, lived experience. Fanon cites W.E.B Du Bois’ ‘double 
consciousness’ as a fundamental alienation of black self-
consciousness from itself, that is, an association of oneself as 
other for the other. When in Black Skin, White Masks (1952), 
Fanon writes that “the colonized…becomes whiter as he renounces 
his blackness, his jungle” (18), the ‘becoming’ he refers to is 
in phenomenological as well as material (and social) relations 
with the world.  
Edward Said’s influential Orientalism (1978) considered the 
act of academic knowledge production about the ‘east’ to be a 
consolidation of the European exercise of power, a casting of 
the ‘gaze’ of ontology—which confers power—over the other. Yet 
the European subject, the bearer of this Occidental gaze, is 
itself a dialectical product of this othering, i.e. not a being 
antecedental or independent of Orientalism but contingent 
precisely on that imaginary duality. As Said puts it: 
“[Orientalism is a] major component in European culture… There 
is in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, 
themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental 
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backwardness…In a quite constant way, Orientalism depends for 
its strategy on this flexible positional superiority, which puts 
the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with 
the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand” (7). 
Myriad other views of otherness exist, of course, related and 
unrelated to these. In Michel Foucault’s terms, othering is a 
result of the exercise of institutional, societal and political 
power, whose gaze and capacity to define structures of 
normativity create the systematic disenfranchisement of the 
other. Simone de Beauvoir cognized a female other as the 
negative opposite of normative male (patriarchal) subjectivity. 
What is meant by ‘other’ is, in short, frequently changeable 
across ontologies that ostensibly do not lie adjacent to each 
other, so that the etymology of the word itself is fundamentally 
unreliable. 
The rationale for my approach relies heavily on the premise 
that art, as reality’s “shadow”2, is intentionally and materially 
unlike ontological systems and nomenclatures. By animating a 
facsimile or shade of the ‘real’, art’s primary invention is in 
a sense the opposite of analysis or appraisal: to obscure and 
even conceal the real rather than demystify and annotate it. I 
                                                             
2 Levinas writes: “Does not the commerce with the obscure, as a totally independent ontological event, 
describe categories irreducible to those of cognition?...Art does not know a particular type of reality; it 
contrasts with knowledge. It is the very event of obscuring, a descent of the night, an invasion of shadow. To 
put it in theological terms…art does not belong to the order of revelation” (“Reality and its Shadow” 132). 
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juxtapose theory against art on the basis of the epistemic 
violence of the former vs the latter’s (desired) inscrutability, 
i.e. its capacity to invoke that which it does not necessarily 
also essentialize. My broader claim throughout this project is, 
in brief, that the other, whether described as individual or 
belonging to a collective, and otherness as a phenomenological, 
psychic or rhetorical category, is nonetheless as a basic unit 
irreducible to reference or signification, an insight that art 
uniquely realizes.  
‘Art’ itself being a widely contested moniker and category is 
a debate I also by necessity take up in part herein, as well as 
the interaction and delineations between forms and methods. I 
focus primarily on contemporary literature, ‘western’ and 
‘eastern’3, as the primary currency of this dissertation. My 
reading of these texts deliberately does not take on a singular 
critical posture. While not ignoring biographical and contextual 
details, I primarily attempt an interdisciplinary reader-
response approach which emphasizes the theme of otherness/ 
alterity, both within the texts and in conversation with others. 
This methodology does not posit or privilege literature as 
                                                             
3 I have included as well texts that problematize this synthetic binary, works “in between” and along the 
bluntly serrated border between these geographic regions and some that resist categorization altogether, in 
no small part so as to challenge their thuswise allocation. A text like Albert Camus’ The Stranger (1942), for 
instance, can be read as an existential experience of the other or in a postcolonial literary conversation with 
Kamel Daoud’s The Meursault Investigation (2015) which inverts the former’s narrative, each reading partial 
but revelatory.  
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necessarily preeminent among the arts; the texts I include are 
generally either explicit investigations of the other or are 
otherwise tied together by shared imagery, symbols and 
incarnations of otherness. Alongside a reading of novels, I call 
attention to literature’s limitations as compared with music, 
painting, etc., in order to open up a wider conversation about 
art as a venue for, and (in the final chapter) possibly an 
instance of, radical alterity. 
My chosen title, Art and Otherness: Tragic Visions in Modern 
Literature, seeks to indicate these concerns and methods of 
inquiry. At its core, this thesis’ contribution is to consider 
art and the other alongside each other and then to examine the 
consequences of overrunning the delineation between them as 
separate modes of experience. I choose to highlight ‘tragic’ to 
foreshadow the results (often catastrophic) of the encounter 
with otherness in most of the texts included herein as well as 
to hint at the always precarious nature of the ‘ethical’ 
encounter in the work of Emmanuel Levinas, which features 
prominently throughout these pages. The word ‘visions’ 
deliberately foregrounds the always ephemeral and experiential 
(i.e. not reflective) nature of the ‘artistic moment’, a line of 
argumentation I develop mainly through phenomenology. Though I 
include a wider discussion of art and aesthetics, I engage 
primarily with literature to investigate the relationship 
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between language and the experience of otherness, specifically 
the former’s capacity (or lack thereof) to describe, that is, to 
signify the latter.  Finally, I use the ‘modern’ qualifier to 
proffer that although the big questions I take up here are of 
course not inventions of modernity, they are nonetheless both 
especially imminent to and perhaps uniquely refracted by the 
lens of the ‘modern’. Though I do not suggest a progression or 
continuity in the texts I explore and their relationship to 
these queries, they are therefore principally from the last two 
centuries. Modernist literature in particular provides a key 
frame of reference, being situated at a point of critical mass 
with regard to historical movements in art, colonialism, the 
sacred and the secular etc. and the (self-reflexive) questioning 
of these. To the extent that these preoccupations can be 
ascribed at all to ‘modernity’, I follow a very loose chronology 
toward and into the twenty-first century.   
This dissertation includes four chapters. Chapter one cites 
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899), E.M. Forster’s A 
Passage to India (1924) and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) 
alongside the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’ concepts of 
an “ethical” and metaphysical relationship with the other within 
the il y a, the primordial darkness which both reveals and 
constitutes alterity. Chapter two explores concepts of 
simultaneity, ‘non-authoritative’ language and hybridity in 
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Virginia Woolf’s The Waves (1931), Salman Rushdie’s short story 
“The Courter” (1994) and Anita Desai’s Baumgartner’s Bombay 
(1988) through critical work by Homi Bhabha, Trinh T. Minh-ha 
and Maurice Blanchot. Chapter three poses Albert Camus’ The 
Stranger (1942), Kamel Daoud’s The Meursault Investigation 
(2015) Don DeLillo’s Falling Man (2007), Saadat Hasan Manto’s 
short story “Toba Tek Singh” (1955) and Immanuel Kant’s schema 
of the sublime as instances where the other represents a 
challenge to the transcendental epistemology of the self. 
Finally, chapter four employs Herman Melville’s Moby Dick 
(1851), Yann Martel’s Life of Pi (2012), Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
“The Poet” (1844) and art theorists including Viktor Shklovsky, 
Monroe Beardsley and Arthur C. Danto to ask what the 
relationship of art is to everyday experience as itself an 
expression of alterity. 
My chapters are each organized around a context or 
perspective from which to consider otherness, components that 
fit together but do not constitute in any sense a ‘full’ view of 
the subject. Each chapter takes the basic form of exploring a 
specific realization within a literary work which is expounded 
and developed through its interplay with other texts. I largely 
align chapters around the texts themselves (rather than around 
critical analysis in which the literary works would play a 
secondary role). Themes and chapters are intended to be cross-
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referential and at times (though not always) complementary. The 
selection and deployment of the theoretical/ interpretive 
sources I utilize is similarly pluralistic, with the aim of 
eschewing theoretical grids to ‘explain’ a particular text. 
Often, this means the conflict between varying ideologies is one 
of opposing (internally defined) vernaculars rather than of 
‘like’ terms (i.e. of apples to apples). I therefore attempt to 
include critical discourses which flow not only in contrary but 
also parallel motion, i.e. where they do not contradict so much 
as bypass each other entirely. Here, I claim, the rationale for 
the intervention of art is most evident, since (as I will 
discuss) art probes these very contested spaces, in which the 
instability of the other as an epistemological and rhetorical 
category may be revealed.  This ‘other’, sought thusly through 
echolocation (rather than through concentric circles of 
increasing precision) resembles the ephemerality of an artwork.  
The first chapter, which reads Joseph Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness (1899) alongside E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India 
(1924) and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), appropriately 
begins these reflections with Conrad’s eponymous darkness.   
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Things that happen in the dark 
 
When he began writing Heart of Darkness in 1898, Joseph 
Conrad had been eight years home from the 1890 British trading 
mission up the Congo River that inspired the novel. Still a 
relatively young man, he had—mainly for the sake of his health—
already taken his last major voyage in 1893 and spent his 
remaining years writing and reflecting on his youth abroad and 
at sea. His life was thus separated into two roughly equal 
halves, one tempestuous, the other ruminative, his time in the 
British Merchant Navy informing much of his writing as an older 
man. Heart of Darkness’ Captain Charles Marlow is based in large 
part on Conrad himself, or rather, a version of himself as 
Conrad the writer, recently married and a new father living in 
England, remembered Conrad the wanderer sailing on the Congo, 
into the darkness. In a 1917 author’s note to the 1898 short 
story “Youth: A Narrative”, (also narrated by Marlow), Conrad 
writes movingly of his relationship with the character who was 
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both a memory and a shade of himself:  
[t]he man Marlow and I came together in the casual 
manner of those health-resort acquaintances which 
sometimes ripen into friendships. This one has ripened. 
For all his assertiveness in matters of opinion he is 
not an intrusive person. He haunts my hours of 
solitude, when, in silence, we lay our heads together 
in great comfort and harmony; but as we part at the end 
of a tale I am never sure that it may not be for the 
last time. Yet I don't think that either of us would 
care much to survive the other. (3-4)  
Heart of Darkness is to a degree then not only Conrad 
retracing his steps (or sails, rather), but also reliving an 
incarnation of himself frozen in a moment of emotional 
significance, a trauma perhaps, which bridged the two halves of 
his extraordinary life. Though he would base much of Heart of 
Darkness (and its successors) on meticulous travel journals he 
kept from his voyages, I believe the presence of his older self 
alongside Marlow, listening, observing, recording, is also 
perceptible throughout the novel. This is perhaps one answer to 
the identity of the unknown frame narrator who hears Marlow’s 
story; Conrad is effectively relating the story to himself, the 
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sailor speaking to the writer.4 
What is this experience then that gave Marlow his symbolic 
nascence as Conrad’s fictional counterpart? Heart of Darkness is 
replete with possible traumatic births. While the writer had 
time to let his time on the Congo gestate in his own mind, his 
younger self experiences the events of the story in all their 
traumatic immediacy and urgency. Marlow is, by the end of the 
novel, almost as compromised and haunted as Kurtz. Consider his 
reaction in the moments after lying to Kurtz’s fiancé about the 
dying man’s last words. The enormity of the lie crushes him, as 
he tells the narrator: 
It seemed to me that the house would collapse before I 
could escape, that the heavens would fall upon my head. 
But nothing happened. The heavens do not fall for such 
a trifle. Would they have fallen, I wonder, if I had 
rendered Kurtz that justice which was his due? Hadn’t 
he said he wanted only justice? But I couldn’t. I could 
not tell her. It would have been too dark—too dark 
altogether… (92)  
The novel ends with the narrator considering these words, as he 
looks “into the heart of an immense darkness.” 
I am inclined here to probe the nature of this moment, the 
                                                             
4 See Adam Hochschild’s extensive exploration (in the “Meeting Mr. Kurtz” chapter from his book King 
Leopold’s Ghost) of Conrad’s excursion on the Congo River and its many parallels to Marlow’s journey. 
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vertigo Marlow seems to feel on the precipice of darkness, and 
the meaning of this rhetorical darkness itself. The question has 
naturally been widely asked and answered, the most frequent 
interpretations being a version either of spiritual5 or psychic 
darkness (the “horror”) or the opposition between the rational, 
post Enlightenment “light” of European colonialism and the 
unknown gloom of the new colonies6. Less charitable critics, like 
Chinua Achebe, have denounced the latter binary for being a 
deeply exploitative rendering of the Congolese as a mere 
backdrop, “props for the break-up of one petty European mind” 
(789). Ian Watt’s ‘impressionist’ reading of Conrad’s darkness 
explores the novel’s deep metaphysical, perhaps mystical, vein 
(185), noting the author’s own comment on his work (in an 1897 
letter) about trying to “get through the veil of details at the 
essence of life” (Collected Letters, 334).  
Still, Heart of Darkness by and large keeps its secrets to 
itself (aptly) about what exactly Marlow (and Conrad) encounter 
in the darkness. Marlow and Kurtz spend the novel’s most 
important moments together, searching the dark for something it 
                                                             
5 Albert J. Guerard wrote in 1958, for instance: “The insistence on darkness, finally, and quite apart from 
ethical or mythical overtone, seems a right one for this extremely personal statement…may it not also be 
connected, through one of the spirit’s multiple disguises, with a radical fear of death, that other darkness?” 
(335). 
6 Most notably, Edward Said’s reading in “Two Visions in Heart of Darkness”, in which he notes the tension 
between the novel’s imperialist “aesthetics” and Conrad’s “self-conscious” and ambivalent posture towards 
imperialism (22-24).    
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never surrenders. At one point, Kurtz abruptly tells Marlow: “I 
am lying here in the dark waiting for death,” (83) but never 
states what the darkness is made of, or why indeed death must be 
met in the dark. Marlow’s last memory of Kurtz, as he is about 
to deliver his message to Kurtz’s fiancé, is similarly 
‘enshrouded’, alternating images of Kurtz swallowing and being 
swallowed by the darkness:  
I had a vision of him on the stretcher, opening his 
mouth voraciously, as if to devour all the earth with 
all its mankind. He lived then before me; he lived as 
much as he had ever lived—a shadow insatiable of 
splendid appearances, of frightful realities; a shadow 
darker than the shadow of the night, and draped nobly 
in the folds of a gorgeous eloquence. The vision seemed 
to enter the house with me—the stretcher, the phantom-
bearers, the wild crowd of obedient worshipers, the 
gloom of the forests, the glitter of the reach between 
the murky bends, the beat of the drum, regular and 
muffled like the beating of a heart—the heart of a 
conquering darkness. (87-88) 
Whatever else this passage may mean, it does evoke a peculiar 
anxiety, a tension between conquering and being conquered, as if 
there is in darkness some secret struggle which disappears by 
light. When Marlow leaves the jungle after Kurtz’s death, he is 
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greatly changed by this conflict which, critically, he describes 
not as an education—as some acquired wisdom to annex to his 
person—but rather as an unknowing, an unlearning of something 
false: “They were intruders,” he says of the people he observes 
in Brussels upon his return, “whose knowledge of life was to me 
an irritating pretence, because I felt so sure they could not 
possibly know the things I knew” (85). It is, in other words, as 
if Marlow leaves behind some part of his former nature in the 
jungle, and that returning and belonging to the world afterward 
(as Conrad may have felt in his own life after his last voyage) 
requires a sustained belief in something the “darkness” had 
shown to be an artifice, an illusion. On the Congo River in the 
jungle, both Marlow and Conrad find a kind of second birth, a 
space where the writer and his avatar decussate, the serrated 
edge between sailor and novelist.  
The analogy of an impenetrable and transforming darkness does 
of course occur frequently in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century European literary canon, paralleling European colonial 
adventures. As in Conrad, these occurrences are tempting to read 
as a rendering of Orientalist dread or as a critique of it, and 
it is certainly appropriate to interpret them that way. My 
interest though, lies in the darkness metaphor and its 
deployment, as well its aspects in an intertextual reading.  
Like Heart of Darkness, E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India 
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(1924) centers on a material conduit between the colonialist 
(known) world and the colonies (unknown). The particulars in 
Passage are different, of course; Congo’s place is taken by 
colonial India and the Congo River is swapped for the titular 
“passage”, the allegorically rich Marabar cave system in which 
the novel’s key moments occur. Darkness, however, seems to haunt 
Forster’s novel equally. As with Kurtz and Marlow’s 
conversations, Passage’s enduring question is the ambiguity of 
exactly what occurs in the Marabar caves and on whose account. 
Adela Quested, the young British woman visiting India, accuses 
Doctor Aziz, her Indian companion, of sexually assaulting her in 
the caves but later recants after claiming that she was confused 
and distressed by a mysterious “echo” in the darkness. Like 
Conrad’s “horror”, Forster’s echo is complex, a kind of symbolic 
key without an obvious lock to match. And like Marlow leaving 
the river, Adela and her prospective mother-in-law Mrs. Moore 
leave the caves haunted by what they learned (or unlearned) in 
the darkness. When Marlow returns to Brussels only to find a 
grating “pretence”, he resembles Mrs. Moore’s extreme 
disillusionment before leaving India for London, her faith 
somehow shaken by the echo in the caves, “Her Christian 
tenderness had gone, or had developed into a hardness, a just 
irritation against the human race” (187). 
Mrs. Moore’s disorientation and disillusionment in India 
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cannot be treated separately from her Anglican roots and 
devoutness, which significantly inform the identity she carries 
into the Marabar caves. The caves, as Sunil Kumar Sarker has 
observed, reveal to her an ancient and “supra-sensuous” (344) 
mysticism, a counterpoint to the conservative “Northamptonshire 
church where she had worshipped” (Forster 242). Her preparedness 
(or lack thereof) for this experience is foreshadowed in the 
text before the incident in the caves, when she extols to Ronny 
(her son and Adela’s fiancé) the limitlessness of universal 
Christian love, the message of God whose reach extends into the 
deepest darkness: “‘God…is…love…God has put us on earth to love 
our neighbours and to show it, and He is omnipresent, even in 
India” (46). The caves, in their darkness and indifference, 
represent a stark delimitation to this notion which severely 
shakes her faith. What could explain this similarly 
misanthropic, even nihilistic turn in the two characters? What 
do Marlow and Mrs. Moore find (or lose) in the darkness that 
makes life afterwards feel so false? 
The echo is in many ways Passage’s central pillar. Forster 
describes the sound as somehow both subsuming and formless, 
swallowing all other sounds while also hollowing them out:  
The echo in a Marabar cave…is entirely devoid of 
distinction. Whatever is said, the same monotonous 
noise replies, and quivers up and down the walls until 
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it is absorbed into the roof. ‘Bourn’ is the sound as 
far as the human alphabet can express it, or ‘bou-oum,’ 
or ‘ou-boum’—utterly dull. Hope, politeness, the 
blowing of a nose, the squeak of a boot, all produce 
‘bourn’. (137)  
Like the jungle becomes Africa for Marlow, for Mrs. Moore the 
caves come to define India; later, as she leaves for England, 
she imagines coconut palms in Asirgarh mocking her, “So you 
thought the echo was India; you took the Marabar caves as 
final?” (198), as though the land itself is rebuking this 
thought. The sound of this rebuke for Mrs. Moore, like Kurtz’s 
“horror” for Marlow, is the “ou-boum” echo, In a sense, both 
sounds can be interpreted as the opposite of the Word, an 
unmaking of the world, or (alternatively) of the “light”, i.e. 
of European reason and curiosity. The echo negates speech, 
reason, ontology and faith, claiming supremacy and primacy over 
all of these.  
As has been explored by several critics, “ou-boum” suggests, 
phonetically, an antithesis to the sacred Sanskrit incantation 
“ॐ (Auṁ/Ouṁ/Oṁ)”. As Jeane Noordhoff Olson writes in her book on 
Forster, “The sound of the echo…as Forster transliterates it is 
not quite the three-syllable mantra—‘a-u-m-’ or ‘o-u-m’—often 
chanted in Hindu worship…Indeed, Forster’s interpretation seems 
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a deliberate devaluation of that holy sound, a primal scream 
that only confirms the absence of any kind of god or spiritual 
comfort for Mrs. Moore” (163). Where ॐ (Auṁ/Ouṁ/Oṁ), the 
Sanskrit syllable of worship, refers to an immutable, 
encompassing all-ness, “ou-boum” seems, at least ostensibly, to 
refer to a maw, an imminent nothingness, the sound of an event 
horizon. Mrs. Moore emerges from the confrontation with this 
imminence with a sense of spiritual evisceration. Syed Anwarul 
Huq observes, “the monotonous echo is taken by Mrs. Moore to be 
a devaluation of life and her own beliefs in Christianity. In 
India, her relationship to her Christian God has altered in a 
manner that has traded presence for absence” (36). 
Yet, while compelling, this too closely resembles 
conventional readings of Heart of Darkness and A Passage to 
India, i.e. either that the message of Forster’s caves and 
Kurtz’s horror is (more or less) that the project of European 
civilization somehow shrivels (or is revealed as a pretence or 
artifice) before an impenetrable and eternal Oriental gloom, or 
that Marlow and Mrs. Moore experience in their encounter with 
this Old World darkness an existential disorientation that 
mirrors that of Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century colonialism. I believe, however, that there is a 
relatively distant variant of these interpretations in both 
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texts that opens up a more metatextual and less oppositional 
reading.  
I contend that what Mrs. Moore and Marlow find in the 
darkness is not an ancient indifference to European reason, but 
rather an unspecific, unassumable infiniteness, a loss of 
individual identity and subjectivity which neither is able to 
withstand. Consider, for a start, the almost supernatural powers 
(indeed, ostensibly of negation) that Forster confers to the 
echo as well as the language he uses to describe its effect on 
Mrs. Moore: 
The echo began in some indescribable way to undermine 
her hold on life. Coming at a moment when she chanced 
to be fatigued, it had managed to murmur, "Pathos, 
piety, courage—they exist, but are identical, and so is 
filth. Everything exists, nothing has value." If one 
had spoken vileness in that place, or quoted lofty 
poetry, the comment would have been the same—“ou-
bourn." If one had spoken with the tongues of angels 
and pleaded for all the unhappiness and 
misunderstanding in the world, past, present, and to 
come, for all the misery men must undergo whatever 
their opinion and position, and however much they dodge 
or bluff—it would amount to the same, the serpent would 
descend and return to the ceiling. (139) 
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The recurrent image Forster deploys to describe the echo is 
the last one in this passage, a kind of devouring serpent that 
indiscriminately swallows all intonation and intention, 
rendering them indistinguishable. Elsewhere, Forster uses “worm” 
instead of serpent (137; 196), perhaps meaning to invoke both 
the primitive and the supernatural, the ‘wyrm’ of various 
European/ Norse traditions. The serpent/worm feeds on sounds, 
subsuming them into itself, but in doing so it does not destroy 
sounds but rather envelopes and composes them, into a kind of 
infinite chorus: “…if several people talk at once, an 
overlapping howling noise begins, echoes generate echoes, and 
the cave is stuffed with a snake composed of small snakes, which 
writhe independently” (137). The resulting ou-boum is thus both 
all sounds and no sound, ॐ (Auṁ/Ouṁ/Oṁ) and nothingness, echo 
and silence.  
The serpent of course is a multifaceted symbol. Forster does 
make a passing but significant allusion to Genesis, to a kind of 
primeval malevolence that speaks through the echo: “What had 
spoken to [Mrs. Moore] in that scoured-out cavity of the 
granite? What dwelt in the first of the caves? Something very 
old and very small. Before time, it was before space also. 
Something snub-nosed, incapable of generosity—the undying worm 
itself” (196). The Satanic reference in this passage and Mrs. 
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Moore’s subsequent loss of faith after coming in contact with an 
enduring, ancient power—in a British colony at that—are tempting 
to interpret as a parable, perhaps an allegory for European 
Great War disillusionment. It also again opens Passage up to 
Orientalist understandings, in much the same way as “horror” can 
be read as an expression of being overcome by the impermeability 
of the Old World. I believe however that the serpent (like the 
echo it produces) is a more complex symbol, an indirect refrain 
of Conrad’s primal darkness in which unseen struggles occur. 
The dual nature of the Marabar serpent, its ability to 
contain within itself inherent contradictions, anarchic noises 
and disharmonious voices and to assimilate them into a greater, 
self-sustaining whole is at least as reminiscent of ouroboros, 
the pan cultural mythological serpent eating its own tail as a 
symbol of both infinite cyclicality and of the ‘completeness’ 
and self-sustenance of the universe,7 as it is of the snake of 
Genesis8. The ouroboros is suggested both by the “snakes within 
snakes” description, and by “undying worm”, which both swallows 
                                                             
7 The Norse sea serpent Jörmungandr, for example, enrings the world while gripping its own tail and will 
begin Ragnarök—the cataclysmic death of the present world—by releasing it.  
8 One might find closer Biblical parallels to the ‘wyrm’ toward which Forster may be pointing in the great sea 
serpents that either precipitated Creation or else threatened humankind and the Created world with a 
collapse back into (often diluvial) chaos. The Book of Job includes a “Leviathan”, possibly a rendering of the 
earlier Canaanite Lotan or the Babylonian Tiamat, the primordial god of chaos. The sea dragon/ serpent 
Rahab referenced in Isaiah 51 and recurring frequently in the Psalms is likely to be of particular interest, 
possibly representing Egypt during the exodus and/ or the primeval serpent vanquished by Yahweh to bring 
forth the universe from its chaotic preform (see Job 26:12, “He stirreth up the sea with His power, and by His 
understanding He smiteth through Rahab”).  
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sound and produces echo in a feedback loop (the cycle of birth 
and death and rebirth).  
This evocation is, to my mind, a bridge between Conrad and 
Forster; the snake that swallows all utterances into its own 
body is a materialized incarnation of the darkness that haunts 
Marlow and Kurtz. It is the means of nullifying differentiation, 
of returning things to their original, formless state—in 
primordiality, within the body of the ouroboros.9 This is not, 
critically, interchangeable with the darkness of Orientalist 
imagination, the gloom of some distant, antecedental world; it 
is rather the darkness that contains infinities, a precognitive, 
primordial soup from which nothing is excluded nor possesses 
tangible form (or a distinct voice). Is this the “horror” then? 
The experience of the self being first unmade and then 
assimilated into the darkness, into the body of the serpent? 
The preternatural darkness here is also a clear echo of 
Genesis 1:2,10 i.e. a place not of bodies interacting, but rather 
space before individuation, a metaphysical abyss opened up by 
the very encounter with otherness disembodied where otherness 
itself is the original adversary. Carl Jung wrote of the 
                                                             
9 In psychoanalytic terms, this returning to an ‘undifferentiated’ state recalls Julia Kristeva’s distinction 
between the symbolic and the semiotic stages in early childhood. The latter, Kristeva’s term for the state of 
consciousness before it recognizes itself as a singular “speaking subject” (through the repressive intervention 
of identity, language, socialization etc.) is associated not coincidentally with instinct rather than reason, and 
with a sort of prelingual indistinctness of subjectivity. See Kristeva’s Desire in Language (1980).  
10 “And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep.” 
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ouroboros as a symbol of the unconscious (and unresolved) 
struggle between the self, with its own internal contradictions, 
and its symbolic “shadow”, i.e. a resolution or synthesis of the 
self and the not-self. Writes Jung:  
In the age-old image of the uroboros lies the thought 
of devouring oneself and turning oneself into a 
circulatory process…[t]he uroboros is a dramatic symbol 
for the integration and assimilation of the opposite, 
i.e., of the shadow. This ‘feed-back’ process is at the 
same time a symbol of immortality, since it is said of 
the uroboros that he slays himself and brings himself 
to life, fertilizes himself and gives birth to himself. 
He symbolizes the One, who proceeds from the clash of 
opposites, and he therefore constitutes the secret of 
the prima materia which, as a projection, 
unquestionably stems from man’s unconscious. (365) 
Forster’s undying worm appears to bear many of these 
characteristics. To return to the distinction between Auṁ and 
“ou-boum” for a moment, the worm as ouroboros suggests that the 
difference between the two sounds is akin to the difference 
between the Sanskrit Ātman and Anātman, literally ‘self’/ ‘soul’ 
and ‘non-self’. Where Auṁ evokes the Hindu concept of Ātman, the 
individual manifestation of universal Brahma consciousness of 
which the self is an expression, “ou-boum” can be understood as 
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the Anātman, the opposite, an indication of the Buddhist concept 
of the non-self/ non-distinction of the self—more succinctly, a 
resonating of an emptiness rather than a presence. In this 
sense, “ou-boum” is the inverse of Auṁ, not the sound of the 
self realizing its place in a transcendent ‘all’, but rather an 
evacuation of self and an assimilation into a consuming 
emptiness (or darkness)11, as in a “snake composed of small 
snakes.” This is the emptiness, I claim, that Marlow and Mrs. 
Moore encounter in the darkness, not merely the fear of the 
alien or inhuman other, but rather the abyss of “ou-boum”, the 
dissolution—phenomenological and metaphysical—of the 
separateness of the self and the other as subjects. 
How can we understand this “abyss”, what are its contours, 
what can we meaningfully say about its relationship to the 
other, to literature or to art? Answering these questions 
requires first a consideration of the basic coordinates of 
‘otherness’ and encountering it, which are of course themselves 
the subjects of innumerable modes of theoretical explication. 
While the other is a meaningful epistemological category in 
various ontologies (post-colonial, psychoanalytical, gender 
studies, phenomenological from Husserlian to Hegelian etc.), the 
self confirming nature of each system means that it is nowise 
                                                             
11 That these two principles resemble each other in their opposition to each other is of course, not 
coincidental, and may indeed be the underlying point.  
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obvious which description is superlative or even contextually 
preferable. It also is difficult to read across these traditions 
without misapplying the lessons of one to the other. Moreover, 
it is debatable whether the ‘other’ is in any way a stable or 
useful category outside of its identification and deployment as 
a category in one of these (or any other) ontological/ 
rhetorical systems. One might ask, indeed, whether otherness is 
contingent on the application of a discourse to define its 
parameters and limitations, and if so, how useful it is as a 
category in cross disciplinary work, or as a term in literary 
criticism, for instance.  
Further, why literature, why art? That is, to what extent is 
art, by its very nature, distinct from these ontologies that 
define otherness within their own vernaculars, if it is at all? 
Put simply, does art somehow approach or define otherness in a 
way in which the darkness—the “abyss” of metaphysical crisis—is 
revealed to us more starkly to peer into and if so, how and why? 
The French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas once wrote of art 
that at its most basic, it is a kind of stencil image, a 
facsimile or shadow of the living world that differs from 
ontological analysis (art criticism, for instance) in one 
crucial way: where theoretical interpretations of events or 
objects attempt to describe or “reach out” for the referent 
phenomena, art (the “image”) performs a substitution, swapping 
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for the object its impression, for an idea its signifier, for a 
moment its memory. This substitution makes an artwork a kind of 
double, resembling to varying degrees the object of its 
inspiration but being otherwise free to change or even reject 
any (and every) aspect or “truth” that lies in the source—which 
Levinas sees as a perverse freedom. In “Reality and Its Shadow”, 
he writes, “a concept is the object grasped, the intelligible 
object. Already by action we maintain a living relationship with 
a real object; we grasp it, we conceive it. The image 
neutralizes this real relationship...The well-known 
disinterestedness of artistic vision, which the current 
aesthetic analysis stops with, signifies above all a blindness 
to concepts” (132). Art is thus inherently caricature, as 
Levinas calls it, “something inhuman and monstrous” (141). The 
rendering of an object by an artist is a comment on the object, 
a parody, rather than the object re-embodied by the artist’s 
hand.  
German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, whose work 
significantly influenced Levinas, similarly distinguished the 
intentionality he called “image consciousness” (the “intending” 
that is directed in looking specifically at an image or artwork) 
as unique and separate from other perception. Image 
consciousness, Husserl claims, creates a fundamental conflict in 
perception because, while the artwork itself is present, its 
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subject is usually not. The image is, as Husserl puts it, an 
“appearance of a not now in the now” (51), and our 
intentionality towards it is therefore towards a physical object 
which depicts a scene that appears as present but which we know 
to be absent. Perceiving the image is thus a sort of grasping at 
empty air, an intending that “bears within itself the 
characteristic of unreality, of conflict with the actual 
present.” The image, Husserl declares, appears as a “nullity 
that does indeed appear but is [actually] nothing.” 
 Though Levinas considered this absence or “freedom” to be a 
great failure of art (in that it allows it to exist and to 
indulge exclusively in a space divorced from the ‘real world’), 
I consider this same observation to be the key not only to 
redeeming art, ironically, through Levinas’ own phenomenological 
ethics, but also to the relationship between art and the 
aforementioned abyss from Conrad and Forster. The latter, I 
claim, is informed by this very same material divorce (i.e. the 
symbolic from the real) of the artwork from object, which 
thwarts its cooption into a particular, self-referential 
epistemology.  
Overly simplified, Levinas’ critique of art is primarily that 
its detachment from the represented object effectively removes 
the artwork from the world and creates what he calls “the 
indelible seal of artistic production” (131), a seal which—once 
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applied by the artist to the finished artwork—forecloses it to 
any definitive explication or demystification through critical 
analysis. The ‘finished’ image of the object once rendered, 
becomes unassailable not only to critics but even to the artist 
who produces it, who after the moment of intuitive inspiration 
that produced the work concludes becomes merely a part of the 
interested public. All analysis and commentary on the work thus 
does not add to it but merely narrates it in an attempt to 
restore it to a place in the world. The ineffability of the work 
itself, as well as the interstice—the netherworld between the 
real object and the one in which the artwork lives—is meanwhile 
(and forever) inaccessible to everyone, including the artist. 
Levinas argues that this view of criticism and analysis, as a 
superfluous exercise that leads a “parasitic existence” upon the 
body of art, is not just uncharitable, it is entirely misplaced. 
Not only is criticism far from a vain attempt to interpret the 
inviolable sublimity of the artwork, he argues, it is the only 
redemption available to art, the sole means of returning and 
assimilating “the inhuman work of the artist into the human 
world” (142), “…the intervention of the understanding necessary 
for integrating the inhumanity and inversion of art into human 
life and into the mind” (131).  
Levinas’ claim is that art needs a critical ontology (and 
presumably an ethics) to ‘redeem’ it, to give it a functional 
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purpose by returning it from a world resembling reality to the 
actual world, from ideal back to real. His suspicion—well 
founded—seems to be that, left alone (or perhaps, even if 
exhaustively scrutinized), the true purpose of art is not to 
illuminate the world but to intentionally obfuscate it, to 
conceal it behind its representation, its substitution. One 
might of course consider this to be art’s great intuition, but 
Levinas argues that obfuscation is not an act of transcendence 
or of immortalization (as the artist might claim), but rather a 
way to dismember the object irrevocably. He is most troubled by 
the elevation of this purpose, which inarguably comes at a great 
cost: 
Is to disengage oneself from the world always to go 
beyond, toward the region of Platonic ideas and toward 
the eternal which towers above the world? Can one not 
speak of a disengagement on the hither side…Does not 
the function of art lie in not understanding? Does not 
obscurity provide it with its very element and a 
completion sui generis, foreign to dialectics and the 
life of ideas? Will we then say that the artist knows 
and expresses the very obscurity of the real? (131) 
Though Levinas asks it sardonically, it is this last question 
that I find most compelling on its face, namely: what art 
reveals about reality, what is its relationship with otherness, 
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and if what is unique about this relationship lies somehow in 
(contending with) obscurity. Pertinent, even essential, to this 
exploration as well is how artistic representation functions at 
its most basic level, how it realizes its ‘purpose’, if one can 
be identified. Does art, very broadly and simply, attempt to 
interpret reality, represent it, understand it or obscure it? 
Does it leave us better educated about its subject(s), or 
undermine our understanding? Do the answers to any of these 
questions apply to all art, and if not, what distinguishes 
‘representative’ art from ‘destabilizing’ art? And, finally, how 
do we avoid in having this whole conversation the same pitfalls, 
of (arbitrarily) inventing a methodology that is self-
confirming, as with any other discourse that anticipates the 
answers to its own questions? I approach these problems 
initially through a more methodical survey of Levinas’ 
constellation.  
The basic phenomenological experience of art for Levinas is 
one of a deep anxiety, even a kind of temporary (and temporal) 
paralysis, which he attributes to art being essentially an 
epitaph, what Peter Schmiedgen calls in his reading of Levinas a 
“death mask” (148) of the object. The image is, in essence, a 
freeze frame, suspended in the moment of its own creation. “The 
Mona Lisa will smile eternally”, Levinas explains (138); 
ephemerality conceals the object’s past and forecloses its 
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future, so that the image must remain eternally in the 
“meanwhile”, in the interstices between each moment, unable 
(like a living instant) to be open to “the salvation of 
becoming” (141)—which would require a temporal resumption that 
never comes. By doing so, an image (inadvertently) renounces the 
possibility of being improved upon, and also therefore any of 
the possibilities of rational discourse and edification 
essential to post-Enlightenment thinking. The artist exacts, in 
a manner of speaking, a revenge on the world of reason, offering 
not a revealing comment or insight but rather a distortion, an 
evasion that leaves the world as inscrutable as when he/she 
first found it, perhaps even more so.  “To make or to appreciate 
a novel and a picture,” Levinas charges, “is to no longer have 
to conceive, is to renounce the effort of science, philosophy, 
and action. Do not speak, do not reflect, admire in silence and 
in peace” (141).  
Whilst the views he expresses here on art are, in my view, 
not only unsympathetic but even—as I will argue later in this 
chapter—contradictory to his own approach to the ethical 
“encounter” with the other, Levinas’ laconic analysis does 
highlight the basic antagonisms between art and criticism (or 
more broadly, intellectualism). Where the latter, speaking very 
generally, reaches into the world for comparison and then 
attempts to contain what it finds in language (through metaphor, 
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comparison, inference etc.), the insight of art, again very 
generally, lies not in closing the distance between the referent 
object and the audience but to increase it and find meaning in 
doing so. Where criticism describes the object, the image 
recalls the object’s absence. Though slightly reductive, it is 
arguable that what is made obvious and easily understood tends 
not to make for very interesting art.12  
In his book, Radical Passivity: Levinas, Blanchot and 
Agamben, Thomas Carl Wall writes: “By substituting an image for 
the concept, all real relations with the object are neutralized… 
[The artists’] is a nonconcerning, nonknowing gaze. It does not 
cross a distance in order to grasp an object as does the hand 
that labors or the consciousness that seizes the thing in an act 
of recognition…The image that the artist substitutes for the 
concept is not another object and does not behave like an 
object” (13). There is, to summarize, no ‘way back’ to the 
object from its image; the true event or source of the artwork’s 
inspiration cannot be reconstituted from its artistic 
representation, which makes the goal of critical interpretation 
to understand ‘through’ art the reality of the object for which 
it was substituted inherently superfluous, even antagonistic to 
                                                             
12 I intentionally use “art” here in the broadest possible sense, without the implications brought on by the 
specification of a particular definition. This approach, I feel, allows for building toward a more refined 
definition, ideally without any presuppositions. I offer a measure of response to these methodological 
questions in chapter four. 
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art. It follows then that art is not the site of reality’s 
purest distillation, whose quality or effectiveness relies on 
the clarity of the rendering; it is instead the moment of 
reality’s desertion. The work of art exists in a kind of 
negative space, a reverberation of reality from which it is 
nonetheless materially untethered. This indeed confers on art a 
kind of perverse freedom from the real, that which Levinas deems 
an “irresponsibility” (142).  
But an irresponsibility to what, we might ask? Theodor Adorno 
famously wrote “To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” 
(Prisms 34), the inference being, presumably, that artistic 
contemplation is an act of insidious privilege, connoisseurship 
without the burden of accountability (to the real). What makes 
art monstrous is a disinterest in, even a subversion of, 
politics and ethics, i.e. looking away from the utility of 
objects in favor of the aesthetics. Yet, paradoxically, it is 
also this aspect that is the beginning of insight especially as 
regards that which is obscure in reality. The barbarism of art 
is both the source and result of evoking the unrepresentable, 
the ‘hither side’ of objects. As Henry McDonald has written 
about Adorno’s comment vis-à-vis Levinas: “The alterity of the 
artwork is double-edged: the barbarism from which it cannot be 
disassociated is the ground of its transcendent status” (17). 
The same can be argued about atemporality, what Levinas calls 
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the “meanwhile”. Is not the great redemptive potential of art 
precisely that it exists in the gaps, the oblique silences left 
by everyday discourse in its utilitarian rendering of the world?  
McDonald puts this in terms of art as a resistance to ontologies 
in their aim to make the world unmysterious: “Art and literature 
demonstrate a Utopian, emancipatory potential in revealing the 
fissures and hidden pathways that run through the hegemonic 
structures and totalizing frameworks of modernity” (16).  
As a ‘barbaric’, atemporal statue, does art thus have some 
special capacity to disclose that which is concealed, both in 
everyday experience and from “totalizing frameworks”? What are 
these obscure aspects, if not mere inventions of the artwork 
which we retroactively (and wrongly) assign to the object or 
phenomena? The latter question is a rephrasing, in a sense, of 
‘what is otherness?’ and the nature of encountering it. If art 
is something other than a “totalizing framework”, it follows 
that in applying such frameworks to otherness something 
(ineffable) is lost which, as I am attempting to claim, can be 
reclaimed by art.  
Because this is not, as I’ve explained, a thing that can be 
pointed at directly, I will instead approach it through 
literature, that is through texts that take up the very question 
I have posed. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein has much to offer on 
the subject, as an exploration of the anxiety of otherness as 
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well as one’s ethical responsibility for the other. I first 
frame my reading of Shelley’s work with a brief summary of 
Levinas’ and Husserl’s view (and disagreement) on alterity and 
ethical responsibility, the same two duelling concerns that doom 
Victor Frankenstein and which readers of the novel must 
reconcile.  
Levinas’ ethics begin at the moment of the face to face 
encounter with the other, which is the source of his ethical 
first philosophy. This initial encounter occurs before 
cognition, i.e. in a moment that precedes individuation, in 
which the first request the face (of the other) makes of me is: 
“do not kill me”. The nature of this request is not only 
literal, but also an imperative to resist the will to dominate, 
to subsume the other within my own consciousness as with a base 
object. The other, for Levinas, is possessed of a “radical 
alterity” set apart from the world of objects which can be 
understood through contemplation, and presents therefore for me 
an ethical dilemma (whose potential resolutions include murder 
at one extreme). In Totality and Infinity, Levinas’ describes 
the other “as interlocutor, as him over whom I cannot have 
power, whom I cannot kill” (84). The first demand of the face of 
the other is therefore toward ethics, not understanding (which 
closes the distance). Doing justice to the other is to respect 
his alterity without trying to reduce or negate it. The “ethics” 
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of this encounter, significantly, are decoupled in Levinas from 
rational morality, which requires not only reflection and 
deliberation but also individuation and the desublimation of the 
primordial, preconscious encounter into bodies (and then 
identities). What Levinas deems the “epiphany” of the face is 
that it opens a space for an ethics of radical, primordial 
alterity that is also pre-rational; it does not impel upon me to 
uphold a set of social or moral obligations, each of which are 
naturally predicated on an ontological, not metaphysical 
relation, and in which “[we] would remain within the idealism of 
a consciousness of struggle, and not in relationship with the 
Other” (199). 
What is especially unusual about this ethical philosophy is 
that it is specifically not based on empathy, and in fact is 
theoretically opposed to empathy as a construct. It does not 
proceed from a recognition of the other’s likeness to me or on 
the other confirming to me my own transcendental ego13. Levinas’ 
ethics are explicitly spontaneous, and the “justice” that the 
other’s face demands begins with humility, an acknowledgement of 
the other’s phenomenological ineffability, or “infinity”: “[t]he 
strangeness of the other, his irreducibility to the I, to my 
                                                             
13 Whether that transcendental ego is defined as Kantian phenomenal revelation to the transcendent subject 
ego or the sum of all egos in a universal consciousness or godhead, as implied by Fichte, Berkeley or later by 
Emerson. 
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thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a 
calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics…as critique 
precedes dogmatism, metaphysics precedes ontology” (Totality 
43). This insistence clearly distinguishes Levinas’ approach 
from one based on empathy, identification with the other based 
on, in common parlance, ‘putting oneself in another’s shoes’.  
It is also therefore quite apart from Husserl’s 
transcendental idealism, which relies on the ego at the center 
of perception to “intend” the world and the objects in it, to 
interrogate and constitute their being in the world through the 
act of perception and directed intentionality, and in so doing 
to map out the spatial and temporal coordinates of the world 
shared with the other who is a variation of the intending ego. 
In the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl describes the 
relationship with the other within the context of his 
“bracketing” phenomenological approach, in which objects are 
revealed spontaneously through the experience and intentionality 
of the perceiver, and the world shared with the other is 
confirmed by identifying the other as a symbiotic interaction of 
ego and alterego (both of which intend each other). Husserl 
describes this interplay as bodies in a state of sustained 
interdependence, sharing a space whose contours are shaped by a 
reciprocal intending. The other in his ‘ownness’ is an ego/body 
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“as if I were standing over there, where the Other’s body is. 
The body is the same, given to me as the body there, and to him 
as the body here”’ (123).  
For Husserl then, the alterity of the other is not 
“radical” in the same sense, in that it is not truly 
independent, for the other to appear to me and, conversely, for 
me to appear to the other as we appear, each must rely on the 
other’s intentionality. The encounter is therefore symmetrical, 
not an ethical imperative but rather a reduction of the other to 
my ownness (and for the other, to his) and an assimilation by 
the ego of its variant, of an alternative expression of itself. 
“The ‘Other’,” Husserl writes, “according to his own constituted 
sense, points to me myself; the other is a ‘mirroring’ of my own 
self and yet not a mirroring proper, an analogue of my own self 
and yet again not an analogue in the usual sense” (94). To be 
apart from any other object I intend, the other must be seen as 
bearing some basic likeness to me, each of us a variation of the 
other and neither therefore ‘infinitely’ other.  
It is this specific point of departure from Husserl that 
makes Levinas’ formulation of the ethical encounter especially 
useful, both for revealing the metaphysical (the “abyss”) of 
otherness and for pointing at the capacity of art to describe 
the other in this ineffable aspect. In Levinas’ ethics, the face 
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stubbornly resists totalization into any ontological framework, 
and thus creates a crisis that can only be solved by killing (or 
otherwise trying to subsume) the other. Randy Friedman explains: 
“for Levinas, I can never make the other fully present to 
myself. This is the meaning of alterity… presence, for Levinas, 
is not achieved by a subject. Levinas’s phenomenology of the 
ethical begins with the inversion of Husserlian intentionality” 
(“Alterity and Asymmetry”). The ethical imperative of the face 
in Levinas is not for an exchange between two “I’s”, two 
transcendental egos that work to confirm their resemblance to 
each other. Its request is quite the opposite: for each to 
remain radically other, on the cusp of understanding but always 
beyond it, so that the encounter is always metaphysical and 
prior to embodiment as “I”. The first imperative of the face 
asks precisely that I not, on the basis of its resemblance to 
me, affix into my ownness the other as an analogue (as I would 
an object) or an alternate monad (i.e. me, were I to be embodied 
as the other). The ethical crisis engendered by the other is to 
encounter a being whose radical freedom is not in my power to 
negate, and the obligation to the face, the first ethics, is 
contingent on this radical alterity remaining absolutely other.  
The very other, in fact, of Kurtz’s whispered horror. The 
face differs from other phenomena in a very similar way to the 
image from the object or event to which it refers. Like the 
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image, the face is that which is does not bend to understanding; 
it is the subject of what Levinas calls metaphysical “desire”, a 
wholly other order way of looking and perceiving: 
the other metaphysically desired is not “other” like 
the bread I eat, the land in which I dwell, the 
landscape I contemplate…I can ‘feed’ on these realities 
and to a very great extent satisfy myself, as though I 
had simply been lacking them. Their alterity is thereby 
reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a 
possessor. The metaphysical desire [on the other hand] 
tends toward something else entirely, toward the 
absolutely other…it is a desire that can not (sic) be 
satisfied (33-34). 
It is this unsatisfied desire—the state of suspended animation 
engendered by the dual nature of otherness, at once imminent to 
me and to my desire to dominate and yet radically, impalpably 
other—which makes this encounter the center of metaphysical 
crisis. The other so perceived is at once reassuringly familiar 
and disturbingly alien, possessing humanity and yet monstrous—as 
Sigmund Freud describes in The Uncanny (1919), both heimlich and 
unheimlich.14  
 The dual impulse, to find in otherness a deep familiarity 
                                                             
14 The interplay between these opposites is explored later in this chapter.  
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and simultaneously recoiling from its strangeness, finds 
articulation perhaps nowhere more poignantly than in Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, whose central motif is the desire and 
simultaneously the inability of Victor and the creature to 
‘recognize’ each other. Frankenstein’s inversion of the moment 
of Creation, in which the creator recoils in horror at his 
creation, rests largely on the question of the familiar/ 
unfamiliar.  
Upon being awoken by the suddenly animated creature, Victor 
expresses a spontaneous disgust at its appearance: “Oh! no 
mortal could support the horror of that countenance. A mummy 
again endued with animation could not be so hideous as that 
wretch. I had gazed on him while unfinished; he was ugly then; 
but when those muscles and joints were rendered capable of 
motion, it became a thing such as even Dante could not have 
conceived” (59). In his essay, “Face, Figure, Physiognomics: 
Mary Shelley's ‘Frankenstein’ and the Moving Image”, Scott J. 
Juengel points out that Victor’s description of this encounter 
(“he was ugly then”) belies his declaration just before this 
moment that he “had selected [the creature’s] features as 
beautiful” (58). Nothing in the creature’s appearance changes, 
save for his animation, to so change Victor’s mind. Victor’s 
revulsion at the creature’s appearance thus seems not to 
originate in the creature itself nor in the shock of its birth—
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as is the frequent interpretation of the first encounter between 
the two—but rather is borne, Juengel claims, of a “monstrosity… 
always already present within Frankenstein's epistemological 
project, here disclosing itself as an inherent instability in 
the narrator's discourse…[a]subtle categorical slippage between 
the body's beauty and deformity” (361).  
The “project” in question here goes beyond creation; 
Victor’s decision to assemble the monster from assorted hunks of 
dead flesh rather than reanimating a single cadaver is expressly 
not a concession to convenience [“the minuteness of the 
[disparate] parts formed a great hindrance to my speed,” (54) he 
admits]. It is rather a necromantic experiment with the ultimate 
hope of not only reconstituting the discarded hunks into a 
living being, but also thereby unifying the ineffable with the 
material world, i.e. enmeshing soul and flesh. Victor’s great 
purpose, to “bestow animation upon lifeless matter” (55), is 
overtly an attempt to find, in Levinas’ terms, a knowable, 
replicable totality within the infinity of the other—the machine 
without the ghost so to speak, a being comprised entirely of and 
disintegrable into basic components assembled with a blueprint.  
It is the achievement of this very purpose, I believe, that 
causes Victor to recoil in horror. The monster though animated 
and ostensibly possessed of some kind of will nonetheless does 
not appear (at least to Victor) as a being with true human 
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interiority. He instinctively does not recognize the creature’s 
features as a true ‘face’, the frontage of Levinas’ ethical 
imperative. In place of a face, which would distinguish him from 
object (or monster), the creature’s countenance appears to 
Victor as a mask—i.e. the absence of a face—which reveals the 
workings of its own construction and the mortification imbued in 
its limbs and lineaments.  
Victor’s dismay is not, I argue, that the creature is 
inhuman, but rather that it appears to be only “human”, in the 
sense that it is nothing more than its functionally conjoined 
human parts, concealing neither a transcendence nor the secrets 
of its machinelike construction. It is, to cite my earlier 
discussion about images, as if the obfuscation of the object by 
its image (the mediating “abyss”) has been burned off to fully 
reveal the object behind it, hideous in its vulgar materialism 
and over proximity. Victor hints at this very vulgarity in his 
traumatic first impression of the creature with the comparison 
to, “a mummy again endued with animation…[with] “muscles and 
joints…rendered capable of motion.” What appears to disturb 
Victor then is the very success of his project—the creature 
seems to him both other and yet without discernible subjectivity 
and thus alterity.15 He is able to look right through him, as 
                                                             
15  Or, alternatively, a being without Levinas’ “indelible seal of artistic production.” 
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though the creature were a two way mirror.  
Further, Victor’s description of the creature as possessing 
an ‘excess’ [“more hideous than belongs to humanity” (77)] 
inscribes it as both familiarly human and, simultaneously, 
obscenely corpselike. In Freudian terms, this contradiction is a 
primary marker of the uncanny. Juengel points out that the 
creature’s distinctive seams and surgical stitches, which call 
attention to both its assortment of parts and the crisis of 
interiority engendered by their assemblage, are actually an 
addition to Shelley’s text (which does not mention them at all) 
made by theatrical and film adaptations. These visual fissures 
upon the creature’s sutured face and limbs are, in my 
estimation, signifiers of a violent entanglement of the object 
with its image (of the face with the mask) which results in 
Victor’s experiencing of the uncanny. Of Boris Karloff’s iconic 
portrayal of the creature in James Whale's Frankenstein (1931) 
and Bride of Frankenstein (1935), Juengel writes: “Karloff’s 
pallid sutured countenance presents a borderland, a site of 
disparity between face and mask, being and seeming, human and 
monster...Whale’s closeups reveal a conspicuously constructed 
figure, the manifest stitches, seams and folds announcing the 
face as assemblage, representation, narrative” (354).  
Though Shelley’s text makes no mention of any obvious 
markers of this surgical fragmentation, it does clearly describe 
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Victor’s horror at the translucency of the creature’s face, 
which leaves the traces of its inner workings (and thus, of 
course, of Victor’s hand as its creator) just barely visible. 
Though he again surely knew what the creature looked like before 
its animation, Victor describes this obscene ‘excess’ of visual 
revelation as a new realization once he sees the creature alive, 
as if there is too little separating the flesh and the visage in 
a living creature: “His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of 
muscles and arteries beneath…his watery eyes that seemed almost 
of the same colour as the dun-white sockets in which they were 
set, his shrivelled complexion and straight black lips” (58). 
The impression of this anemic translucency is repeatedly evoked 
in the text through imagery of pale or yellow moonlight, which 
is repeatedly the harbinger of the creature’s imminent 
appearance: “by the dim and yellow light of the moon...I beheld 
the wretch” (59); “I saw, by the light of the moon, the daemon 
at the casement” (171); “I felt a kind of panic on seeing the 
pale yellow light of the moon illuminate the chamber…I saw at 
the open window a figure the most hideous and abhorred” (200); 
“Suddenly the broad disk of the moon arose and shone full upon 
his ghastly and distorted shape” (206). Returning to my point 
regarding the dual nature of the image as a corollary of 
Levinas’ face, it is as if the creature’s face has somehow 
collapsed into its mask, the visage into its casement, and thus 
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its subjectivity (if there was such) into its base nature as a 
material object.  
This is the source of Victor’s paralysis once the creature 
comes to life; his creation appears suspended somewhere between 
material object and ethical subject (or more abstractly, between 
flesh and spirit). The creature’s monstrous appearance is rooted 
in its unmitigated availability, reflecting what Levinas calls 
the “collapse [of beings] into their “materiality…terrifyingly 
present in their destiny, weight and shape” (Existence 59-60). 
Victor actually refers in passing to the creature’s oscillation 
between object and image, and the crisis engendered by looking 
upon its face to determine which is its true nature: “if he 
dared again to blast me by his presence I might, with unfailing 
aim, put an end to the existence of the monstrous image which I 
had endued with the mockery of a soul still more monstrous” 
(187). The petrification of the creature between subject and 
object is grounded in the uncanny. The creature repeatedly 
reveals itself to both possess human emotion and be highly 
articulate, only to have its humanity overturned by its 
epistemically indeterminate countenance which, as Juengel puts 
it, “stands for and at the dead end of the verbal” (355).  
Victor’s anxiety thus runs parallel to his guilt as creator. 
The German psychiatrist Ernst Jentsch explains in his essay “On 
the Psychology of the Uncanny” (1906)—later referenced by Freud—
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the feeling of the uncanny in terms that seem to speak directly 
to Victor’s abiding terror:    
Among all the psychical uncertainties that can become a 
cause for the uncanny feeling to arise, there is one in 
particular that is able to develop a fairly regular, 
powerful and very general effect: namely, doubt as to 
whether an apparently living being really is animate 
and, conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless object 
may not in fact be animate – and more precisely, when 
this doubt only makes itself felt obscurely in one’s 
consciousness. (11) 
The uncertainly Jentsch describes here, though wide ranging in 
terms of possible objects, is arguably most applicable to 
automata, which he discusses almost as if diagnosing Victor’s 
condition directly: “[L]ife-size machines that perform 
complicated tasks, blow trumpets, dance and so forth, very 
easily give one a feeling of unease. The finer the mechanism and 
the truer to nature the formal reproduction, the more strongly 
will the special effect also make its appearance” (12).  
Freud’s 1919 essay “The Uncanny” expands on (and at times 
disagrees with) Jentsch’s definition. As is frequently his 
approach, Freud explores the feeling of uncanniness through the 
etymology of the term itself. He points out that that the German 
counterparts to the words canny/uncanny—i.e. heimlich/ 
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unheimlich—are provisionally oppositional but not exclusively 
so; each also contains the other within itself. Alongside the 
primary meaning of heimlich (the intimate, familiar or homely), 
Freud argues that an implied secondary meaning of the intimate 
is that which is also private and concealed. What is most 
familiar also contains within it an element of the most secret 
and the most veiled–and therefore, the most repressed (unknown 
to the conscious mind). Heimlich thus contains, “among its 
different shades…one which is identical with its opposite, 
‘unheimlich’” (223). The opposite term unheimlich similarly 
refers not only to the unfamiliar, unknown or threatening, but 
also refers us back to its own opposite, i.e. the intimate 
revealed, the private and secret made frighteningly visible and 
unhidden (219-225). This, Freud claims, is the source of the 
anxiety caused by uncanny phenomena: the uncanny reveals a 
hidden, often fearful aspect within the familiar, or an aspect 
of the familiar that was always present but was unacknowledged. 
The feeling of the uncanny/ unfamiliar is thus inseparable from 
the fear of losing one’s hold on what is most familiar, since 
the uncanny makes the familiar, in some aspect of it, unfamiliar 
again.   
 In this sense, the uncanny is fundamentally destabilizing, 
as it not only recalls repressed anxieties but also—more 
significantly for my purposes—casts doubt upon the surety of 
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what is already known. The effect lies not in the unheimlich 
object itself but in a slipping of the illusion of stability of 
the heimlich (known) world. As a specific iteration of this 
profound disorientation, Freud raises the figure of the 
“double”, which appearing as a replication of oneself causes one 
to experience the heimlich/unheimlich interpolation specifically 
as a crisis of the self: “[in the case of the double] the 
subject identifies himself with someone else, so that he is in 
doubt as to which his self is, or substitutes the extraneous 
self for his own. In other words, there is a doubling, dividing 
and interchanging of the self” (233).  
Though Jentsch’s essay preceded Freud, he poses another 
aspect of this uneasiness about one’s self raised by the double, 
one that brings us back into dialogue with Frankenstein. Among 
his examples of the phenomena that can give rise to the feeling 
of uncanniness is a speculation or misapprehension of the 
inanimate as living (or vice versa). By way of analogy, Jentsch 
cites the bewilderment that accompanies unexpectedly coming upon 
an object that reveals itself as a living organism, as in “a 
tree trunk…that, to the horror of the traveller, suddenly 
[begins] to move and [shows] itself to be a giant snake” (11). 
The inverse possibility is equally unsettling, i.e. 
misperceiving the presence of characteristics of life, as in a 
shadow that happens to take a humanlike shape, or a machine with 
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a human voice. Jentsch all but points us in the direction of 
Frankenstein’s creature with his example, “a wild man [who] has 
his first sight of a locomotive or a steamboat…perhaps at night. 
The feeling of trepidation will here be very great, for as a 
consequence of the enigmatic autonomous movement and the regular 
noises of the machine, reminding him of human breath, the giant 
apparatus can easily impress the completely ignorant person as a 
living mass.”  
This analogy is compelling precisely because the true 
nature of the automaton remains ambiguous; it bears the markers 
of a living creature but relies wholly upon comparisons the 
perceiver makes with the nature of the familiar world to confer 
to it those living aspects. Taken alongside Freud’s analysis of 
the crisis of the double, I believe this schema responds 
directly to the key dilemma posed by Shelley’s text: the monster 
(unheimlich) who, as his own creation, is also Victor’s double 
(heimlich)—with its dual nature as vulgar object and ethical 
subject—creates a metaphysical crisis of self for Victor, one 
which takes the form of the aforementioned prelingual, 
metaphysical encounter with the other. 
     Victor’s predicament is grounded in his inability to 
determine whether or not the creature is capable of compelling 
him toward an ethical response (“do not kill me”), which would 
require Victor to simultaneously renounce his role as the 
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creature’s master and acknowledge, as its creator nonetheless, 
its demands for just treatment. Victor is thus ensnared in a 
paradox of responsibility notably similar to the one the artist 
has to the work of art in Levinas’ criticism: in order to 
quicken the creature’s mortified flesh as he intended (i.e. as 
man, not monster), Victor must forsake ontological mastery—
ownership—over it. He must, effectively, become an artist 
instead of a scientist, confer upon the creature the “the 
indelible seal” of artistic creation and thereby foreclose it to 
his own power of discrimination. 
Deprived of this gift by his creator, the monster becomes 
trapped in its very transparency to Victor’s ontological 
queries, as a living incarnation of Victor’s latent fears, more 
double than true antagonist. This is the reason that the 
creature’s quest throughout the text is for agency, to be 
absolved not only of Victor’s fear and guilt but freed also from 
being an object of epistemological inquiry. The creature never 
receives this affirmation from Victor, precisely because Victor 
is unable to perceive the creature as anything other than 
double, a totalization rather than an infinity.16 The rejection, 
which ends in tragedy, impedes completely the creature’s ability 
to achieve the very radical subjectivity that Victor initially 
                                                             
16 Note that Victor’s dread of the creature’s inhumanity is at the core of his loathing; the “wretch” is wretched 
because he is the “daemon” etc.  
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strived to create and then feared the creature did not possess. 
Shelley’s text here again seems to precipitate Jentsch, 
particularly the latter’s description of the human inclination 
to bestow upon inanimate objects or automata recognizable 
features of life and to then believe in the inherent presence of 
our projections. As Jentsch explains, being subsequently unable 
to confirm the veracity of those beliefs then becomes itself the 
source of fearful uncertainty: “That which man himself semi-
consciously projected into things from his own being now begins 
again to terrify him in those very things, or that he is not 
always capable of exorcising spirits which were created out of 
his own head from that very head. This inability thus easily 
produces the feeling of being threatened by something unknown 
and incomprehensible…” (14).  
 This, I argue, is Frankenstein’s primary axis (resolved 
ultimately by the death of both creator and creation) and the 
means by which the novel teases out the ethical dilemma of the 
other. The monster’s role as a symbolic double is a version of 
the ethical crisis of otherness. Its first monstrous appearance, 
recalling the initial, hostile appearance of the face in 
Levinas, is for Victor (both symbolically and actually) an 
invitation not to destroy it. But Victor fails this test; his 
denial and condemnation of it makes the creature not the other 
of Levinas’ irresolvable “metaphysical desire”, whose face 
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distinguishes him from the disclosable world of objects, but the 
other as an analogue of myself (i.e. Victor) whose “alterity is 
thereby reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a 
possessor” (Totality 33-34).  
The relationship between Victor and the creature thus 
presents both possibilities: the other as an object that departs 
from me and is available to me, and as the opposite, the radical 
other Levinas describes. We might even say that the encounter 
with the other is always a version of Victor’s first appraisal 
of the creature upon its animation, compelling one each time to 
make the same decision Victor must make. If the first imperative 
the face of the other makes is “do not kill me”, perhaps the 
first question one asks of the other is: are you an object or a 
doppelgänger imitating me, or actually a being possessing true, 
radical and independent subjectivity?  
 
Still, it is essential to point out that the doubt that the 
creature incites begins not within itself but in its creator. 
Frankenstein is at least as concerned with the self as about the 
other; the creature is monstrous because Victor requires it to 
be so, since it is a reflection of Victor’s doubts about his own 
true nature, his own subjectivity. The creature’s indeterminate 
otherness undermines the belief Victor has in his fixity as the 
centre of his own subjectivity. In Existence and Existents, 
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Levinas describes the feeling of dissolution, the losing of 
one’s grip on oneself, as not an incidental effect of otherness 
but as a coming into contact with the il y a (literally, the 
there is)17. The il y a is the counterpart of form, both 
preceding and transcending; it is being without individuation 
and chaos within order, a wholeness without either subject or 
object, running through and looming above these. Using darkness 
and nightfall’s blurring of clear separations between objects as 
a comparison, Levinas describes perceiving the il y a as a 
shedding of artificial separations (and thus of individuality), 
a seeping of everything back into its unsorted, 
indistinguishable form: “indeterminateness constitutes its 
acuteness. There is no determined being, anything can count for 
anything else. In this ambiguity the menace of pure and simple 
presence, of the there is, takes form. Before this obscure 
invasion it is impossible to take shelter in oneself, to 
withdraw into one’s shell. One is exposed… What we call the I is 
itself submerged by the night” (58-59).  
This reciprocity of the self and other, exposing each other 
while both are always on the verge of slipping back into the 
formless il y a is the foundation for what Levinas calls the 
                                                             
17 Though it stubbornly evades language, the il y a may be imagined as a depersonalized allness or Tao-like 
fabric of all being, alternatively everything and nothingness, distinct but not unrelated to Martin Heidegger’s 
Dasein (Being-in-the-world). I engage with this idea as a conclusion to this chapter and again in chapter two.  
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“hypostasis” or coming together of the self in the first place, 
and it is this frightening possibility, I argue, which permeates 
each of Victor’s encounters with the creature. The most primal 
terror evoked by il y a is not death, but the loss of selfhood, 
of distinctness and freedom from the immanent, anonymous there 
is. The creature’s appearance as Victor’s own apparition incites 
in Victor the horror of his own dissipating subjectivity (or 
perhaps, of its fragility), as Levinas deems it, the “horror [of 
the il y a]…which will strip consciousness of its very 
“subjectivity” (Existence 60).   
 The “horror” of the il y a brings us back to Kurtz and to 
Mrs. Moore and Forster’s ou-boum. Is there a symbiosis between 
Kurtz’s last words, Mrs. Moore’s spiritual dislocation in the 
Marabar caves and Victor’s existential terror? Each seems to be 
induced by the disquieting revelation or discovery of something 
concealed, heimlich become unheimlich. The menacing jungle, the 
gloom of the cave system and the creature’s pallid appearance in 
the moonlight each seem to manifest the night of Levinas’ 
metaphor, finding particular resonance in actual or metaphorical 
darkness. And darkness, rather than obscuring what is real or 
the pellucidity of light, seems instead to disclose what is most 
intimate, as if belying the artificial separations of the day. I 
contend that Kurtz’s horror and Forster’s ou-boum are both 
utterances indicating the imminence of the il y a; as if echoing 
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The Word, each contains within it both the prelingual and the 
non-lingual. And, as the axis on which each novel pivots, each 
seems to open into an abyss with neither language nor 
individuation, a primeval place which bears a deep and 
substantive resemblance to the il y a. 
 Viewed through this prism, the figures of Victor, Kurtz and 
Mrs. Moore seem to converge; each approaches the corners of 
realization unawares, and each realization is too much to be 
borne or even looked upon directly, dislocating and overwhelming 
their subjectivities. And, crucially, each character’s crisis 
occurs through confrontation or conversation with the other, 
literally and symbolically. This last commonality makes an 
intertextual reading of the novels—as Levinasian encounters with 
otherness—especially useful, as each character seems to stagger 
between ethical responsibility towards the other and the 
consuming il y a. The defining moment for each character is a 
version of the same unnamed (and unnameable) realization: the 
vertigo of experiencing oneself consumed, falling into the 
‘abyss’.  
 In his paper “Beyond the Dialectic: Conrad, Levinas, and 
the Scene of Recognition” which also reads Heart of Darkness 
through Levinas as a potential ‘way out’ of the Hegelian master-
slave dialectic, Ihor Junyk describes Marlow’s interaction with 
Kurtz as an ethical relation, one in which each resists the 
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temptation to enslave or subsume the other. The Hegelian aspect 
of Kurtz’s character, seeking to dominate the native Congolese, 
both defines his appearance18 and is the catalyst for his 
eventual undoing, when the horror evinced by the native other 
leaves him emaciated and dying. Junyk reads Marlow’s encounter 
with Kurtz as one that goes “beyond” this dialectic, opening a 
space for a radical ethics: “Unlike the harlequin, who is 
entirely under Kurtz's domination, Marlow maintains his 
distance, irony and autonomy…abandon[ing] the anticipated 
Hegelian dialectical battle of mastery and slavery. 
Acknowledging Kurtz's degradation, he assumes radical 
responsibility for him” (144). The uniqueness of this encounter 
is, I believe, established by the novel’s narrative structure; 
the circumstances and backdrop against which Marlow and Kurtz 
meet are richly infused with imagery and metaphors that invoke 
the ‘night’ of the il y a. Representing the destination at the 
end of Marlow’s journey, Heart of Darkness positions Kurtz as 
the bearer of an undisclosed, one that takes the form of an 
enigmatic silence to which Marlow is oriented throughout the 
novel and which that draws him into the darkness. Junyk writes 
that Marlow’s journey is “not only forward in space, but also 
back in time, to a primordial era… what can only be described as 
                                                             
18 “I saw him open his mouth wide,” Marlow describes, “it gave him a weirdly voracious aspect, as though he 
had wanted to swallow all the air, all the earth, all the men before him” (72). 
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an archetypal journey into a veritable underworld. The 
forthcoming encounter with Kurtz, then, is presented, not as an 
ordinary meeting, but as a primal scene of recognition, a 
primordial, mythical event” (143). It is in this setting that 
Marlow, pursuing secret knowledge, discovers Kurtz, who has 
ostensibly attained it and, like Victor Frankenstein, has been 
destroyed by it: the realization of the il y a, the proverbial 
heart of darkness.  
 The novel’s silences, evasions and the obliqueness of 
Kurtz’s last words become entirely consistent, from this 
perspective, with its intention; the origins and characteristics 
of the “horror” are unnameable precisely because the contours of 
the il y a—like the Tao—exist beyond the purview of language, 
signification or even comprehension. Junyk rightly decries the 
misreading of critics of the novel like F.R. Leavis, who bemoans 
Conrad’s rhetorical imprecision as an insistence on “making a 
virtue of not knowing what he means" (Leavis 180). Like Shelley, 
Conrad’s great revelation must remain a half remembered dream, 
able to be glimpsed only out of the corner of the eye. The il y 
a can be spoken about (if at all) only by not pointing directly 
at it. As Junyk argues, this is the methodology by which Heart 
of Darkness “questions and undercuts the picture of a universe 
with secure coordinates and absolute reference points. What 
emerges in its stead is the chaotic world (or non-world) of the 
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‘il y a’” (148).  
 Levinas further associates silence, or at least white 
noise, with the il y a, describing a kind of pregnant, 
primigenial silence or “rustling” that both contains and nulls 
all other sound. The ‘allness’ that the il y a represents is 
analogous, for Levinas, to a "rumbling silence, something 
resembling what one hears when one puts an empty shell close to 
the ear, as if the silence were a noise…a noise returning after 
every negation of this noise" (Ethics 48-49). The similarity to 
Forster’s ou-boum and to his metaphor of the primordial “snake 
composed of small snakes” is intriguing; like Levinas’ rumbling 
silence, the echo that traumatizes Mrs. Moore is both 
featureless (“entirely devoid of distinction”) and impenetrable 
in its meaninglessness (“whatever is said, the same monotonous 
noise replies”). One might imagine this noise, as a helpful if 
inexact comparison, as akin to the cosmic microwave background 
radiation left over from the early universe, a constant hiss 
beneath all other sound or a canvas upon which all sound exists.  
Like Marlow and Kurtz’s conversations, Mrs. Moore’s exposure 
to the il y a occurs in an utter darkness that erases identity 
and form, self and other. In darkness, Levinas concludes, the 
rustling becomes audible again “the whole is open upon us… 
Darkness does not only modify their contours for vision; it 
reduces them to undetermined, anonymous being, which sweats in 
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them… The rustling of the there is is horror” (Existence 59-60). 
If this rustling, the ou-boum, is the sound of the abyss of the 
il y a, darkness is its corresponding visage, and the other is 
the bearer of its terrible message.19 
Of course, the prevailing question with regards to these 
realizations is whether they are unique in any way to these 
texts, or whether art is an ideal or even appropriate lens 
through which to arrive at them. I have already discussed, in 
brief, the basic act of ‘substitution’ (of an object for its 
image) at the core of the artistic endeavor which allows art to 
open up a distance between the object and its artistic 
rendering, a check against the often totalizing effects of 
language and description. But what, one is compelled to ask, 
separates the consideration of otherness in a novel, for 
instance, from otherwise contemplating the same question? What 
about the language and discourse of art allows an experience or 
exposure to “the whole [that] is open to us”? How can one sense 
the presence or absence of this capacity, and what can one learn 
(or unlearn) about the other by it?  
To develop and respond to these questions, the next chapter 
presents a reading of several works concerning the nature of 
literary/ artistic speech and ‘non-speech’, including texts by 
                                                             
19 As Michael Fagenblat has put it, “it is the transcendence of the anonymous and/or the divine that is the real 
and non-ethical source of (ethical) subjectivity (299). 
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Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, Igor Stravinsky, Salman Rushdie, 
Anita Desai, Trinh T. Minh ha and others, as well as critical 
work by Maurice Blanchot, Homi Bhabha, Max van Manen etc. I 
begin with a discussion of the relationship between the ‘second 
language’ of literature and the act of looking ‘obliquely’.  
----- 
“Thus did We show Abraham the kingdom of the heavens and the 
earth that he might be of those possessing certainty: When the 
night grew dark upon him he beheld a star. He said: This is my 
Lord. But when it set, he said: I love not things that set.” 
(107) -The Quran, Surah Al-An'am 6:75-76  
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Side Eye, or Fun with Words 
 
As a rather ironic exclamation point to his long soliloquy 
that comprises the final chapter of Virginia Woolf’s The Waves 
(1931), the writer Bernard portentously declares “I have done 
with phrases” (176). Being a writer and thus most closely 
associated with the novel’s experiments with and expositions on 
language among the novel’s six primary characters, his decision 
is a weighty one. His plea is answered by the novel’s final 
phrase, “[t]he waves broke on the shore”, a non-utterance of 
white noise that seems, in a sense, to grant him his wish, a 
sound emptied of purpose or thought. Bernard’s exasperation with 
language is arguably The Waves’ primary meditation, the 
inadequacy of language (and signification) to stand in for the 
real, or as Rhoda, the novel’s most Woolf-like character, 
observes, the “‘[l]ike’ and ‘like’ and ‘like’” of language 
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semiotics, “but what is the thing that lies beneath the 
semblance of the thing?” (95). For Bernard, disenchanted with 
metaphor, analogy and explanation, “phrases”—in their 
contemplative seriousness—reveal themselves to be empty 
signifiers, a vain attempt to stave off death and non-being. “By 
what name are we to call death?” he asks, “I do not know” (176), 
hinting both at an ineffable “thing beneath the thing” and at 
that primordial, chaotic soundscape beyond language, the sound 
of the titular waves and of Levinas’ “rumbling silence”.  
Perhaps hedging his bet, Bernard does, however, qualify his 
condemnation somewhat, exempting from his call for a complete 
annihilation of language a kind of non-speech, a primitive, 
obtuse speech comprised of monosyllabic fragments: “I need a 
little language such as lovers use, words of one syllable such 
as children speak...I need a howl; a cry...Nothing neat. Nothing 
that comes down with all its feet on the floor. None of those 
resonances and lovely echoes...false phrases. I have done with 
phrases... What delights me [now] is the confusion” (176; 143). 
This suggestion, essentially that “phrases” (i.e. language as a 
means of signification and comparison) are false while 
spontaneous utterances express the immediacy of the world, is an 
especially remarkable one for a writer. As critics like Elicia 
Clements and others have noted, Bernard speaks to Woolf’s own 
long-standing concerns about the limitations of language and its 
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tempestuous relationship with meaning, the same concerns that 
inform the experimental structure of The Waves, perhaps the most 
stylized work in her oeuvre. What does Woolf mean here by 
“howl”, the “little language” of lovers? What distinguishes 
these from “phrases” and saves them from Bernard’s disdain about 
the ineffectuality of language? And, moreover, could this “howl” 
represent a way out of the problems I discussed at the 
conclusion of chapter one, namely identifying and mapping an 
artistic ‘second language’ in which the “whole is open to us”? 
The emancipatory potential of the “howl” has several 
antecedents in Woolf’s earlier work, both fiction and non-
fiction. Some of these are worth exploring here, as they 
illuminate both the adjacency of Woolf’s criticism of rhetorical 
signification to Levinas’ totalizing ‘ontology’ as well the 
ethical possibilities of what I am tempted to call a pseudo-
anarchic language of art.20 The Waves notably attempts to 
replicate, in form, structure and even prose, the compositional 
structure of a musical piece. Gerald Levin, Elicia Clements and 
Linda Nicole Blair have noted the novel’s fugal structure 
                                                             
20 Samuel Beckett once expressed a similar sentiment about the seeming falsity of a prepared or varnished 
speech. In a 1937 letter to the German publisher Axel Kaun, Beckett writes “more and more my language 
appears to me like a veil which one has to tear apart in order to get to those things (or the nothingness) lying 
behind it…[and] drill one hole after another into it until that which lurks behind, be it something or nothing, 
starts seeping through” (518). The sentiment compares interestingly with Michael Fagenblat’s notion the il y 
a as “the remainder of life which remains when both being and nothingness have been drained out of it” 
(300). 
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(though Levin settles on the term “pantonal”), its six narrators 
speaking in a kind of affectation of contrapuntal simultaneity 
that, among other achievements, undermines the monological 
authority of a single narrator (or truth).  
The unifying motif of the novel, repeated intermittently and 
sequentially by each narrator (as in a fugue) is the inescapable 
shortcomings of language, that is, its inability to be musical. 
Bernard’s final resignation is a stated resolution of this 
motif, the inadequacy of a ‘phrase’ to contain within itself its 
own contradictions and thus to replicate a continuous ‘wave’. 
Levin explains that, by straining the limitations of the novel 
and mimicking the discordant polyphony of a contrapuntal musical 
piece, “the implication [of The Waves] is that the musical 
experience is finally one of unresolved dissonances. We have 
connection without consonance or resolution” (167). Towards the 
end of the novel Bernard makes this relationship explicit, as if 
metatextually comparing the narrative of The Waves to music:  
Faces recur, faces and faces—they press their beauty to 
the walls of my bubble—Neville, Susan, Louis, Jinny, 
Rhoda and a thousand others.  How impossible to order 
them rightly; to detach one separately, or to give the 
effect of the whole—again like music.  What a symphony 
with its concord and its discord, and its tunes on top 
and its complicated bass beneath, as a “[symphonic] 
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whole …with its concord and its discord, and its tunes 
on top and its complicated bass beneath. (156)  
The effect of coalescing these contradictions and collisions, 
the overlay of melody and discordance, is a ‘democratization’ of 
narrative. The novel’s prismatic subjectivities allow it to 
subvert the dictatorial stance of the single narrator choosing a 
definitive version of events or, more abstractly, a single 
reality from within the diffuseness of experience. To borrow an 
esoteric but illuminating metaphor from quantum physics, The 
Waves is an experiment in repacking particles back into quanta, 
a simultaneity of multiple synchronicities prior to the 
collapsing of the wave function into a singular, canonical 
particularity21. Mikhail Bakhtin has made a similar observation 
about Fyodor Dostoevsky’s kaleidoscopic narration, a temporal 
invention that opens up the singular ‘event’ into its myriad, 
divergent possibilities and intervals which Bakhtin calls the 
“interrelationships in the cross-section of a single moment” 
(28). While Woolf and Dostoevsky have little (if anything) else 
in common as writers, the experiment Bakhtin here cites is a 
similar ‘stretching’ out of narrative directionality, revealing 
interstices and fissures within a single text. In theory, each 
additional cross-section, like each of the The Waves’ narrators, 
                                                             
21 As in the case of light quanta. See the wave-particle duality, including the work of Niels Bohr.  
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brings the ‘real’ event (its many hidden aspects) closer at 
hand, though—short of an infinite number of cross-sections—it 
must always remain just out of reach.  
Bernard’s supplication for an alternate speech, one that 
survives the trappings of “phrases” and bears a stronger 
likeness to lived experience22 finds a close consort in Lily 
Briscoe from 1927’s To the Lighthouse. Though she approaches the 
question from the perspective of a painter (the relationship 
between painting and writing being a frequent subject for 
Woolf), Lily Briscoe’s frustrations with the incongruity between 
the nameless world beyond the human voice and the ordered 
cadences of language are quite similar. She notes particularly 
the flightiness of language when compared with feeling: 
“[l]ittle words that broke up the thought and dismembered it 
said nothing…one could say nothing to nobody. The urgency of the 
moment always missed its mark. Words fluttered sideways and 
struck the object inches too low…for how could one express in 
words these emotions of the body? Express that emptiness there?” 
(240-241). Lily Briscoe’s attempt to create a portrait of the 
Ramsays that captures essence while making “no attempt at 
likeness” (72) anticipates Bernard’s wish for a language without 
prescription, which does not put “all its feet on the floor”—in 
                                                             
22 That is, the ‘distance’ between signifier and signified; how one might make this assessment of language is 
one of several significant issues of interest here.   
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other words, signification without essentialization. For Lily 
Briscoe, a painting is freer than a novel, or at least it has 
the possibility to be. Her painting, like the elusive symbol of 
the novel’s titular lighthouse, leans toward a representation 
which is not a true likeness, which strains the relationship 
between signifier and signified. Its relative freedom thus 
places it somewhere on the figurative bridge from “howl” to the 
“phrases” that Bernard wants to forsake.23   
Like Bernard, Lily Briscoe’s desire for a representation 
without likeness is a variation on a concern that can be traced 
back even further, to Woolf’s earliest work. Well before the 
publication of her first novel, Woolf had described the failure 
of words to express the “emotions of the body”, whilst 
explicitly privileging music as closest amongst of the arts to 
the “howl”. In 1909’s “Impressions at Bayreuth”, she writes “we 
are miserably aware how little words can do to render music. 
When the moment of suspense is over, and the bows actually move 
across the strings, our definitions are relinquished, and words 
disappear in our minds” (Essays 291-292). For Woolf, the musical 
form is closest to the disembodied territory24 where the “thing 
                                                             
23 I revisit the lighthouse Lily Briscoe’s painting in chapter four as part of a different discussion regarding 
symbols. 
24 Arnold Schoenberg elaborates on the intangibility of music in Theory of Harmony, i.e. on the distinctness 
and separateness of sound from the instruments that create it. The sound of a violin, for example, is not the 
violin itself. The sound that is heard does not materially lead us back to what created it. “[T]he material of 
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beneath the thing” exists. In 1905’s “Street Music”, her 
observation about the ineffability of music and the possibility 
of ‘empty’ signifiers, already seems to put her on the path to 
the musicalization of the novel form which found its eventual 
realization in The Waves. Like Forster’s echo, Woolf associates 
music with a primal scream25, capable of producing a “musical 
ecstasy”: “[the god of music is] the wildest of all the gods, 
who has not yet learnt to speak with human voice, or to convey 
to the mind the likeness of human things…[it] incites within us 
something that is wild and inhuman like itself” (Essays 29-30).  
 A frequent attendee at Sergei Diaghilev’s Ballets Russes in 
Paris after the War, Woolf would have been aware of the ongoing 
insurgence not only against musical conventions but, as the 
riot-inducing 1913 performance of Igor Stravinsky’s The Rite of 
Spring showed, against the conventional definition of ‘music’. 
The Rite’s subversion of conventional tonality, consonance, 
rhythm and of musicality itself (along with Vaslav Nijinsky’s 
vulgar choreography which, as Richard Taruskin has written, was 
the true cause of the 1913 riot) was a progenitor of The Waves. 
Like Woolf, Stravinsky’s disruption of acculturated expectations 
of musicality implicated audiences in their need to find 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
music is the tone” Schoenberg writes, “what it affects first, the ear. The sensory perception releases 
[previous] associations and connects tone, ear, and the world of feeling” (19).  
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familiar signifiers within the music and, more substantially, 
revealed the ‘meaning’ behind those signifiers to be conditional 
rather than universal. In its arrangement, The Rite also built 
on earlier forays into musical simultaneity, in that it played 
with vertically ‘stretching’ its internal logic into a diffuse 
(rather than acute) axiom. Pieter Van Den Toorn writes that in 
The Rite, “symmetrically defined units no longer succeed one 
another, harmlessly, as they do…in the early Stravinsky 
passages…These units are now superimposed—played 
simultaneously…[This] radically alters the conditions of 
octatonic confinement, opens up a new dimension in octatonic 
thought” (129). While Den Toorn attributes this “new dimension” 
in The Rite to an alternate (but stable) pattern of interaction 
between diatonic and octatonic scales, Dmitri Tymoczko 
challenges this analysis, suggesting that what appear as 
octatonic moments are actually elements of several non-diatonic 
scales grafted onto the piece to create a portentous disorder (a 
companion to Nijinsky’s chaotic choreography).  
The polyphonic dissonance in The Rite is neither an 
incidental nor an arbitrary variance; the countercurrent of 
varying scales and opposing melodies forms a ‘language’ that 
effectively comprises its own counterpoint or refutation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
25 She refers here to a specific form of rhythmic music which “takes possession of the soul” and in which the 
“god” is present, quite apart from music of a “facile eloquence”, a notable if difficult distinction.   
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Tymoczko argues that the multilogic of scales in The Rite both 
reveal its composer as “a methodological pluralist, a bricoleur” 
(69) and that the key axis of the piece is its “polyscalarity”, 
“a kind of local heterogeneity, a willful combination of 
disparate and clashing musical elements…the feature that 
prompted the Italian composer Alfred Casella (1924) to compare 
Stravinsky’s musical style to the “cubist” technique of Picasso 
and Braque” (84)26.  
Again, like The Waves, Stravinsky’s overlaying of 
intersecting scales refract and disperse narrative uniformity, 
instead constituting, in a sense, another Bakhtinian “cross-
section”. I interpret this as a sibling of the chaotic 
‘language’ of Woolf’s inhuman god of music, a language defined 
not by its clarity but by its opacity, its polytonality. In The 
Rite, this language presents what Tymoczko describes as “a 
fundamental challenge to the traditional assumption that a 
single scale or key area…should govern music at any one time…the 
very notion of polytonality involves logical incoherence.”   
Woolf’s Modernist contemporaries (and their nineteenth 
century predecessors), both literary and non-literary, made 
similar ruminations about and experiments with simultaneity, 
                                                             
26 One is reminded of the collages and three-dimensional ‘assemblages’ with which the two painters 
experimented in 1912-1914, even while Stravinsky was composing The Rite.  
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musicality and an ‘inhuman’ language.27 TS Eliot’s The Wasteland 
(1922) famously assimilated unallocated voices, affecting both a 
chronological and logical refraction that assailed the authority 
of its narrator to disclose the ‘truth’. Wayne Chapman notes the 
Joycean influence and methods in Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, 
especially Joyce’s temporal and synesthetic manipulations in 
Ulysses (Chapman 214), which Sara Danius explains as a 
intermedial way of escaping (perhaps transcending) the 
restrictions of a singular media or form, by “incorporating 
within itself cinematic modalities of the visible and 
phonographic modalities of the audible…[thereby] brining various 
artforms into contiguity with each other” (185).  
Similarly, Richard Wagner’s desire for a true 
Gesamtkunstwerk, a total work of art, raised the possibility of 
escape or at least partial reprieve from the limited vernacular 
and semiotic corridors of any one form. The considerable albeit 
politically contentious legacy of Wagner’s early work extended 
well into the Modernist era (including, of course, its eventual 
Fascist appropriations); the familiar Modernist allergy to the 
established conventions of and separations between mediums owed 
                                                             
27 It should be noted, so that we do not mistake these concerns about language and truth as narrow or recent 
obsessions, that multiperspectivity is by no means a Modernist invention (though it was perhaps cultivated 
by the Modernists). Epistolary novels had established a version of the device more than a century earlier. 
Neither are narrative alternatives to monological narrative structure a strictly Western (or literary) reform; 
traditional Sufi and classical India musical forms like qawwali and thumri, as early as the 13th and 15th 
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a debt to Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk compositions and the theatres 
constructed to stage them. Modris Eksteins has skilfully 
explored in his book Rites of Spring how Wagner’s total art work 
drew the arts into a closer, dialogical discourse. The tug 
against the vernacular hegemony within each individual medium 
both closed the distance between the arts and destabilized their 
epistemological foundations. Eksteins explains: 
The search for the Gesamtkunstwerk—for the holy grail 
that is the "total art form"—was actually a universal 
one by the end of the nineteenth century. The arts, in 
part because of the enormous influence of Wagner, had 
moved steadily toward each other. [Claude] Debussy [for 
example]…would take a symbolist poem by Mallarme and 
use it as a basis for a tone painting not dissimilar in 
effect from impressionism in pictorial art. (25) 
Although The Waves is a mimesis of musical forms and not 
truly (that is, literally) synesthetic, its structure and 
leitmotif are a play on intermediality which recalls Wagner’s 
die Versmelodie, the amalgamation of the written/ spoken 
language with the musical—as Wagner puts it in Oper und Drama 
“[of] absence and presence…the thought with the sensation” (“der 
Gedanke mit der Empfindung”) (288). This intermediary 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
centuries respectively, often expressed the female voice through a male singer. Far earlier still, the Five 
Classics of the Confucian canon channeled a polyphony of voices within its singular edificatory construct.       
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‘language’, somehow mediating between word and feeling28 is an 
intriguing response to Lily Briscoe’s question in Lighthouse, 
i.e. the inability to express the “emotions of the body.” What 
Versmelodie contemplates is the intertwining of the intellectual 
with the intuitive, the language of concepts and description 
with the (non)language of the “howl”. Though they bear no great 
similarity, this is also in principle (and perhaps motivation) 
the shifting, spontaneous language which Joyce aspires to in 
Ulysses, as Danius put it, “to transcend the domain of 
literature, even the domain of art as such, attempting to 
capture the experience of everyday life in its lived immediacy” 
(187). Without the façade of deliberation and ornamentation—of 
“phrases”— a language which embeds sensation within itself has 
the potential to be stubbornly and profoundly evasive. Like 
Woolf’s wild god of music, the purpose of this ‘language’ is—to 
a significant extent—to subvert itself.  
What runs through all these Modernist experiments with 
immediate speech, a language that assails language, is that each 
seems to acknowledge and reach for the ‘pure’ event, for insight 
driven by and limited to the unembellished phenomenological 
experience. In this aspiration, their similarity to Levinas’ 
                                                             
28 See in particular Wagner’s use of spoken verse and recurring musical leitmotifs in Tristan und Isolde and 
Die Walküre from the Ring operas, a technique seemingly replicated by Woolf in The Waves which opens the 
text to synchronous, ‘cross-sectional’ reading. 
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insistence on a “metaphysics [which] precedes ontology” is 
considerable—each acknowledges the opposing currents of “phrase” 
and “howl” (ou-boum) and steers towards the latter as a more 
reliable bearer of truth.29 At the heart of this concern is that 
each affirms the veracity of Bernard’s suspicion, the 
insufficiency of language to contain lived experience. And since 
(as Hegelian dialectics teaches us), experience begins with what 
is other, the insinuation therefore is that language is a flawed 
instrument to describe otherness, without similar 
essentialization. The “howl”, the instinctual language of non-
authority therefore works towards driving us toward the other, 
by obscuring and subverting its own edifications. It is this 
language of obliqueness that art proffers as a redemptive 
possibility. And, far from being an esoteric invention of 
Modernism, this language is rooted in a theory of perception 
developed in disparate bodies of literature. Far afield from 
European Modernism it has been dexterously explored, as one 
example, in postcolonial writing and post-Oriental critical 
discourse regarding the other.  
                                                             
29 Levinas’ complicated relationship with metaphysics and language is explored extensively by Jacques 
Derrida in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics” (1967), in which he writes “this unthinkable truth of living 
experience, to which Levinas returns ceaselessly, cannot possibly be encompassed by philosophical speech 
without immediately revealing, by philosophy’s own light, that philosophy’s surface is severely cracked, and 
that what was taken for its solidity is its rigidity” (112). Derrida’s main critique of Levinas, that  radical 
alterity cannot be expressed in language and therefore cannot help but be squandered by its own description, 
is answered by Levinas in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974), a deeply nuanced discussion I will 
not go into here. 
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As the opening salvo of her 1982 documentary Reassemblage, 
narrating over shifting images from rural Senegal, author and 
filmmaker Trinh T. Minh-ha declares: “I do not intend to speak 
about…just speak nearby.” This cryptic thesis resonates 
throughout the film, which is as much an extended meditation on 
positionality as about the Senegalese, perhaps more so. Trinh’s 
methodology is to intentionally and self-reflexively undermine 
and invert the documentary format, blurring the lines between 
documentary filmmaker of the developing world—as the anonymous 
voice of traditionally Orientalist authority—and the abject 
other, the object of study and scrutiny. “A film about what?” 
she asks more than once, voicing the inevitable question in the 
audience’s mind as fleeting and thematically disconnected scenes 
depicting tribes and villages seem to fold into each other, some 
recycled, others out of focus. The cadence of Reassemblage is 
abstention instead of revelation, exhalation instead of speech. 
Its decontextualized narration and inexact phrases are sharply 
detached from the images on screen, its long silences starve the 
viewer of ontological nourishment, a rebellion against what 
Trinh calls “the eternal commentary that escorts images.”  
The Senegalese are not explicated or brought closer. No words 
are spoken that reach out for the other or shorten the distance 
between us and them. The film’s subversion of the traditional 
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documentary format lies in not understanding; Trinh’s antagonist 
is not the state of unknowing (as for documentarians 
traditionally), but rather ethnology, which strives to ‘know’. 
“Ethnologists handle a camera the way they handle words,” she 
remarks, “…every single detail is to be recorded…the man on the 
screen smiles at us while the necklace he wears, the designs of 
the cloth he puts on, the stool he sits on are objectively 
commented upon.”  
The absence of this ‘ethnological’ voice in Reassemblage 
calls attention to the gaze of the filmmaker while 
simultaneously obscuring it. What remains in its place is a way 
of seeing that is defined by its inexactitude, its obliqueness. 
"[R]eality is delicate,” Trinh observes, before passingly 
offering the viewer one of the film’s most important insights, 
to “dull the habit of imposing a meaning on every single sign." 
Without the aid of descriptive language and precise signifiers, 
the signified—the other—of Trinh’s film remains similarly 
ephemeral; what phrases the narration offers seem to push us 
away, disconnecting the other from us and from language. Under 
this oblique gaze, otherness remains veiled, warily keeping its 
distance.  
As compelling as this invention is for filmmaking, it is 
nonetheless contingent on its medium, the distance that is, 
between sight and language. It leaves unresolved the possibility 
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of a parallel written language, a textual equivalent to this 
imprecision and silence. Trinh highlights this problem in her 
book Woman, Native, Other (1989), echoing Reassemblage’s 
concerns about speech and totalization. “The real,” she writes 
declaratively, “remains foreclosed from analytic experience, 
which is an experience of speech” (76). That this is another 
incarnation/ articulation of Woolf’s frustration with the 
“‘like’ and ‘like’ and ‘like’” of signification—of phrases—is 
straightforwardly apparent. But Trinh’s rejoinder to this 
problem is a useful one for the purposes of trying to find an 
‘ethical’ discourse that does justice to the other. She points 
us in its direction when she describes an “art for art’s sake”, 
a resistance to the “bourgeois ‘functional’ attitude of mind”, 
an art that admits and probes its own “gratuitousness” (15).  
The potential of a radical politics of authorship arises when 
the boundary between the writer and the written is destabilized, 
distorting the ontologizing gaze of ‘author’ upon the other. 
Such writing would seek to erode its own ossifying, hegemonic 
power, while having as its only rule that the rule itself must 
be created and uncreated spontaneously. Like filmmaking, writing 
inherently emerges from an authoritarian posture, which to be 
thwarted must be consciously and persistently undermined by the 
writer. “As holder of speech, Trinh explains, “[the writer] 
usually writes from a position of power, creating as an 
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“author,” situating herself above her work and existing before 
it, rarely simultaneous with it” (7). A radical discourse that 
preserves the metaphysical relationship with the other must 
therefore, at its most fundamental level, subvert its absolute 
authority to describe and categorize the other. For the alterity 
of the other to survive the ontological violence of description 
(of which Levinas warns), it must maintain a posture of self-
reflexivity, speaking in a vernacular that is in a constant 
state of contention.  
 
How might we understand the contours of such a language? 
Moreover, how might one even inquire after such a language—talk 
about it—through language, if its whole purpose is to counter 
the pretentions of language? The work of Maurice Blanchot, a 
contemporary (and close friend) of Levinas, drives toward an 
answer. Blanchot’s literary criticism employs Levinas’ il y a to 
develop an aesthetics of an ethical/artistic language. While the 
conversation between Levinas and Blanchot occurs—figuratively 
speaking—within the il y a (on the basic coordinates of which 
they agreed), the two theorists diverge significantly when it 
comes to the possibilities opened up by this space. In his paper 
“Back to the Other Levinas”, building on Alain P. Toumayan’s 
meticulous detailing of the personal and philosophical 
interaction between Levinas and Blanchot, Michael Fagenblat 
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observes that while for Levinas, the il y a represents the 
“undetermined menace” (Existence 60) of chaos, indistinctness 
and impersonality, this same il y a bears for Blanchot the 
potential to become “the very space of literature, the occasion 
when writing betrays its marriage to meaning in search of a life 
of its own” (301). Where Levinas perceives the il y a as an 
omnipresent threat to the stable world30 to be kept at bay by a 
vigilant, transcendental ethics, Blanchot’s response to his 
friend is the inverse, to drive toward and even abide in the il 
y a as the location of pure insight.  
Central to Blanchot’s thought is the distinction he draws 
between crude or immediate (i.e. everyday) language and 
essential language, the latter a term he borrows from the French 
poet Stéphane Mallarmé. Blanchot’s premise is that although all 
language is the sound of the substitution (and destruction) of 
the signified for a remainder (i.e. a concept), crude, everyday 
speech is limited to being a functional vehicle for these 
concepts, while essential language, the language of literature, 
has the capacity to contain multitudinous meanings for each 
word. Blanchot’s literary speech tries to avoid the pitfalls of 
language by introducing distance and variability between 
signifier and signified, the event from the “like” and “like” 
                                                             
30 The threat of which, as a coming apart of form into non-form or a falling away of the order represented by 
Creation, is the source of its omnipresent urgency. 
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and “like” or the music from the instrument. Blanchot refines 
this point in The Space of Literature:  
In crude or immediate speech, language as language is 
silent. But beings speak in it. And, as a consequence 
of the use which is its purpose—because, that is, it 
serves primarily to put us in connection with objects, 
because it is a tool in a world of tools where what 
speaks is utility and value—beings speak in it as 
values. They take on the stable appearance of objects 
existing one by one and assume the certainty of the 
immutable. The crude word is neither crude nor 
immediate. But it gives the illusion of being so. It is 
extremely reflective; it is laden with history…the 
immediacy which common language communicates to us is 
only veiled distance, the absolutely foreign passing 
for the habitual, the unfamiliar which we take for the 
customary, thanks to the veil which is language and 
because we have grown accustomed to words’ illusion. 
(40)31 
The illusion of words Blanchot cites here is of course the same 
sleight of hand that accompanies the totalization of the real, 
                                                             
31 It must be noted that Blanchot’s use of the terms crude and immediate are not analogous to the “little 
language”/ “words of one syllable” that Bernard covets in The Waves. Confusingly, in fact, the everyday speech 
Blanchot invokes here is in many ways the opposite—more comparable to the language of ornate phrases 
debased by metaphor and signification. The speech, in other words, that points directly at what it means.  
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the thing with the “semblance of the thing.” The utility of 
language in its everyday use—nomenclatural, ontological and 
descriptive—bestows upon it a false but convincing transparency, 
the ability to, in a manner of speaking, conceal the evidence of 
its own crime: the substitution of object for concept, other for 
selfsame, totality for infinity. Blanchot’s difficult and rather 
saw-toothed separation of common and essential/literary language 
rests on this basic deception, entrammelling the former and 
contested by the latter, but a persistent hazard for both. 
“Language has within itself the moment that hides it…” Blanchot 
claims, an insidious power “by which mediation (that which 
destroys immediacy) seems to have the spontaneity, the 
freshness, and the innocence of the origin.” 
Beyond its tendency to make the act of signification at once 
acute and yet invisible, the efficacy of this mediating language 
is limited by its own representational power. As reductive to a 
single signified, it can neither be ethical in Levinas’ terms 
nor enflesh/represent the ineffable or unrepresentable. The 
premise here is that the abyssal territory of the il y a, of 
radical alterity/ absolute otherness, can only be grazed by 
language, brushed as if by a glancing blow, in the very moment 
of its disappearance. Blanchot’s essential language sets for 
itself this specific purpose. In his reading of Blanchot, 
Fagenblat emphasizes the loss of (ontological/ epistemological) 
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control that both instigates and sustains an aesthetics of 
essential language. Where crude language “appropriates and thus 
annihilates existing things for the sake of its general economy 
of meaning” Fagenblat writes, “literature begins only when the 
ordinary, representational power of language fails and another 
language is presented in its place, the other language of the il 
y a” (301). 
Like Levinas, Blanchot uses night and darkness to evoke the 
site of the other language. And like the loss of visual fidelity 
which marks the transition from the ordered world of objects 
into the instinct chaos of the il y a, this ‘nocturnal’ speech 
germinates from a feeling of volatility, an eroding of faith in 
language to keep the world from breaking up and dissipating. 
Essential language is what remains after all other speech has 
been boiled away (recall Reassemblage), because the world it 
engages exists beyond the reach of light. This language behaves 
for Blanchot as image rather than word, in that in borrows from 
images their disassociation with the object world behind them. 
Like Lily Briscoe’s lighthouse, the signified in Blanchot’s 
essential language regains a measure of its freedom from the 
dictatorial authority of rote signification.  
Blanchot’s idea is not unlike Stravinsky’s: emancipation by 
broadening and diffusing, so that the meaning of words and the 
concepts they represent become unstable, creatures of night. 
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But, where Levinas’ night is looming and cavernous, Blanchot 
imagines night as divided in a similar way to his duelling 
languages: a night of sleep and a night of dreams32. He refers to 
dreaming as “the other night”, the phantasmal (metaphysical) 
counterpart to (material) sleep whose appearance marks the 
moment when the secrets and disappearances of the night, its 
absences, become the very fabric of its opposite number, of the 
“other night”. Blanchot explains, “when everything has 
disappeared in the night, ‘everything has disappeared’ [itself] 
appears. This is the other night. Night is this apparition… 
[and] apparitions, phantoms, and dreams are an allusion to this 
empty night” (163).33 This nocturnal world clearly borders the il 
y a, in that “the other night” is not simply the absence of the 
material but the domain of absence itself disclosing itself, 
where the “invisible is what one cannot cease to see…the 
incessant making itself seen.” In the other night, Blanchot 
seems to suggest, the unspeakable (the “rustling”) and the 
unseeable (the dark) both suddenly become perceptible and 
imminent. 
                                                             
32 In the introduction to his book on sleep and dreaming in literature, Herschel Farbman explains this duality 
simply: “Every night is two nights. The division of the night in two is Blanchot’s way of expressing his sense of 
the irreducibility of the dream to the sleep on which it depends” (1). In this sense the dichotomous nature of 
Blanchot’s night recalls the Levinas’ oppositional tendencies of totality and infinity (i.e. the latter’s 
irreducibility to the former). 
33 Fagenblat similarly describes as “a space of darkness and contestation, of language existing in the twilight 
of meaning where it loses its mastery over the objects it identifies…[where] alone do words outlast their 
instrumental meaning” (301). 
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Herschel Farbman explains that this journey to the other 
night is most evident in literature’s proximity to dying [“the 
place from which writing emerges is as much a place of death as 
it is a production site” (10)]. The domain of writing, for 
Blanchot, begins at the threshold of the waking world, the “I”, 
the ontologically aware waking self that must “die” to allow for 
the act of dreaming34. Farbman writes that writing is what wakes 
when the “I” sleeps35. It is in this underworld, the proverbial 
graveyard of the self (and thus, as I will argue, of the known 
other) that Blanchot claims writing, the essential language, is 
ascendant.  
The essential language’s critical praxis is to depose its own 
authority and therefore its control over ‘the night’, but this 
displacement rests on an instinctive resistance to authoritarian 
(or documentarian) ‘looking’. Like Trinh shows us, this language 
and the gaze that informs it trades in gradations and shades 
rather than exactitude; it is a ‘sidelong’ gaze which allows it 
perceive the ethereal, the other night, ever on the verge of 
disincarnation. Blanchot too alludes to this ‘disappearing’ 
gaze, a seeing without looking at directly, with the evocative 
example of Orpheus and Eurydice at the threshold of the 
                                                             
34 From Ann Smock’s introduction to The Space of Literature, “Literature's space is like the place where 
someone dies: a nowhere, Blanchot says, which is here. No one enters it, though no one who is at all aware of 
it can leave: it is all departure, moving off, éloignement…it is its very own displacement or removal” (9).  
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Underworld: “When Orpheus descends toward Eurydice, art is the 
power by which night opens… For him Eurydice is the furthest that 
art can reach…she is the profoundly obscure point toward which 
art and desire, death and night, seem to tend. She is the 
instant when the essence of night approaches as the other night” 
(171). The moment of the Orphic turn is the flickering of 
artistic interruption, one that is by its very nature too 
transient to be seen directly. Michael Newman describes this 
space as the interstitial opening where seeing and not seeing 
(and the seen and not seen) is as yet an unresolved conflict: 
“the eye both wants to see and not to see…that which lies behind 
the visible. This duplicity is manifested in Orpheus’ double 
turn—away from and [italics mine] towards Eurydice” (157).  
It is in this moment alone, I argue, that the other and 
otherness can appear before the eye without being hidden by the 
gaze. Like Trinh’s narrator in Reassemblage, the impulse of this 
seer is not to look “at” by look “nearby”, peripherally, in the 
lag or delay between perception and vision. Before a language of 
art, there must therefore be an artistic gaze from which it 
emerges and a spontaneous, metaphysical intending. The 
emancipatory potential of art rests on perceiving this instant 
and on the extent to which the work of art can ‘midwife’ it into 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
35 “Every dreamer—everyone, literate or not, poet or not—is involved in a form of writing” (10). 
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an extemporary aesthetics, losing as little fidelity as possible 
to the Orphic space, to the other night.36       
The aptness of the Orphic turn as a metaphor for art’s 
fugacious insight extends not just to Orpheus the seer but to 
the magnetic source of his desire to see, Eurydice—the other-
paradoxically the focal point of his gaze who nonetheless must 
remain out of focus, hidden but at the very edge of sight. By 
completing the turn to look upon Eurydice directly, Orpheus 
transgresses the border over which Blanchot’s essential artistic 
language precariously tightropes, between perception and 
revelation, the radical alterity of Levinas’ other and the other 
disclosed by ontologization (causing Eurydice’s symbolic death 
and vanishing back into the Underworld). The disappearance or, 
more accurately, the imminent disappearing of radical alterity 
is a prerequisite to its own echolocation; it is the very death 
rattle of these infinities that become audible to the artist’s 
ear. The Orphic space of art exists, I argue, under this eclipse 
of presence and absence in similitude, the hypnagogic moment,37 
                                                             
36 Blanchot maintains that this achievement, in order to avoid betraying its very purpose, must be an act of 
surrendering to the spontaneous, as miraculous each time as much the first, rather than toiling toward 
likeness: “Writing never consists in perfecting the language in use, rendering it purer…This operation is so 
difficult and dangerous that every writer and every artist is surprised each time he achieves it without 
disaster” (48, 52). 
37 That is, involuntarily epiphanic, like the myoclonic muscle spasm that often occurs in the moment just 
before sleep in the transition between the conscious and unconscious mind, usually and not surprisingly 
experienced as a falling sensation. 
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for which art provides a tenuous (and temporary) asylum.38 The 
essential (or as I have called it, nocturnal) language, is for 
Blanchot both the beginning of writing as art and its highest 
vernacular, when “speaking is still the shadow of speech…an 
imaginary language and a language of the imaginary…the point at 
which here coincides with nowhere” (48). A dialect of 
literature, like an ‘ethical’ discourse of art, must therefore 
begin and end in search of the spectral—its subject is the 
vestige of the other rather than the essence, the “empty night” 
assailed by the violent intercession of sight and common 
language, leaving only shadows. The rest of this chapter 
explores the problematics of discussing otherness in literature, 
whose description becomes the site of its own disappearance. 
 
Salman Rushdie’s 1994 short story “The Courter” explores the 
relationship between language, particularly names, and identity. 
“The Courter” is the story of first generation Indian immigrants 
in London, a family of five, their ayah39 Mary or “Certainly-
Mary” (so named for her tendency to answer most questions with 
“certainly” or “certainly not”), and an Eastern European 
                                                             
38  Samuel Beckett’s comparison of Dutch painter Geer Van Velde’s paintings to literature is somewhat 
illuminating here, in its phrasing as much as its meaning: “On dirait l'insurrection des molécules, l'intérieur 
d'une pierre un millième de seconde avant qu'elle ne se désagrège” (“It is like an insurrection of molecules, [in] 
the inside of a stone a millisecond before it disintegrates”) (“La Peinture” 128). 
39 Maid, or more specifically, house servant and nursemaid. 
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building porter and night-watchman named Mecir who becomes 
Mary’s confidant. Mecir also has a nickname: “Mixed-Up”, given 
him by Rushdie’s young unnamed narrator, a stand-in for Mecir’s 
Slavic name which has the narrator derisively declines to learn 
to pronounce because it has “invisible accents on it in some 
Iron Curtain language” (179). Mecir is also the titular 
“courter”, an auspicious misnomer bestowed by Certainly-Mary 
(whom he later ‘courts’) due to her erratic substitutions of 
English consonants—in this case, “p” for “c”.40 After their 
courtship begins, Certainly-Mary is again renamed by the 
narrator and his siblings, “it’s Jumble-Aya who’s fallen for 
Mixed-Up” (181). 
Limited in their grasp of English, Mecir and Mary are both 
tested by the language barrier and freed by it. Their 
relationship is largely nonverbal; language is secondary, almost 
an afterthought. They eventually discover an unusual way to fill 
in the silences and traverse the distance between their 
cultures—a third, “private” language, after a fashion: chess. 
Mecir, a chess master in his former life, instructs Mary in the 
game’s mysteries, tactics and missteps, metaphorically guiding 
                                                             
40 The story contains several other examples of renaming and misnaming in addition to these, each a case of 
translation anxieties: the narrator’s baby sister Scheherzade becomes Scare-zade, his love interest Chandni 
becomes Moonlight (a loose translation of the name) etc. In one anecdote, the narrator’s father 
embarrassingly misidentifies the appropriate word in British English when trying to buy a nipple for the 
baby’s bottle. In short, matching names with concepts (and people), is a recurring concern. 
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her—she being a more recent migrant—through the process of 
diasporic acclimatization. Using chess both as a surrogate 
lingua franca and the language of romance, Mecir shows Mary the 
strategies and pitfalls of the immigrant experience, “drawing 
her, step by step, into the infinite possibilities of the game” 
(195).  
Importantly however, Mary’s education in chess does not 
represent a replacement or papering over of her Indian-ness or 
Mecir’s Slavic-ness any more than it brings her closer to 
Englishness. Chess is instead the site of cultural and 
linguistic difference, which reveals the antagonisms internal to 
the idea of stable identities in and of themselves. Chess the 
private language becomes the vernacular of their hybridized 
alteregos—Mixed-up and Jumble-Aya—and so represents not only a 
third language but also a way beyond the opposition of 
biculturalism, that is, of either belonging or not belonging.  
Rushdie’s “The Courter” in this sense distinctly recalls Homi 
Bhabha’s influential postcolonial discourse of cultural 
‘hybridity’. In The Location of Culture (2004), Bhabha provides 
a commentary on the work of American artist Renée Green, 
specifically the latter’s Sites of Genealogy installation in New 
York featured a connecting stairwell between two separate 
spaces, which Bhabha reads as an intervening site of collision 
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which not only intermediates between two antagonists, but also 
subverts their own internal stability: 
The stairwell as liminal space, in-between the 
designations of identity, becomes the process of 
symbolic interaction, the connective tissue that 
constructs the difference…[which] prevents identities 
at either end of it from settling into primordial 
polarities…[this] interstitial passage between fixed 
identifications opens up the possibility of a cultural 
hybridity. (5) 
Bhabha claims that this hybridity (incarnated by the figure 
of the postcolonial person whose identity exists ‘in between’ 
the colonizing and colonized cultures), though often understood 
as evidence of dominance of colonizing culture’s narrative, 
actually disrupts the colonialist project by confounding its 
authoritative expectations. The hybridity that is born in the 
“interstitial passage”41 cannot be reconstituted (and therefore 
claimed or controlled) by either extremity, and thus decenters 
the colonialist’s place as the authoritative narrator of its own 
discourse and turns the (hybrid) outsider/other’s gaze back on 
the colonizer. The opening of what Bhabha calls the “third 
                                                             
41 An echo again of Forster’s passage, as a conduit between cultures. I discuss this interpretation more 
specifically in chapter four. 
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space” is thus a result of the dialectical opposition or 
collision of the two cultures but is not constrained by this 
binary; Bhabha explains elsewhere, quite straightforwardly, that 
“[s]omething opens up as an effect of this dialectic…that will 
not be contained within it, that cannot be returned to the two 
oppositional principles” (“Translator Translated” 82).  
In my reading of Rushdie’s story, it is in this third space 
that Mecir and Mary, Mixed-up and Jumble-Aya, find access to 
emancipation from the antagonism of the self and the other, a 
way back to the ethical encounter. Though it belongs to the 
order of postcolonial theory and not psychoanalysis, Bhabha’s 
hybridity is nonetheless based on Jacques Lacan’s formulation of 
the missing third property or ‘lack’ which presents itself as 
desire, such that the components of dialectical interaction (of 
two cultures, two persons, or self with other) are actually 
always 1 plus 1 plus the surplus, the object petit a, which 
Lacan describes as “the object that cannot be swallowed, as it 
were, which remains stuck in the gullet of the signifier” (Four 
Fundamentals 270). As Slavoj Zizek adroitly clarified, this 
surplus object erodes the “deadlock of classification” between 
two positions by representing the eternal remainder, thus 
“inscrib[ing] into an order of symbolic differences its 
constitutive antagonism” (“The Sexual is Political”). Though 
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Zizek’s analogy—of the surplus in categories of sexual 
difference (literally, the + in LGBT+)—is a characteristically 
contentious one, its Lacanian roots make it a sibling to 
Bhabha’s hybridity. He writes of this remainder, the impossible 
objet petit a which prevents categorization from ever fully 
inscribing or describing symbolic difference, that “in the final 
act of subdivision, we no longer get two particular parts or 
elements, two somethings, but a something (the rest) and a 
nothing.” The remainder, in other words, is not what is left 
behind after the differentiation or interaction between 
categorizes, but represents difference itself, and in turn 
erodes the illusion of internal hegemony within sexual 
categories (or, in the case of Bhabha, colonizing cultures) 
themselves.   
Rushdie hints at this unresolved (and irresolvable) hybridity 
between two positions being the axis of his story when his 
narrator, as an adult, finally realizes of the similarity of his 
own predicament (as a member of the Indian diaspora in England) 
to Mary and Mecir’s: “I, too, have ropes around my neck…pulling 
me this way and that, East and West, the nooses tightening, 
commanding, choose, choose…I choose neither of you, and both. Do 
you hear? I refuse to choose” (211). Bhabha has interpreted the 
comma in the title of Rushdie’s story cycle (East, West) which 
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contains “The Courter” as essentially the marker of hybridity. 
The comma “both divides and joins East and West” (Reynolds 179) 
Bhabha muses, as Green’s stairwell does for separate spaces. 
Rushdie’s story is entirely contained in that comma, which makes 
possible a world of shades and in-betweens which cannot be 
subdivided, and “furnishes the little room for literature.” 
Hybridity thus quite literally represents a way to keep 
oneself from being subsumed by either culture, to avoid the 
“noose”.  The alternate identities of Mixed-up and Jumble-Aya 
are not the resolution of their native and immigrant selves 
(that is to say, 1 plus 1), they are hybrid (surplus) identities 
which both reveal and represent a way out of the antagonism of—
and within—identities. Bhabha summarizes that, “by exploring 
this hybridity, this ‘Third Space’, we may elude the politics of 
polarity and emerge as the others of our selves” (“Cultural 
Diversity” 157).  
Bhabha’s notion of hybridity has of course been extensively 
annotated and criticized, by Amar Acheraiou, Gayatri Spivak and 
others, particularly as an imbalanced theory that implicitly 
accepts the centrality of colonialism within postcolonialism.42 
While those critiques are both compelling and useful, they are 
not necessary to my purpose here. I argue that this “third 
                                                             
42 See in particular Acheraiou’s book Questioning Hybridity, Postcolonialism and Globalization (2011). 
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space”, represented in Rushdie’s story by the “private 
language”, is also a metaphor for the space made accessible by 
art, including but not limited to literature. Does not art 
itself behave as a private, impossible language of surplus, 
counting nowise for itself, an “interstitial passage” between 
the (unstable) self and the radically other?43 Dialectical 
uncertainties allow for the artwork to interrupt the 
totalization that imperils otherness. Art, as a language, 
behaves much like an interstice, of unresolved and irresolvable 
contradictions and temporal antagonisms (which, as Levinas 
shows, must always exist in the “meanwhile,…[deprived of] the 
salvation of becoming”). I claim that this language reveals the 
internal tensions within the hybrid positions of artist and 
subject, author and other, and is thus a similarly private 
language of surplus in which radical alterity is always 
indivisible remainder (the +), the objet petit a. As Bhabha has 
stated elsewhere “the importance of hybridity is not [italics 
mine] to be able to trace two original moments from which the 
third emerges…the process of cultural hybridity gives rise to 
something different, something new and unrecognizable, a new 
area of negotiation of meaning and representation” (“The Third 
Space”, 211). The indivisibility of the third space is the 
                                                             
43 When, how much, and in what form are, of course, critical questions, which I pose and attempt to answer in 
chapter four.  
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source of its invention: a language to ethically and 
meaningfully describe alterity.44  
The Partition of the Indian subcontinent being an especially 
potent backdrop for literature about hybridity, a postcolonial 
instance of this intervention can be found in Anita Desai’s 1988 
novel Baumgartner’s Bombay. Though the text resolves itself 
somewhat cryptically, Desai’s Hugo Baumgartner is a fictional 
representation of the impossibility of the stable self/other 
dialectic and evokes within himself the third space described by 
Bhabha. Desai’s novel follows Hugo’s trials as a Jewish exile 
from Nazi Germany who struggles to recover (or rather, discover) 
a sense of belonging in pre-Partition India. Like Rushdie’s 
Indian emigres in London, Baumgartner in Desai’s Calcutta and 
Bombay is a fixed outlier, certain of nothing so much as his 
dual otherness: as both Jew and firanghi45. “Accepting—but not 
accepted,” Hugo reflects on his experience in India, “that was 
the story of his life, the one thread that ran through it all. 
In Germany, he had been dark—his darkness had marked him the 
                                                             
44 There is a degree of irony in this, of course, since it is also the severance of the image from the object (and 
thus the impossibility of ‘returning to’ the real from its impression) that Levinas uses as his basis for artistic 
‘disinterest’ in “Reality and its Shadow”. Here, by participating in the innovation of a ‘third’ that is separate 
(essentially above) and apart from the ‘two’, art’s purview instead becomes to reveal the surplus (i.e. the 
difference as such), finding in the image’s very separateness (the interstitial passage) a glimpse of the 
ineffable that is hidden in the object itself.   
45 From the Hindi फिरंगी and Urdu, نر فی گ (phiraṅgī), possibly Persian in origin, referring specifically to 
foreigners of generally European or white descent.  
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Jew, der Jude. In India, he was fair –and that marked him the 
firanghi. In both lands, the unacceptable” (20). Hugo’s 
predicament is similar to the diasporic anxiety faced by 
Rushdie’s Mixed-up and Jumble-Aya, with one critical difference: 
where Mecir and Mary represent the messy comingling of two 
cultures, Hugo arguably embodies the third category or surplus, 
external to both cultures which thus destabilizes both. Desai’s 
novel asks what it means not only to be other, to not belong, 
but also what otherness is when not defined by non-belonging. 
Hugo is not merely an outsider to particular cultural 
hegemonies; he represents the impossibility of belonging in 
itself, the universal anxiety of an imminent otherness within 
the self that prevents it from ever being secure in itself.  
Desai’s choices and handling of Hugo’s Jewishness in the 
novel is both complex and purposeful. As Isabelle Hesse has 
noted in her comparative essay on portrayals of twentieth 
century Jewishness, Hugo’s exile from Germany and his subsequent 
inability to belong in India leaves him only Jewishness from 
which to draw his identity, a category with which he had not 
previously much identified. Hugo is already alienated from his 
Jewishness before the expulsion from Germany that confirms him 
as other. It is in his exile that he realizes himself the 
indivisible ‘remainder’ from which Nazi Germany tries to purify 
itself.  “Strange,” he muses while searching for the Jewish 
100 
 
quarter in Venice, “in Germany he had never wanted to search 
[Jews] out, had been aware of others thinking of him as a Jew 
but not done so himself. In ejecting him, Germany had taught him 
to regard himself as one” (62). It is, in other words, as a 
result of the impossibility of belonging within Nazi Germany’s 
absolutist self-excoriation that Hugo is later compelled to 
defend his Germanness as “a Jew, not a Nazi” (177).  
Hugo’s estrangement from the outset of the novel is thus not 
only from Germanness (and later, Indianness) but also from 
Jewishness. The choice of portraying the tensions of colonial 
India as it appears to a protagonist who himself embodies 
similar contradictions becomes the wellspring of the novel’s 
insights into identity and otherness; alienation itself is the 
point, its own ethos.46 The message of Desai’s novel is that 
being eternally “in between” is a universal condition, i.e. the 
presence of a surplus otherness within all categories of 
identification prevents anyone from ever securely belonging. 
 The ambiguity of Hugo’s Jewishness represents different 
                                                             
46 Desai acknowledges in interviews the influence of Albert Camus’ The Stranger on Baumgartner’s Bombay as 
well as on her other work, much of which also focuses on exilic characters. Her own assessment of Hugo as a 
kindred spirit for her own turbulent background and at the same time an embodiment of a basic universal 
alienation is notable: “I think I’m drawn to such characters…[the] same type of character surfaces again and 
again [in my work]. I’m interested in people who live in a kind of exile; it may not be political exile, but in 
some sense it’s exile from the rest of society. It may have something to do with my upbringing and my 
parents. My mother, having been German, lived most of her life in India and never felt able to return to 
Germany…My father was, in a sense, in exile too. He was from East Bengal, which then became East Pakistan… 
I was brought up with the same sense of being an outsider. I certainly absorbed it from them” (“You Turn 
Yourself”). 
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types of foreignness in Germany and in India, reflecting the 
distinct anxieties of each society and, as Hesse notes, “exposes 
the contradictions inherent in conceptions of whiteness…[while 
drawing] attention to the ambivalence of Jewishness as a racial 
category” (888). Desai has explained in interviews that Hugo’s 
Jewishness was simultaneously a way to universalize his 
isolation while also hinting at the antagonisms fundamental to 
constructions of identity: “I had to find a way to generalize 
his isolation and one way of doing it was to make him a 
Jew…[yet] I think of it as the human condition” (“Against the 
Current” 522). This seeming contradiction—a character whose 
identity is derived from his status as ethnic minority (as Jew) 
standing in in some way for a universality—is actually a 
compelling twist on hybridity, as well as an argument for the 
disruptive possibilities of literature. In essence, Hugo 
iterates the liminality of hybridity, the falling through the 
gap, in a way that is deeply similar to the language Mecir and 
Mary discover as a by-product of their encounter. Though 
cultural hybridity and hybridity in speech are distinct 
phenomena, each is born of a dialectic and represents a third 
not reducible to an alloy of the two. Hugo epitomizes exilic 
hybridity; he stands in for difference as such, the ‘excess’ 
element in the dialectic that is nonetheless a part of both. His 
location somewhere between the stark delineations of two 
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cultures undercuts the homogeneity of both, leaving him the dual 
other, between der Jude and firanghi, object a residing in an 
interstitial third space. 
Ideas about post-1948 Jewishness also contribute 
significantly to the ambivalence of Hugo’s viewpoint, 
simultaneously an oppressed minority in Europe and the 
Orientalist European observer from whose perspective we 
encounter British India. Hesse explores this dual nature of the 
archetype of Jewishness and its relationship to and function in 
Desai’s novel: “Post-1948 the ambiguity of the figure of the Jew 
has been extended to include ideas of both minority and 
majority, vacillating between definitions of exile and 
‘otherness’ on one hand, and Zionism and settler-colonialism, on 
the other…Jewishness functions as a means to demonstrate the 
universal nature of conditions such as exile and belonging” 
(884; 886). Hugo’s hybridity is thus not simply a result of 
negotiating between birth and adopted cultures, but points at 
identity as itself emerging out of contradictions. By narrating 
from within the perspective of both the dominant-colonialist and 
the minority-colonized, Desai is able to describe otherness as 
an alienation within as much as from the self.              
  
At this juncture, I would like to pose and begin to develop 
the questions that arise when discussing the ‘potential’ of art 
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to be disruptive, and indeed from any discussion of art in 
general, namely what, if anything, constitutes this potential? 
How and when does it enact itself? To what extent can we define 
what ‘disruption’ looks like, and what does it mean to be able 
to ‘emancipate’ alterity? Is it an act of discovery (of what is 
already there in a particular kind of artwork) or an act of 
interpretation (of what one perceives to be there)? To this 
point, I have argued for and traced out the territory which art 
creates for itself, i.e. the response it motivates in the 
listener, reader or viewer, a place in which the evocative 
supersedes the indicative and in which the ineffable remainder 
of otherness becomes barely and momentarily perceptible. I 
address these questions in a more thorough and methodical way in 
chapter four. To address how we come about the experience of art 
(and therefore take away from it some unique insight), however, 
I will conclude this chapter with an analysis of the ‘oblique’ 
looking proffered by Trinh which inverts the discussion 
regarding academic/ ontological vs artistic/nocturnal speech.  
The dialectical relationship between art and the perceiver of 
art who ‘reads’ the artwork represents, as a reading of the work 
of Franz Brentano, Max Van Manen and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (each 
building on Husserl’s “image consciousness”) shows, the two 
sides to an equation that is the key to understanding how 
meaning can be read from a text as either indicative or 
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“vocative”.47 The fragile insights ‘embedded’ in a text (such as 
its representation of otherness) rely not only on the gaze of 
the artist, but on the way the reader chooses to approach the 
text, i.e. how to ‘look’.  
The German philosopher Franz Brentano usefully describes the 
act of observing one’s own engagement with objects (and reality) 
as a reflective grasping that occurs alongside (effectively 
simultaneous with) the engagement itself, an “inner observation” 
which he calls grasping reality “en parergo, ‘by the way’” 
(Moran 8). Dermot Moran, in his reading of Brentano explains 
that this secondary act of perceiving is “built into the 
original act”, i.e. that the experiencing of an object is 
inseparable from the insights one understands the object to 
contain within itself, though it cannot be said where precisely 
in the interaction that meaning actually lies. In this way, it 
may be said that the production of meaning, the process by which 
objects (or language) come to mean (or not mean) something is 
‘contained’ in neither the object nor the subject—it is instead 
created in the very act of dialectical experience upon which one 
reflects and which, therefore, one can only apprehend en 
parergo, “by the way.” For language, including the ‘nocturnal’, 
                                                             
47 This term, used extensively by Max Van Manen in Phenomenology of Practice, is related to the descriptor 
‘nocturnal language’ I have used, with the key distinction that it introduces the question of where meaning is 
located i.e. in the object or the subject, or if we are fundamentally mistaken to attribute it to either instead of 
to the ‘experience’ itself.   
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vocative language of art I have privileged, this suggests that 
while the potential of art (to evoke otherness or aspects 
thereof without totalization) may to an extent be indicated or 
‘motivated’ by the work itself, its true meaning or effect is 
neither determined by the artist nor the audience, neither the 
utterer nor the listener, but created within the dialectical, 
ephemeral moment of experience. This immediately undercuts, to 
an extent, the contentious discussion about which works of art 
are superior to others and which possess something others do 
not; the vocative potential of art is always experientially 
realized. This renders any discussion or arbitration of the 
objective merits of particular artworks somewhat secondary (I 
develop this point and the similar regarding of symbols in later 
chapters).  
Max Van Manen goes further along this path when he writes in 
Phenomenology of Practice (2014) that phenomenological insight—
i.e. moments of acute perception, realization and disclosure—
occur in a state of near inadvertence, in a sort of openness to 
experience that is neither directed nor aimless, a looking 
without focusing, (following Hegel) an “active passivity” (345-
347). Van Manen observes that perception, like language, is at 
its most immediate incidental rather than causal; an object or 
event cannot be safely identified as producing a particular 
insight or response in a subject every time, as a work of art 
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cannot reliably be said to always ‘cause’ a particular feeling 
in a particular audience. Emotions, like insights, are 
epiphenomenal, they occur while ‘looking away’, as one falls 
into sleep when not actively trying to. Van Manen calls this 
state of passive readiness “preduction”, which must precede the 
moment of “abduction” in which the insights that lead to the 
ascertaining of meaning occurs (344-345). It is the moment and 
state of preduction, in which one is not actively interpreting 
or reflecting, when one is most open to revelation.48  
Approaching art (and in the same way, Trinh shows us, the 
other) en parergo—as epiphenomena rather than stable or 
indicative—and looking at it not directly but obliquely 
encourages us to think about the experiencing of art as a 
spontaneous bearing witness, in which it reveals itself to us 
(especially with visual and aural media) sensorially and 
unexpectedly. To remain open to art, to be actively passive, is 
thus akin to the pre-reflective openness (“metaphysics precedes 
ontology”) required for Levinas’ ethical non-dogmatic 
relationship with the other, in the very state, as Merleau-Ponty 
                                                             
48 It would not be incorrect to interpret that, following Van Manen’s reasoning, nearly any phenomena can be 
experienced in a way that resembles the feeling that we associate with experiencing art. That is, while we may 
say that the properties of a particular text, image or piece of music can tend to evoke or motivate a certain 
feeling in an individual (which may be somewhat similar to the feeling experienced by someone else when 
encountering the same work), understanding the epiphanies of art as inadvertent, as a  ‘looking away’ that 
lets in phenomenological insights, and therefore the production of meaning as a dialectical exchange or a 
bearing witness (among many other insinuations), does greatly widen out the very definition of ‘art’. This 
107 
 
argues, the being that perceives art is enfleshed, i.e. not 
separate from the body. In his essay “Eye and Mind” (1960) 
Merleau-Ponty echoes Levinas’ description of an underlying world 
‘beneath’ the world of form, a world which is imperceptible 
through scientific analysis of form but which art glimpses in 
the instant of its birthing: 
Scientific thinking, a thinking which looks on from 
above…must return to the “there is” which underlies it; 
to the site, the soil of the sensible and opened world 
such as it is in our life and for our body—not that 
possible body which we may legitimately think of as an 
information machine but that actual body I call mine, 
this sentinel standing quietly at the command of my 
words and acts…But art, especially painting, draws upon 
this fabric of brute meaning…Art and only art does so 
in full innocence. (160-161)        
Though Merleau-Ponty specifically treats painting here, he 
makes a related point about literary speech in Phenomenology of 
Perception (1945) which speaks to the reinvention of the meaning 
of words that occurs depending on where and how they are 
deployed. Speech is ever gestural, and its meaning is initially 
determined on its face, i.e. perceptually instead of in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
approach substantially informs my analysis of how the radical alterity of the other endures the moment of 
“abduction”, as is discussed further in later chapters in conjunction with other texts.    
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comparison to a sustained meaning, since the meaning of speech 
is materially inseparable from its utterance and perception. 
Merleau-Ponty’s sense of literature is thus one of consistent, 
even constant invention in the meaning of words:    
In the case of prose or poetry…we have the illusion of 
already possessing within ourselves, in the shape of 
the common property meaning of words, what is required 
for the understanding of any text whatsoever…But in 
fact, it is less the case that the sense of a literary 
work is provided by the common property meaning of 
words, than that it contributes to changing that 
accepted meaning. There is thus, either in the man who 
listens or reads, or in the one who speaks or writes, a 
thought in speech the existence of which is unsuspected 
by intellectualism. (208-209) 
Literature, though it may exist somewhat further away on the 
spectrum from the phenomenal and from sensory experience49, is 
nonetheless not simply an effective or ineffective deployment of 
language whose meaning is preset, but (echoing Blanchot’s 
separation of “crude” and “literary” speech) it perpetually 
reinvents the meaning of language, since its project in its most 
basic form is to invent relationships between words and thereby 
                                                             
49 As from the “howl” that began this chapter.  
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test the coordinates of their meaning, change their shape, even 
shed them entirely. From all of this we may extrapolate that 
art’s quarry more broadly is towards this “brute meaning” that 
lies underneath the narrow corridors of ontological and 
analytical categories. The gesture of art is to catch the world 
unawares, to ambush it in a sense as it is being formed and 
taking on form. And since this achievement relies on a 
dialectical exchange between the work of art and the body which 
perceives it, it is this very gesture that allows art to 
similarly ensnare the fragile alterity of the other. 
  
In the final chapter of his 2016 novel Zero K, Don DeLillo 
movingly describes a phenomenon familiar to many New Yorkers, a 
happenstance called Manhattanhenge. Sometimes called the 
Manhattan solstice, Manhattanhenge is an occurrence during 
which, twice a year, either the rising or setting sun align 
perfectly with the buildings and gridlines of downtown Manhattan 
and in a manner vaguely reminiscent of Stonehenge. In a May 2016 
interview about the novel with The Guardian, DeLillo relates the 
precise moment when the sun, the skyscrapers and the street 
lines synchronize as a sudden, ephemeral revelation, “a 
wonderful moment. This enormous glow, like nothing you’ve seen, 
a concentration of light in that narrow street…And you know, 
like most things, there and gone in a flash” (Brooks). These 
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moments, because they appear and disappear without warning, 
catch us unguarded, when we are most open to epiphany. They 
behave as a sudden flashing, of realization or unforeseen 
Revelation, like Gabriel appearing before Muhammad in the 
darkness of the cave of Hira. The (impossible) aspiration of art 
is to arrest this awe before it vanishes—the fragility of the 
moment before light changes.  
As he watches the spellbinding sun falling on Manhattan, 
DeLillo’s narrator in Zero K observes a young boy in a state of 
rapture, awestruck by the event. Though he wonders if it is as a 
result of the boy being somehow “macrocephalic, [or] mentally 
deficient”, the narrator is transfixed by the boy’s wordless, 
ecstatic cry, a sound expressing the “purest [form of] 
astonishment” (274). As if paying his respects to Bernard’s 
crisis of faith as a writer in The Waves, DeLillo concludes his 
novel with his narrator reaching the very same realization about 
the artifices of language when compared to this cry: “[the 
boy’s] howls of awe were far more suitable than words…I didn’t 
need heaven’s light. I had the boy’s cries of wonder.”  
The howl, this cry, as I have argued, is the purest of 
noises, the companion to phenomenological insight and the gift 
of unexpected revelation. It is also in this same state that we 
can rediscover otherness as a metaphysical (and thus ethical) 
relation. In the next chapter, I explore the figure of the other 
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from a comparative standpoint, in terms of the epistemic 
boundary or frontier between the self and the other as well as 
its representation in the contemporary novel form, including how 
violent collisions with otherness challenge what we know about 
ourselves. 
----- 
 
“He who strikes his khudi [ego self] with La ilah 
Produces a seeing eye from dead earth” (185) 
- Muhammad Iqbal, Armaghan-i-Hijaz  
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Each in His Prison  
 
Kamel Daoud’s 2013 debut novel The Meursault Investigation is 
a contemporary reinvention of Albert Camus’ seminal L’Étranger 
(The Stranger) (1942). Daoud’s book though is a mirror image, 
inverted, written from the point of view of the brother of The 
Stranger’s nameless murdered Algerian “Arab”. Meursault attempts 
to recover and mourn the victim—who functions mostly as sort of 
a prop in the existential, late colonial drama of Camus’ novel— 
by belatedly giving him not only a name but an identity, a past. 
This simple act of naming begins to humanize the Arab, lifting 
him out of his provincial otherness, his obscurity. It also, of 
course, re-centers the act and power of authorship, in the quite 
literal sense of conferring narrative (and canonical) 
‘authority’ upon the postcolonial subject—a counter-discourse or 
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“writing back” to the colonialist canon50.  
Yet although Daoud sets out to write ‘back’ to Camus, 
ostensibly to refute The Stranger, his narrator Harun Uld el-
Assas finds himself instead repeatedly walking along the same 
the same path as his counterpart Meursault, if in the opposite 
direction. Harun explains his intent explicitly to the unnamed 
graduate student who is his interviewer: to rescue the voice of 
his murdered brother Musa and to reverse the current of Camus’ 
story, perhaps arriving eventually at convergence: “It’s simple: 
The story we’re talking about should be rewritten, in the same 
language, but from right to left. That is, starting when the 
Arab’s body was still alive, going down the narrow streets that 
led to his demise, giving him a name, right up until the bullet 
him” (7). ‘Direction’ takes on two meanings here: the 
figurative, i.e. the perspective from which the story is 
narrated and the literal, the right to left direction of Arabic 
                                                             
50 In the introduction to his book on this subject, Postcolonial Con-Texts: Writing Back to the Canon, John 
Thieme points out that the effect of postcolonial reimaginings of the canon (‘con-texts’) is not to entrench or 
re-entrench an oppositional binary (i.e. to ‘correct the record’), but rather, recalling Lacan and Bhabha, to 
reveal hidden instabilities within the canon and therefore also in comparative readings of it. Writes Thieme, 
“[it became] increasingly apparent that the canon to which [postcolonial authors] were writing back was far 
from unitary and that the texts to which they were responding were unstable objects that were, in effect, 
being constructed anew by each postcolonial writer’s gaze in a kind of parodic reversal of the process by 
which postcolonial subjects had been constructed as ‘other’ during the heyday of imperialism…Whether or 
not they set out to be combative, the postcolonial con-texts invariably seemed to induce a reconsideration of 
the supposedly hegemonic status of their canonical departure points, opening up fissures in their supposedly 
solid foundations that undermined the simplism involved in seeing the relationship between ‘source’ and 
con-text in terms of an oppositional model of influence” (2). The conversation between canon and “con-text”, 
Thieme suggests, delves into an interstice whose coordinates are defined by a crosspollination of 
contradictions, what he describes as a “discursive dialectic operating along a continuum.”  
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script, a vectorial ‘opposition’ to Latin/ English or, as Daoud 
writes, “a story that begins at the end and goes back to the 
beginning. Yes, like a school of salmon swimming upstream” (2)51. 
Both senses of the term share a counterpoise relationship to 
Camus’ original; Daoud’s project is not merely to rebut but to 
enflesh a subjectivity missing in The Stranger, one that fills 
in its predecessor’s silences and shapes the interaction between 
the texts in a dialectical rather than autocratic form. The two 
texts take up positions in a pitched battle, a collision of 
subjectivities.  
The novel begins with a rebuke of Camus’ nonchalant “Maman 
died today” (3): “Mama’s still alive today” Harun declares (1). 
Daoud’s novel follows this path throughout its entirety, 
opposing Camus while also echoing him. Harun seems, in spite of 
himself, to discover more and more aspects of Meursault within 
himself, each one turned around on its axis. Where Meursault’s 
mother is a distant apparition who, as critics like Jean Gassin 
and Patrick McCarthy have observed, is evoked by natural symbols 
(as I discuss shortly), Harun’s relationship with his mother is 
its opposite. He is oppressed by his mother’s overbearance, her 
“sensual closeness” (16), and the survivor’s guilt that 
fractures their relationship after his brother’s death (“She 
                                                             
51 This phrase too can be taken in two different ways, i.e. not just the story of Meursault and the Arab told 
backwards but also the story of French colonization told from an Algerian perspective.  
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seemed to resent me for a death I basically refused to undergo, 
and so she punished me”) (36).  
Daoud’s novel is not actually written from right to left, as 
it would be in Arabic. It was originally published in his native 
Algeria in French, under the more illuminating title Meursault, 
contre-enquête (Meursault, counter-investigation). Though 
opposed and opposing, the two novels thus also share a 
repository of meaning, nuance and signification embedded in 
their common vernacular, and so their oppositional postures 
nonetheless bear a colonial imprint. Daoud acknowledges the 
imperialism of language from the outset, noting the dull echo of 
Camus’ voice in his own prose (3), but he does so by imagining 
the project of the postcolonial novel in European languages more 
broadly as a repurposing of language, in much the same way as 
postcolonial societies must assimilate the ruined artifacts of 
colonialist art and architecture within their own continuing 
history. Harun self-consciously presents his story as a symbolic 
syncretisation that parallels that of his native Algeria after 
French colonization: “I’m going to do what was done in this 
country after Independence: I’m going to take the stones from 
the old houses the colonists left behind, remove them one by 
one, and build my own house, my own language.” As he explains to 
the interviewer, language is the last piece of evidence on the 
crime scene of his brother’s murder, and so also the means by 
116 
 
which he can draw himself toward Meursault.  
As in Bhabha’s hybridity, by appropriating the colonizer’s 
language, Harun leaves Meursault nowhere to hide, drawing him 
ever closer to a metatextual confrontation: “You look surprised 
by my language” Harun later tells the interviewer, “I devoured 
thousands of books! It seemed to me I was approaching the places 
where the murderer had lived, I was holding him by the jacket 
while he was embarking for nothingness, I was forcing him to 
turn around, look at me, recognize me, speak to me, respond to 
me, take me seriously” (89-90). Even the structure of Daoud’s 
novel—a confession to a stranger in a bar in Oran (as reviewers 
like The Guardian’s Nick Fraser have noted) is a refrain of a 
later Camus work, La Chute (The Fall) (1956), in which Camus’ 
narrator relates his story to an unnamed second-person audience 
in a series of monologues in a bar in Amsterdam. 
Though they are narratively and ritually counterpoised, Daoud 
seems to seek with Camus’ a synergy, an eclipse, where the 
common meaning of things becomes plain—or alternatively, where 
Camus, like Meursault, can be called to account for his 
colonialist indifference. This imbricative synthesis between the 
two texts penetrates to the imagistic and symbolic levels, and 
open the novels to a provocatively Hegelian reading, i.e. a 
higher resolution of two opposing truths. And, as I will argue, 
it constitutes another version of Levinas’ encounter, colonial 
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and postcolonial subjectivities that undertake ‘doing justice’ 
on a more spontaneous level.  
In addition to Harun’s assertive use of colonialist language, 
Meursault deliberately revisits and repurposes several of The 
Stranger’s events, themes, symbols and metaphors. Like 
Meursault, Harun is deeply alienated from God, but experiences 
his alienation as abandonment. Both characters respond to God as 
the father from whom each has been estranged. “Friday?” Harun 
scornfully remarks, “It’s not a day when God rested, it’s a day 
when he decided to run away and never come back” (69), echoing 
the magistrate who tells a skeptical Meursault “all men believe 
in God, even those who turn their backs on Him” (69). For Harun, 
the indifference is at least mutual, again reminding us that 
there are two halves to a whole, even when one is in absentia. 
“When the sun’s not there to blind you,” Harun explains to the 
interviewer, “what you’re looking at is God’s back” (39).  
Daoud’s appropriation of the Algerian sun as a symbol of 
Meursault’s existential panic, in the first, functions as an 
explicit refutation of Oriental myths of the mysterious, secret-
laden darkness of the former colonies. Harun, like his brother, 
is not the other that is the bearer of secrets or greater truths 
who Meursault must kill to silence—he suffers under the same 
oppressive sun as his counterpart. Daoud describes the movement 
of the sun on Friday, the primary day of communal prayer, as 
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indicative of the same divine indifference, the effect of which 
is to reclaim the subjectivity of the colonized, to undermine 
the Orientalist belief that spiritual crisis is the sole purview 
(and marker) of the enlightened colonizer: “It’s the Friday 
prayer hour I detest the most…there’s the sun, which runs its 
course uselessly on that eternal day, and the almost physical 
sensation of the idleness of the whole cosmos…As for death, I 
got close to it years ago, and it never brought me closer to 
God…there’s nothing on the other side but an empty beach in the 
sun” (68-70). As with Meursault’s overall counterposition with 
The Stranger) and its mimetic structure (with La Chute), the 
borrowing of Camus’ symbolic currency allows Daoud’s text to 
enter the discursive space opened by Camus while challenging, 
again, the latter’s canonical privilege. 
The provincial sun plays various potential roles in Camus’ 
text; it alternatively excites Meursault to his existential 
crisis (McCarthy 49-52), stands in for his absent father or 
chastises him for his indifference to his mother’s death (Gassin 
226). It has also been interpreted as Camus indirectly 
addressing the race question, perhaps depoliticizing it. The sun 
and sea periodically incite Meursault to fits of Pied-Noir 
(French Algerian) anxiety without directly referring to it, 
since, as McCarthy argues, to invoke it directly would itself be 
a transgression. “The conflict between colonizer and colonized 
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cannot be treated directly,” McCarthy observes, “if the 
legitimacy of the colonizer is not to be undermined” (49).  
Camus’ numerous references to the sun are persistently 
ambiguous; it watches over nearly all of Meursault’s movements, 
but it does so as both witness and chastiser, representing the 
absent parent. The first reference to the sun in The Stranger, 
as Meursault stands by his mother’s coffin, is affirmational: 
“The room was filled with beautiful late-afternoon sunlight” 
(7). But as he rises the next day, the sun quickly ascends to 
its appointed position as superego overseer: “When I went 
outside, the sun was up… [it] was now a little higher in the 
sky: it was starting to warm my feet” (12). Soon after, 
Meursault describes a growing feeling of discomfort and 
exposure: “The sun was beginning to bear down on the earth and 
it was getting hotter by the minute…I was surprised at how fast 
the sun was climbing in the sky” (15-16).  
Meursault’s relationship with Marie, his romantic partner, is 
repeatedly reproached by the sun acting as a powerful 
representation of maternal superego (with Marie as id): “the 
day, already bright with the sun, hit me like a slap in the 
face. Marie was jumping with joy and kept on saying what a 
beautiful day it was” (47). Marie is positioned as a potential 
replacement for Meursault’s mother (McCarthy 50), and his 
coolness to Marie’s suggestion of marriage followed by his 
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nihilistic murder of the Arab suggest a dual alienation from 
both women. The sun is thus also a sign of Meursault’s emotional 
estrangement; as McCarty has noted “[i]f the sun be accepted as 
an image of the mother, then Meursault is fleeing both the 
indifferent mother and the tender Marie. He is still unable to 
free himself from the former by caring for the latter” (53).    
Like these other important scenes, the moment Meursault 
shoots the anonymous Arab (Harun’s brother Musa in Daoud’s 
novel) on the beach is accompanied by overwhelming flashes of 
sunlight and heat, exciting in him a sort of violence that seems 
less like bloodlust and more a kind of lapse or vertigo 
(“[t]hat’s when everything began to reel”) (59), a losing of his 
grip on himself. Just before the murder, Meursault feels a sort 
of overfilling or exceeding of himself, again accompanied by 
maternal alienation. Stuart Gilbert’s original 1946 translation 
(the British edition originally titled The Outsider) is more 
instructive on this point:  
The heat was beginning to scorch my cheeks; beads of 
sweat were gathering in my eyebrows. It was just the 
same sort of heat as at my mother's funeral, and I had 
the same disagreeable sensations — especially in my 
forehead, where all the veins seemed to be bursting 
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through the skin. I couldn't stand it any longer…(75)52 
In the Algerian afternoon, Meursault’s subjectivity seems to 
be not melting exactly but rather becoming untethered, spilling 
out of his own person. Washed out by the sun, his ironic 
posture—represented especially during his trial as a detached 
self-restraint—disappears into an act of emotionally enflamed 
violence against the colonial subject. Instead of a personal 
death caused by imperialist indifference, Camus writes the 
murder as a moment of fiery Judgement or Phlegethontic53 
condemnation (In Ward’s translation, “The sea carried up a 
thick, fiery breath. It seemed to me as if the sky split open 
from one end to the other to rain down fire”) (59).  
And yet, as the sun makes Meursault a stranger to himself, it 
transforms “the stranger” from “Arab” (i.e. the faceless 
colonial subject, who is transparent under the imperial gaze) to 
the other who is unknown and unknowable, the wrathful bearer of 
terrible truths. Meursault describes a shaft of sunlight that 
reflects off the Arab’s knife that seems to join him to 
Meursault even as it threatens him, a physical sign of their 
metaphysical encounter, in Gilbert’s version, a “long, thin 
blade [which] transfixed [his] forehead” (75). The result of 
                                                             
52 Later editions like Ward’s have replaced “bursting through” (Fr. battaient, ‘to beat against’) with “throbbing 
under”. The former, I feel, is far more revealing in context. 
53 The fiery river in the Greek Underworld, that is. 
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this assault is that Meursault is temporarily blinded, 
awestruck, and so commits the murder in a condition of rapture. 
But, I argue, this is a blindness that has in fact the opposite 
symbolic purpose; blotting out the physical features—and 
politics—of the colonizer and colonized, it reveals instead the 
chthonic level of the other in himself. The scene becomes not 
about the Frenchman and the Arab but the self and the other laid 
bare, strangers met on a beach. The symbolic function of the sun 
in The Stranger is to both draw out and make imminent the 
other’s alterity (in Lacanian terms, the remainder) and thereby 
reveal the strangeness of the self alienated from itself. 
Concurrent with its other imagistic functions, the sun exposes 
the frailty inherent within identity; rather than heighten 
Meursault’s fear of the other’s impending Arabness, he is 
literally blinded to it. In the final accounting, the precise 
nature of the Arab’s foreignness, his identity, seem to fall 
away for Meursault in the same way as does his own grip on 
himself, and—like Victor Frankenstein and his monster—his 
violence is instead directed at the other’s metaphysical 
proximity. While the sun blinds Meursault to his action, 
everything else is left harshly exposed—in its essential 
nakedness, in face to face relation.  
Conversely, in the moments immediately preceding the murder, 
Camus twice describes the Arab’s face as shrouded in the shadow 
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of a rock, ostensibly the only shade available on the sunlit 
beach, though (returning now to the Ward translation) “the rest 
of his body [was] in the sun” (58). So obscured, Meursault 
strains to read or understand the Arab’s features and 
intentions, and the inability to read the other’s face 
immediately engenders a crisis within Meursault of his own 
subjectivity: “Maybe it was the shadows on his face, but it 
looked like he was laughing. I waited. The sun was starting to 
burn my cheeks, and I could feel drops of sweat gathering in my 
eyebrows.” Again, just like Victor and the creature, the 
inscrutability of the other’s face dooms the encounter to 
catastrophe.  
Meursault’s relation and his eventual violence is thus not in 
the strictest sense with and against the “Arab”, whose face he 
cannot see, but with otherness itself; his failure in this 
moment is of his inability to recognize the other as an ethical 
subject, in the instant the face of the other meets him with its 
first imperative, “do not kill me”. In his feverish delirium, 
Meursault’s most primal anxiety is his inability to practice 
Levinas’ ethics and responsibility for the other as first 
philosophy. As he continues to fire, the face of the stranger 
becomes the “inert body”, and the encounter with the other 
becomes an inexorable failure.    
Daoud too seems to affirm the symbolic centrality and 
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omnipresence of the sun. The sun recurs more discretely in 
Daoud’s novel, as a vision both of the colonizer’s moment of 
moral trepidation his and ultimate self-absolution. Harun is at 
first contemptuous of Meursault’s identity crisis on the beach, 
and of Camus’ implied sympathy for Meursault over his anonymous 
victim:  
So the Frenchman plays the dead man and goes on and on 
about how he lost his mother, and then about how he 
lost his body in the sun, and then about how he lost a 
girlfriend’s body, and then about how he went to church 
and discovered that his God had deserted the human 
body…Good God, how can you kill someone and then take 
even his own death away from him? (3) 
But Harun seems elsewise wary of the sun himself, cognisant 
somehow of it as a threat, its potency to totally immolate 
subjectivity. Notwithstanding his derision of Meursault’s 
purported defense, Harun muses about something similarly 
mysterious, something clearly Icarian that happens under the 
sun. “Musa didn’t do anything that day but get too close to the 
sun, in a way” (62) he reflects, seemingly speaking more to 
himself than to his interviewer. He appears not to know exactly 
what he means by this; the observation seems to catch him 
unawares. But the revelation that follows, his “family secret” 
(80)—that he, too, had murdered a man during the Algerian war of 
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Independence (in his case, a Frenchman)54—blurs the lines between 
Harun and Meursault, the former following in the latter’s wake.55 
Days before the murder, Harun sees the Frenchman, Joseph (whom 
he takes care to name) for the first time, and their eventual 
violent collision is heavily foreshadowed. This first encounter, 
on a crowded street in the afternoon, is immediately assailed by 
the sun, reprising its role from The Stranger as the panoptic 
overseer under which the relation with otherness plays out. 
“That afternoon there was a big, heavy, blinding sun in the 
sky,” Harun recalls, “and the unbearable heat scrambled my mind” 
(82). Harun is in the same state of blindness—about the other’s 
political and racial identity—as Meursault, and in this state 
otherness, stripped of individual features and distinctness, is 
at its most alien and threatening.  
Yet it precisely in this ignorance there that there arises a 
possibility for ethical relations. Blindness under the sun 
                                                             
54 Like he does with Camus’ sun symbolism, Harun here both reprises Meursault’s action and repurposes it, 
staking claim to the choices and consequences of violence as an expression of postcolonial subjectivity. 
Harun’s murder of the Frenchman inverts the direction violence, from colonial subject to colonist, so that 
violence is no longer the exclusive right of the colonizer but can be appropriated and directed back by the 
other. Taking Meursault’s sole right to violence from him is thus another instance where Harun “take[s] the 
stones from the old houses the colonists left behind…[to] build [his] own house” (2).  
55 To Harun’s great frustration, and as a sort of burlesque of Meursault’s trial, he is afterwards accosted by 
authorities not for murdering the Frenchman in and of itself, but rather that he did not do it in service of the 
Algerian Revolution (109) and that his real crime was not being adequately patriotic. Rather than being 
validated as a murderer, he is robbed of his revenge against Meursault and—synergistically— left as 
alienated from his crime as Meursault is from his. “The Frenchman,” he ruefully observes, “had been erased 
with the same meticulousness applied to the Arab on the beach twenty years earlier” (97). In the postcolonial 
role of ‘writing back’, Harun finds himself re-enacting something beyond his control, living, as it were, the 
same story but “from right to left.”  
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depoliticizes the encounter with the Frenchman, but the other 
who one meets in this ‘blindness’ is a metaphysical subject, 
unknown and unknowable, irradiated by the sun yet hidden in 
shadow56—in Levinas terms, the other “metaphysically desired”. 
The ethical stakes of Harun’s encounter with the Frenchman are 
thus raised even higher; the other he confronts is not the 
Frenchman Joseph or (intertextually) Meursault, but the other as 
the bearer of radical alterity. For his part Harun, unlike 
Meursault, seems to recognize (if only in retrospect) these 
consequences. “The Other is a unit of measurement you lose when 
you kill” (90) he tells the interviewer, “I’d chilled all human 
bodies by killing only one...the only verse in the Koran that 
resonates with me is this: ‘if you kill a single person, it is 
as if you have killed the whole of mankind’” (91).57 
The killing itself, however, happens not in the sun but at 
night, in a revealing tableau of light and shadow. Joseph 
emerges as if indeed out of a primordial darkness, slowly taking 
on a human shape as Harun peers into the night: “The black 
shadow suddenly had eyes…the beginnings of a face” (83), evoking 
the precarious fluctuation between form and non-form in the il y 
                                                             
56 In this sense Meursault and Harun are awestruck by the sun to the same effect as Marlow and Mrs. Moore 
are by darkness.  
57 See Quran 5:32 Surah al-Ma'idah: “For that cause We decreed for the Children of Israel that whosoever 
killeth a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he had killed all 
mankind, and whoso saveth the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind” (92). 
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a. The Frenchman seems to hover in this “in between”, taking and 
then losing shape and the encounter, the ethical moment, teeters 
on the verge of failure as he does so. Significantly, Harun 
waits until the moment when the face is no longer recognizable 
as a face before firing, so that—just like Meursault on the 
beach, looking upon the Arab whose face is in shadow—he is 
momentarily able to absolve himself of his responsibility for 
the other: “the Frenchman moved…and retreated into the 
shadows…the darkness devoured what remained of his humanity” 
(85).58 Harun reels at the gravity of the moment; objects seem to 
verge on disappearance (“every angle and curve stood out so 
confusedly”), and the encounter becomes ossified entirely 
outside of the flow of time, “as if our lives since Musa’s death 
had been nothing but playacting” (84).  
This murder, like the other it resurrects, occurs in an 
overlay of the two novels, joining the two across time and 
space. Harun even echoes Meursault when recalling the moment of 
Musa’s death twenty years earlier: “I can’t clearly make out 
Musa’s face” (73). The implication I am suggesting here is that 
the two murders are not opposing actions, one avenging the 
other, but the same action seen from opposing sides. Both 
encounters, Camus’ and Daoud’s, are located in an imbricative 
                                                             
58 As Levinas tells us, it is the face which first “orders and ordains” (Ethics and Infinity 97) us, so that its 
concealment in both instances here is a predilection of imminent ethical catastrophe. 
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third space opened by the ‘collision’ of the two texts. Harun 
specifically references the meeting of the two ‘stories’, left 
and right, as he describes finding the doomed Frenchman at first 
trapped between two levels or stories of his house, the word 
here taking on a profound double meaning: “The man was there, 
wedged between two stories and some walls, and his only way out 
was my story, which left him no chance” (83-84). The way “out” 
represents, in my reading, a passage to and from both novels, a 
liminal passage much like Renée Green’s stairwell. The author 
explains, in an interview with The New Yorker in 2015: “I’m not 
responding to Camus—I’m finding my own path through Camus” 
[italics mine] (Treisman).  
Meursault is thus neither a homage to nor rebuke of The 
Stranger, but an eclipse, an overwriting of a story on top of 
another which has the effect of subverting the original’s 
authority. Daoud’s work fills in the gaps, twisting through and 
around Camus, and the resulting shape of the new “hybrid” text 
is dynamic, a mutation only partially resembling its 
progenitors. Meursault begins and ends with echoes of its 
predecessor, as if the fabric of Daoud’s story is drawn taut 
over Camus’ and so must traverse the same distance and along the 
same contours. As well as metamorphosing “Maman died today” at 
the outset, Daoud coopts Camus’ final statement of Meursault’s 
defiance on the eve of his execution: “that there be a large 
129 
 
crowd of spectators the day of [his] execution and that they 
greet [him] with cries of hate” (123). Harun finds at last his 
wish granted, to meet his counterpart face to face, live inside 
the other’s skin: “I too would wish them to be legion, my 
spectators, and savage in their hate” (143).  
Meursault’s truth is double-edged, simultaneous with its 
opposite. It exists on the membrane between two worlds, two 
societies, between the self and the other. Purportedly a 
‘response novel’ to The Stanger, the novel actually establishes 
a dialectic, the resolution to which is a truth whose 
epistemology is uncertain. As a final challenge, Harun ponders 
the possibility of two opposites being true at the same time and 
the shape of such a dialectical world. Daoud presents this as a 
choice to the reader, as if the answer might open up a path 
forward, a transcendence built on contradiction, a shared 
reality: “Do you find my story suitable? It’s all I can offer 
you. It’s my word…It’s like the biography of God…no one knows if 
his story is true or not. The Arab’s the Arab, God’s God. No 
name, no initials. Blue overalls and blue sky. Two unknown 
persons on an endless beach. Which is truer? An intimate 
question. It’s up to you to decide” (143).  
What is Daoud asking us to “decide” here, and what are the 
consequences of this decision? How does reading ostensibly 
oppositional works as ‘dialectical’ instead, allow us to rethink 
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the way in which art comments on identity and alterity? And how 
does the concept of two texts in “eclipse” inform or parallel 
the self and the other in the act of dialectical recognition? 
Considering Camus’ and Daoud’s intertextual conversation as 
itself an encounter, informed by Hegel’s insights into otherness 
and the “double movement” of self-consciousness, as well as 
Immanuel Kant’s description of the sublime offers us potential 
ways to think through these questions. What happens to the 
epistemology of the self when it collapses into the other? If to 
encounter otherness is both to be displaced and a requisite for 
self-consciousness (as Hegel argues), is the self therefore in 
itself a trauma? The rest of this chapter will engage these 
questions in the context of literary depictions of this 
‘traumatic’ proximity with otherness, beginning with a brief 
explanation of Hegel’s description of self-consciousness. 
 
In the fourth chapter of The Phenomenology of Mind59, Hegel’s 
famous treatise on dialectics (and other related subjects), he 
describes “the process of Recognition” (105) as the starting 
point or catalyst for self-consciousness, i.e. for one’s 
fundamental awareness of one’s own distinct subjectivity—and 
thus for all aspects of what we might upon subsequent reflection 
                                                             
59 Alternatively translated as The Phenomenology of Spirit, a significant difficulty produced by the German 
word Geist which carries both (and other) meanings.  
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call identity. Like Levinas, Hegel argues that encountering 
otherness is profoundly consequential for one’s understanding of 
one’s place and relationship to the world. Unlike Levinas, 
however, for Hegel the self and the other are perpetually 
exchanged in a struggle for mutual recognition, one which does 
not prioritize, as Levinas does, ethics above all else, but 
rather makes recognition (and mastery) its focus. Hegel’s 
encounter with otherness traces the first emergence of the “I” 
through its dialectical relationship with the other. The self, 
and for the other himself, is negatively determined through 
reciprocity—I begin where the other ends and he where I end. As 
Bernardo Ferro summarizes in his essay on Hegel and otherness, 
“[Hegel’s] self-consciousness is never equal to itself. It is 
what it is through the simultaneous positing of what it is not, 
i.e., through the positing of an otherness it continuously 
discards…unlike a fixed entity, the self-conscious self is never 
simply this or that. Its identity stems from the very act of 
negating” (3). Hegel refers to this movement of mutual 
recognition as a “double movement” that takes primacy over all 
other relations60. 
                                                             
60 Ferro further clarifies the “double movement” of Hegelian dialectics as a persistent reciprocity, an “infinite 
coming and going, [in which] self and other are both moments of self-consciousness and are both completely 
dependent upon each other: on the one hand, as if facing a mirror, consciousness can only acknowledge itself 
as self-consciousness by putting an other in front of itself… Self-consciousness is a purely negative entity, 
which must be conquered anew with each new moment. In light of its self-moving nature, the tautology I am I 
does not really amount to a positive affirmation, but rather to the negative acknowledgment that I am not 
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Levinas’ ethics seem, at least ostensibly to approach the 
encounter with the other from the opposite direction. By 
prioritizing responsibility for the other over reciprocity, 
Levinas’ relationship to the other appears asymmetrical; i.e. it 
does not, as a condition for ethics, demand ethics from the 
other—I am responsible for the other irrespective of the other’s 
behavior towards me. Thus asymmetry is at the core of the 
disagreement between Hegel and Levinas, one that ensues from the 
rules under which the dialectic occurs: “[T]he rupture [between 
Hegel and Levinas]” Robert Bernasconi writes in trying to 
resolve the two philosophers, occurs “precisely at the point 
where Hegelian dialectics attempts to contain the ethical within 
the bounds of the ontological” (50).  
Yet this purported opposition, between Hegel’s dialectic as 
“symmetrical” and Levinas’ ethics as “asymmetric”, seems 
nonetheless to itself converge in a higher resolution, one 
Jacques Derrida calls a “transcendental” truth, an underlying 
symmetry. In Writing and Difference (1967), Derrida argues that 
the other, in order to be an other (for whom I am responsible) 
must be in the same predicament as myself, i.e. confronted by my 
otherness. In his essay on Levinas, Violence and Metaphysics, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
another. This I of which identity is predicated is nothing more than what is left when all otherness was gotten 
rid of…[yet] by stating that I am not another, that same I is forever tied to the otherness it seeks to eliminate” 
(4). 
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Derrida describes the recognition of the other as a subject, as 
one for whom I must therefore be responsible, as indispensable 
in Levinas as in Hegel: “the other, for me, is an ego which I 
know to be in relation to me as an other…The movement of 
transcendence toward the other, as invoked by Levinas, would 
have no meaning if it did not bear within it…[that] I know 
myself to be other for the other” (157). Without this 
“transcendental symmetry”, were I not to proceed from the belief 
that the other is “my fellow man as foreigner” (157-159), both 
self-consciousness (through negation) and the opportunity for 
ethical relations cannot arise.61 The stakes, therefore, in the 
encounter are not only recognizing (or not) the other as subject 
or even the self becoming conscious of itself (i.e. what Hegel 
calls the tautology of I am I); the very ordering of reality, 
the coordinates and conditions under which I can posit the 
existence and viability of subject vs object are in question—a 
question I can answer only through the other.  
In a sense then, Hegel’s constellation can be interpreted 
both an opponent of Levinas’ (the dialectical encounter is 
possible only with another of myself, i.e. otherness that is not 
truly radical or infinite) and as a necessity for Levinas’ 
ethical relationship, in that the other confirms to me my own 
                                                             
61  This recalls Levinas’ disagreement with Husserl about the other as alter ego on similar grounds; see my 
summary from chapter one.  
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subjectivity and therefore my responsibility for him. The space 
for metaphysics or transcendence, for a relationship with the 
other is not a totalization is in this sense opened by the act 
of mutual recognition. This disagreement need not therefore, be 
entirely intransigent, at least on these terms. Consider again 
Victor Frankenstein’s anxiety about the creature’s subjectivity 
I detailed in chapter two. The creature oscillates between 
object (monster) and subject (alter ego) and this anxiety is 
redoubled in Victor as a crisis within himself about himself; 
the “double movement” on which self-consciousness relies 
indefinitely—not only to recognize but to sustain I am I—is 
disrupted (or rather, pre-empted) by the creature’s ambivalence 
as subject/ object. Similarly, Meursault’s encounter with the 
Arab on the beach and Harun’s reciprocation of sorts with the 
Frenchman are each an instance of a disrupted dialectical 
relationship with the other. Shrouded in darkness (and in the 
case of the Arab on the beach, deprived of a name), the other 
remains infinitely so, and the encounter cannot achieve the 
transcendental symmetry of mutual recognition. Across time, 
culture and politics, Meursault and Harun, like Camus and Daoud 
themselves, grapple with the possibility of the other as “my 
fellow man as foreigner”—another of myself—but are left with 
only suspicion and shadows. And thus both journeys, to find in 
the other redemption for the self, end in utter failure.      
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Destabilization or even disintegration of self-consciousness, 
left wanting of mutual recognition with another of itself, takes 
on a multitude of forms and variations in literature 
particularly concerned with national, ethnoreligious or 
political identity. In the following pages, I consider the 
possibility of a similar unravelling of the narrative ego, i.e. 
the protagonist or written self in its interaction with the 
imagined other, as depicted in two distant texts: Saadat Hasan 
Manto’s Urdu short story “Toba Tek Singh” (1955) and Don 
DeLillo’s September 11 novel Falling Man (2007).   
 
Manto’s “Toba Tek Singh” tells the story of an inmate in a 
Lahore insane asylum “two or three years” (14) after the 
Partition of the Indian subcontinent. We are told by the 
narrator that the inmate, a Sikh man named Bishan Singh, is 
called “Toba Tek Singh” by the other inmates, ostensibly after 
the name of his village. The village, like most in the border 
provinces during Partition, is presumably in a state of flux, 
and Bishan Singh and his fellow inmates have no way to 
corroborate its status and location vis-à-vis the new border 
between India and Pakistan62. His trepidation increases greatly 
when he learns that the asylum’s inmates are soon to be 
                                                             
62 The real Toba Tek Singh is today a district in Punjab province, Pakistan, not insignificantly named after a 
Sikh religious figure. 
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relocated, on the basis of their religious affiliation, to India 
or Pakistan. As a Sikh, however, Bishan Singh’s place on the 
continuum between ethnoreligious nation states—and therefore 
between identities—is ambiguous; he is the living falsification 
of the binary nature of borders, both physical ones such as 
between countries and in a metaphysical sense between the self 
and the other. Recalling Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain 
(1924), with its secluded sanatorium high in the Swiss Alps, for 
Bishan Singh the asylum in Lahore is a purgatory. As a man 
belonging to a third religion, whose hometown is a sort of 
quantum superposition63, he has no way of discerning where he is 
in time or space, nor where he is eventually meant to go. 
Likewise, his fellow inmates are uncertain about how to orient 
themselves without knowing which side of the Partition they 
exist on. Removed from the drama of the Partition and its 
aftermath, they are physically trapped in the “meanwhile”; while 
in the asylum, they wear Levinas’ death mask, without future or 
past. 
“Toba Tek Singh” is thus a story of the self, in the form of 
Bishan Singh, which begins in alienation, with a nascent 
displacement from itself. Where Victor Frankenstein’s crisis is 
engendered by the creature’s dubious humanity, for Bishan Singh 
                                                             
63 That is, functionally existing in both countries at the same time, until the very end of the story, a sort of 
geospatial equivalent of Schrödinger’s cat, one might say. 
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this ambivalence is evinced within himself. He cannot determine 
whether he belongs or is in exile, is master or creature—native 
or firanghi—since, in order to do so, he must rely on his memory 
of a time before the asylum, that is, a time outside of time. 
The purgatorial (perhaps, primeval) asylum is the site not only 
of political disruption, but of a metaphysical crisis which 
subverts I am I with an irresolvable pre-emption, i.e. which one 
am I?  
Bishan Singh goes from inmate to inmate in an effort to have 
them disclose to him this epistemological secret, as if trying 
to echolocate his avatar, this other Toba Tek Singh which has a 
fixity which he himself does not. Seeking Revelation, he turns 
to a fellow inmate—who “believed he was God” (17)—for the Word, 
to resolve the question of the location of Toba Tek Singh the 
village. “‘It is neither in Pakistan nor in Hindustan…because I 
haven’t given any orders yet”’ the man answers. The Word is not 
ready to be spoken, a hint again that this asylum is a place not 
only outside of but before time. Bishan Singh vainly implores 
this ‘God’ (Urdu “Khuda”) to “give the orders”, but is told, 
effectively, to get in line because there are “too many other 
orders to be taken care of.” Manto here alludes to both the site 
of and time before Creation (i.e. order), where Bishan and his 
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fellow inmates, spirits without form64, await the Word. 
Partition, in Manto’s story, invokes the primordial excitation, 
when essence becomes manifest and heaven and earth coagulate65. 
Bishan Singh’s is a life that has not yet been spoken into 
existence; “God” has not yet decreed the shape of the earth (and 
the lands therein), and therefore the fate of the inmates—as 
regards both identity and form—remains undetermined.     
As in the il y a, everything in the asylum is jumbled—places 
names and forms—and the self and other are an anagram of each 
other. Bishan Singh exhibits symptoms of the “crisis of the 
double”66 with the mantra he vainly repeats to himself (with 
small contextual variations) and to others, a mangled 
interpolation of languages and identities within which he tries 
to glimpse himself: “Oper di gur gur di annexe di bay dhania di 
mung di daal di of laltain” (16). This hybridity is tied up with 
his statelessness; he and his fellow inmates are, as Navdeep 
Kaur notes (368), the embodiment of what Jacques Rancière 
describes in his political philosophy as le part sans-part (the 
                                                             
64 See the “Jinn” from Surah Al-Jinn and Surah Al-Hijr (15:27) in the Quran, “And the jinn did We create 
aforetime of essential fire” (187). See also Genesis 1:2 and discussion in chapter one. 
65 From the Quran 21:30 Surah al-Anbiyāa, of a time before the Word: “Have not those who disbelieve known 
that the heavens and the earth were of one piece, then We parted them” (233). 
66 Recall Freud’s point about the “doubling, dividing and interchanging of the self” I raise in chapter one, a 
variation of the uncanny, in which the self “identifies himself with someone else, so that he is in doubt as to 
which his self is, or substitutes the extraneous self for his own” (233).  
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part that has no part)67. In her essay on the political 
aesthetics of the story, Kaur describes Singh’s utterances as 
“deterritorialized sound…an amalgamation of Urdu, Punjabi, Hindi 
and English on the one hand, and, on the other hand…a mix of 
sense and nonsense” (369).  
His nonsense refrain though is anything but; as a sans-part, 
an extraneous or superfluous piece, Bishan Singh’s speech is—
like Bishan himself—a quantum variance, both containing and 
parasitic on the various languages at play in the politics of 
Partition. The end of the phrase he utters is adapted slightly 
each time, according to the conversation and political context: 
“Oper di gur gur di annexe di bay dhania di mung daal di of di 
Pakistan government” (16), or “Oper di gur gur di bay dhania di 
mung di daal di of wahay guruji, the khalsa and wahay guruji the 
fathey! (17), etc. The phrase seems to double as both meaningful 
and meaningless, or recalling Blanchot, as both “crude” and 
essential”.68 For Bishan Singh, the act of speaking at once pulls 
him closer to self-consciousness and pushes it away. Not unlike 
                                                             
67 Rancière’s observation in Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (and other writings) about the nature of 
political representation in democracies seems to speak directly to Bishan Singh’s plight, i.e. as a living 
embodiment of the unrepresentable exception which is always essentialized—and thus lost—in the act of 
‘speaking for’ that underwrites all political organization and the very idea of nation state. Writes Rancière, 
politics “does not recognize relationships between citizens and the state. It only recognizes the mechanisms 
and singular manifestations by which a certain citizenship occurs but never belongs to individuals as 
such…Man is not some future accomplishment beyond political representation. He is the truth hidden 
beneath this representation” (31; 83). 
68 See chapter two for this distinction, i.e. language as utility/ learned signification vs language as innovation, 
as soundscape.  
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Derrida’s différance, Bishan Singh has been estranged not only 
from place but also from language, from the signified for which 
he vainly seeks the correct vernacular signifier. Even a very 
rudimentary understanding of Partition must, after all, still 
include the rending apart of languages, dialects and vernaculars 
as well as territory. Words, in many ways the instrument not 
only of social cohesion but of developing and sustaining 
identities, were scattered across the new border along with the 
peoples that spoke them. In the asylum, Bishan Singh must sound 
out both the distance between himself and otherness and the 
difference, speaking (like Mrs. Moore) a fragmentary language 
into the darkness to learn where he ends and the other begins. 
Manto’s story culminates with Bishan Singh’s abrupt (literal 
and symbolic) death. We learn that India and Pakistan have 
agreed, on the basis of religion, to exchange and repatriate 
their respective “lunatics” across the new border. Most of the 
inmates in the Lahore asylum are opposed to being sent to India 
“because they [cannot] comprehend the reasons for being uprooted 
from one place and thrown into another” (18). For Bishan Singh, 
however, occupying the Sikh “third space” in the dialectical 
opposition represented by Partition ties his identity entirely 
to his hometown, which effectively exists nowhere and anywhere. 
For him, the possibility of being relocated to Toba Tek Singh, 
his namesake, thus represents not only restitution but a 
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“solution” to the question of his hybridity69.  
At the border, Bishan Singh is ostensibly finally apprised of 
the location of Toba Tek Singh the village. “Where is Toba Tek 
Singh?” he asks of a border official, “In Pakistan or in India?” 
(18) Yet the dual nature of this question (given the double 
entendre of the name) is left unresolved and leads ultimately to 
his demise. “In Pakistan” the official responds cryptically, a 
statement that could apply to the village or to Bishan himself. 
Taking this to mean the village lies on the Pakistan side, and 
thus that he is being transported to the wrong side, Bishan 
Singh attempts to flee back across the border but is restrained. 
He ultimately perishes mysteriously, “in a place between the 
borders...[i]n the middle [Urdu: darmeeyan], on a stretch of 
land that had no name” (18-19) where he is discovered the next 
morning.  
The implications of this death, occurring as it does in a 
literal interstice—along the membrane—are manifold. Hegel seems 
to anticipate this very moment in Phenomenology of Mind when he 
describes a self-consciousness which, in approaching the other, 
“has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being” 
(105).  Bishan Singh’s death is at once an act of political 
                                                             
69 To slightly extend my quantum mechanics analogy, a collapsing of several possible states into a single one.  
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resistance70, and a more fundamental destabilization of concept 
of “border” as a division between two antagonisms, such as the 
self and the other. The ground Bishan Singh stakes out seems to 
buttress Manto’s comment on subjectivity as being ultimately 
indivisible, as the surplus object a (i.e. the remainder) in the 
oppositional framework. Further, I read the border, both as 
psychology and as text, as a traumatic site wherein the self and 
other not only meet but interpolate, such that a space for a 
metaphysical and symmetrical relationship with the other becomes 
possible (as in Derrida’s reading of Hegel’s transcendental 
symmetry). To understand Bishan Singh’s death as a result of 
this violence of “border”, I first explore the idea of border as 
physical and—more contentiously—as metaphysical trauma and then 
present a crucial variation on this point, a very different 
boundary or membrane, from Don DeLillo’s September 11 novel 
Falling Man.     
Jennifer Yusin has described the semiotics of the “border”, 
as a “geography of trauma” (454), of which the 1947 border 
between India and Pakistan is an obviously apposite instance. 
Citing Freud’s formulation of Nachträglichkeit (the 
                                                             
70 As Kaur explains, his death “opens up a space where anyone can be counted, where a connection is made 
between having a part and having no part” (370). 
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‘afterwardness’ or retroactive nature of experiencing trauma)71, 
Yusin explains that ‘locating’ trauma in the case of Partition 
remains difficult, as the trauma of Partition lies in “the 
[very] impossibility of locating and knowing the event as a 
trauma” (456). The physical and psychical ruptures created by 
borders thus produce trauma which itself constitutes a yawning, 
an in-between, as Yusin puts it, a “gap between knowing and 
unknowing” (459) its own provenance.  
What exists in this gap—in my estimation, the very 
“darmeeyan” in which Bishan Singh perishes—between trauma and 
its realization, is a nightscape which recalls Blanchot in that 
it is the space where Bishan Singh’s search for an “essential” 
rather than “crude” language finds resolution. “Toba Tek Singh 
is here!” (18), he exclaims as the guards attempt to force him 
back across the border. What Bishan Singh realizes is “here”, I 
argue, is not his village but himself; it refers neither to 
India nor to Pakistan, but rather to the darmeeyan, the gap. 
Within the dialectical opposition of nation states, the border 
                                                             
71 As Freud details in “Studies on Hysteria” (with Josef Breuer) and elsewhere, trauma by definition 
overwhelms consciousness insofar as its ability to process and interpret the traumatic event as it is 
happening. Trauma thus enters the psyche and is relocated into the subconscious, whereby it becomes by 
nature deferred, i.e. activated inadvertently and belatedly within a psyche which cannot locate (recall) its 
point of origin. As Bistoen, Vanheule and Craps explain: “an initial event only becomes traumatic, in the sense 
of exerting its full pathogenic power, at a later stage in psychical development, when the initial event to which 
the subject was unable to react adequately is revived by a subsequent encounter. Nachträglichkeit thus refers 
to the process by which pathology develops following a trauma that is constituted through two etiological 
moments instead of one” (672).  
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represents both their separation and their collapse72, so that in 
discovering (or as Freud might say, rediscovering) the site of 
trauma, Bishan Singh’s quest for self-consciousness returns to 
its primordial antagonism, i.e. to the encounter which first 
results in I am I. The encounter with the other is the 
metaphysical twin of the opposition of border, since, as I have 
discussed earlier, it is a (traumatic) precursor to achieving 
self-consciousness. As a Sikh in a political crisis primarily 
involving Muslims and Hindus, Bishan Singh’s body is, as Hugo 
Baumgartner’s was, the object a, the third that belies the two, 
undermines their distinctness and reveals the violence inherent 
in this division. “[T]he I,” as Yusin summarizes, “is put 
radically into question by the other in which the putting into 
question of one’s being, of one’s self-identification, is at 
once recuperated and constituted as the consciousness of being 
put into question” (464).73 Bishan Singh’s death in no man’s land 
ultimately represents both the indivisibility of subjectivity 
into two perfect halves and—relatedly—the volatility of self-
consciousness, whose gestation and subsistence always exists at 
the border between the self and other.  
                                                             
72 Into each other, that is, semiotically and metaphysically. 
73 Levinas makes a very similar point in his essay “The Trace of the Other” (1963), “[The face of the other] is a 
matter of the putting into question of consciousness, and not of a consciousness of a being put into question. 
[In encountering the face of the other] The I loses its sovereign coincidence with itself, its identification, in 
which consciousness returned triumphantly to itself and rested on itself” (353). 
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Of course, it follows then that this epistemic violence which 
shadows border is not exclusive (or restricted) to the physical, 
territorial, symbolic or even psychic type. As Hegel’s double 
movement defines and Manto’s story reminds us, the self is 
always contested and in contention with otherness. The rewriting 
of borders by the Partition of the subcontinent short-circuits 
Bishan Singh’s identification with I am I; yet another 
insinuation of Manto’s story is that this disruption is a 
universal human condition, implied by the very imminence of the 
other as a challenge to the sovereignty of the self. I read 
narrative instances of this challenge or calling into question 
as raising a crucial problem which (keeping in mind my 
discussion in chapter two about embedded meaning vs the meaning 
apprehended by ‘approaching’ art in a particular way) can incite 
a similar feeling of self-doubt, even sublimity for the reader. 
Decades later and culturally far removed yet almost as if a nod 
to Manto’s symbolically rich story, Don DeLillo’s September 11 
novel Falling Man takes up similar questions about the 
“geography of trauma” and the disintegration of the membranous 
‘walls’ of self.        
Falling Man is, as its title indicates, a novel about loss 
and accounting for loss. Though considered a lesser, even 
insubstantial work in DeLillo’s oeuvre and by no means a 
definitive novelization of the September 11 attacks (if one 
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exists), Falling Man is singular perhaps for that very reason, 
in that it is both noticeably unambitious (in terms of trying to 
encompass the whole of the event or making any big statements) 
and, in terms of its prose, the least like DeLillo’s other 
works. Eschewing in large part his familiar rhetorical 
flourishes and obsessions with minutia and metadata, it instead 
trades predominately in stunned silences, evasions and a 
pervading sense of incompleteness. Falling Man is a quiet book 
about a very loud subject, mirroring in a sense the traumatic 
detachment of its fictionalized New Yorkers after enduring and 
surviving the attacks. “[H]e has gutted his style sentence by 
sentence” (Versluys 47), one critic notes of the texture of the 
book’s prose, a study in extreme rhetorical restraint. Sentences 
are short, almost truncated; adjectives are sparse, as if 
rendered impotent by the magnitude of the event. In the 
maelstrom of the falling towers, pronouns are preferred over 
names, as though names have been swallowed up. Linda Kauffman 
describes the parallel tracks of narrative and rhetorical 
emptiness thusly: “[the novel’s characters] are obsessed with 
disintegration: psychic, spatial, temporal, national, and 
marital. The novel is a sustained meditation on time, chance, 
loss, and mutability” (367).74  
                                                             
74 “He started walking again” (5); “He signed a document, then another” (15); “He had no sense of pace or 
rate” (245); “He tried to tell himself he was alive but the idea was too obscure to take hold” (6). 
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Fragmentation and interruption abide. DeLillo’s characters, 
in the wake of the attack, begin sentences they do not finish, 
retrace steps without finding their way, perform rehabilitative 
rituals without understanding their injuries. The respiratory 
rhythm of the novel is the transmutation of suffering and loss 
into amnesia, as if the maximum threshold of trauma has been 
exceeded, leaving behind not grief but catatonia. Like the 
attacks themselves, the amnesia reverberates on levels both 
intimate and national. Time is one of the casualties: the 
novel’s temporality is measured in terms of time elapsed since a 
new, terrible zero point, days survived since and “after the 
planes” (8; 34; 69). Evoking the Fall from Genesis 3 to which 
its title of course directly alludes, time in Falling Man 
endures a traumatic rebirth marked by a second Fall. “[T]hese 
after-days,” one character reflects, “These are the days after. 
Everything now is measured by after” (137-138), like some 
mockery of the Creation, the attack a debased, localized Big 
Bang.  
Keith Neudecker, the protagonist, is both an avatar of 
Freud’s melancholic75 and a kind of watermark of Kurt Vonnegut’s 
Billy Pilgrim from Slaughterhouse Five (1969). After escaping 
the reeling buildings at the book’s outset, Keith spends much of 
                                                             
75 See Freud’s essay “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917).  
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the remaining pages unmoored, in a stricken state of searching 
for the many things he has lost without being able to name them. 
His injuries, physical, psychic and existential, seem to recede 
from his gaze and so remain untreated, recalling Freud’s 
melancholic who knows he has lost something, but cannot identify 
what it was76. And, like Billy Pilgrim, narrative time around him 
seems to warp, as if protectively folding itself around the site 
of his traumatic experience. 
Keith’s arc in the novel is actually a circle; the novel is 
bookended by his vision of looking up at debris, rubble, and 
“things he could not name” (246) falling from the tower as it 
teeters on the verge of imminent collapse. This moment, in “the 
light of what comes after”, seems to exist eternally, in some 
shard broken off from the normal flow of time, narrative and 
memory. The feeling of being, as Vonnegut put it in 
Slaughterhouse, “unstuck in time” (21) becomes and remains 
Falling Man’s temporal interstice, its untimed life. As Keith 
looks on, the final image we are left with (instead of the 
eponymous falling man from the famous Associated Press photo 
from which the novel takes its title)77, is an empty shirt 
                                                             
76 Freud writes that “the [melancholic] patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lost…even if the 
patient is aware of the loss which has given rise to his melancholia [he does so] only in the sense that he 
knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him (245). 
77 Richard Drew’s famous AP photo of the unidentified victim falling from the North Tower, almost devotional 
in its quality, was first published in The New York Times the day after the attacks. It was, in fact, one of several 
the photographer took of the man. The other photos show the same figure in various stages of freefall, his 
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falling from the sky, its “arms waving like nothing in this 
life.” The disappearance of the traumatized body into the empty 
shirt marks a final dematerialization which matches the novel’s 
cadence. The penetrative force of the event, DeLillo suggests—
its strain on the fabric of the real—exceeded what could be 
borne by the triumvirate pillars of time, self-consciousness and 
the body.78      
Keith’s slow recovery from his injuries is measured 
incrementally, in a series of repetitive rehabilitation 
exercises, wrist, arm, and hand (230). “These were the true 
countermeasures to the damage he’d suffered in the tower,” he 
reflects, “These were the dead and maimed” (40). These 
mysterious, almost religious observances, “fragments shored 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
body contorted, his limbs flailing as he fell. Yet only one photo achieved widespread attention and a kind of 
cultural transcendence, the one referenced by DeLillo’s novel. This photo shows the man vertically aligned 
against the beams of the North Tower behind him, statue straight as if suspended in midair, as though he were 
falling serenely and uniformly. This eternal falling, the traumatized body and the traumatic moment as still-
life, again reminds me of Levinas’ eternal image, the image as the epitaph for the “death of each instant” 
(“Reality” 141). This is the symbolic iconography of DeLillo’s novel and its characters, i.e. neither life nor 
death, but something in between, an ephemerality without a resolution. The falling man in the photo falls 
eternally, as the victims in DeLillo’s book suffer eternally, each awaiting the restitution of the temporal which 
the “meanwhile” cannot provide them.  
78 Like other such images, the series of photographs Richard Drew produced of the falling man (and of others 
that fell or jumped from the towers) were quickly suppressed by US media in the days and weeks after the 
attack, and have largely disappeared from national memory. The photos have rarely, if ever, reappeared in 
print, after the Times and other outlets faced a public outcry about their provocative and arguably insensitive 
nature. As Tom Junod recently wrote for Esquire, the surreptitious circulation of these images afterward 
became a transgression specifically because it exceeds restraints of decency, so that “it is impossible to look at 
them without attendant feelings of shame and guilt.” There was a sense that something not only terrible but 
also unspeakable had happened, whose documentation and witnessing were a violation of the sacred intimate. 
“In a nation of voyeurs,” Junod observes, “the desire to face the most disturbing aspects of our most 
disturbing day was somehow ascribed to voyeurism, as though the jumpers' experience, instead of being 
central to the horror, was tangential to it, a sideshow best forgotten.” 
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against [the] ruins” (“The Wasteland” 71), Eliot might say, are 
a narrative counterweight to the periodic appearances of a 
performance artist in various locations around New York, another 
‘falling man’. Using suspension cables, the performance artist 
silently and indecently recreates the posture of the falling man 
from the AP photo before unsuspecting crowds of New Yorkers in 
the wake of the event (33; 168; 219-222). Like Keith with his 
rehabilitation exercises, the performance artist tries to 
contain what is otherwise overwhelming within a coherent 
pattern, a repository for the traumatic memory and a way to 
bring the event back to its zero point: the injury itself. 
Similarly, hereditary Alzheimer’s disease stalks Lianne, 
Keith’s ex-wife, who works with Alzheimer’s patients and 
ritually checks herself against the disease by counting back 
from a hundred by sevens (187-188, 207).  Ritual features 
recurrently in the novel as a buffer against disintegration. 
Characters strain to give a shape or a name to what has happened 
to them, and rituals take the place of directly remembering or 
speaking about the event. Each of these rituals provide a 
measure of certainty, a kind of insular, self-sustaining 
ideology to replace the grand narratives of identity and 
nationhood, all irrevocably lost in the attack.79 If the nation 
                                                             
79 Of course, the cost of this collective amnesia is a near total depoliticization of the attack and its chain of 
causality. As Sven Cvek has argued, memory loss is a device DeLillo uses to null the geopolitical backdrop 
151 
 
is an analog of the self, the America that Falling Man describes 
is as alien to its characters as they are to themselves. 
“[America] is losing the center,” Lianne’s mother’s estranged 
partner muses, evoking Yeats, “I don’t know this America 
anymore. I don’t recognize it…There’s an empty space where 
America used to be” (191-193). “Empty space” is DeLillo’s 
primary subject here, the physical and emotional vacuum that 
September 11 represents. As Kauffman writes of these mediations, 
Falling Man is a study of people “losing the storylines of their 
own existence” (367).  
In an earlier essay for Harper’s Magazine titled “In the 
Ruins of the Future”, first published in December of 2001 and 
later reprinted in The Guardian, DeLillo anticipated some of the 
movements of the novel he would publish six years later. The 
essay is comprised mainly of reflections on ordinary New Yorkers 
living through and coping with the attack. Instead of masses, 
DeLillo tells the stories of individuals “trying not to look 
around, only what's immediate, one step and then another, all 
closely focused, a pregnant woman, a newborn, a dog.” Like 
Falling Man, the essay is concerned with fragmentary stories 
within the grand spectacle, eschewing the political and public 
for the personal and intimate. “[T]hese are among the smaller 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
behind the event, tearing it out of the pages of history, allowing for “a disappearance of history from the site 
of trauma…[an] evacuation of historical discourse” (209). 
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objects and more marginal stories in the sifted ruins of the 
day” DeLillo summarizes his reflections, “We need them…to set 
against the massive spectacle that continues to seem 
unmanageable, too powerful a thing to set into our frame of 
practised response.”  
As Falling Man later confirmed, this choice on his part seems 
to be driven by an understanding of trauma that echoes Freud’s 
melancholia. The traumatic impact of event, the injuries it 
afflicts, are too painful to be swallowed whole. To find some 
perspective, they must be absorbed piecemeal, individually. 
Paradoxically however, this insularity impedes the full 
immensity of the loss from coming ever into view. For the 
melancholic, who has sustained “too powerful” a loss to be able 
to mourn it “successfully”80, self-preservation demands a defence 
against the traumatic memory, which in Falling Man takes the 
form of the attack disappearing into a vacuum of amnesia and 
speechlessness81. 
                                                             
80 In Freud’s terms, a “healthy” and therefore finite period of mourning, after which “the ego becomes free and 
uninhibited again” (“Mourning” 244) 
81 The confounding of speech, as a result of a symbolic ‘fall’ raises another possible reading of the multitudes 
contained within Falling Man’s title, another ‘Fall’ from Genesis: not from Eden, but from (and of) the Tower 
of Babel. Where the first Fall was from Heaven, the second was of the unity of early Mankind, previously held 
together by one common language but now “confound[ed]” by God before it can complete a tower to reach 
Heaven, and thence scattered forever into warring tribes (see Genesis 11: 1-9). This traumatic “Fall” of 
language is thus also a loss of nation and purpose, bolstering it at as a possible secondary allusion of the 
novel’s title.  
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What are the consequences of this traumatic overwhelming of 
time, consciousness, and the body as concerns the interaction of 
self and other? Put more simply, how does one understand the 
other from within a self that is traumatized? Recall that 
Hegel’s description of ‘self-consciousness’ is always 
incomplete, i.e. a moment to moment proposition. Though his 
point was phenomenological and so quite apart from 
psychoanalysis, it bears mentioning that Freud’s melancholic who 
cannot say what he has lost comprises an equally traumatized 
self-consciousness. Like DeLillo’s Keith Neudecker or Manto’s 
Bishan Singh, the self so traumatized is one that cannot 
perceive (or confirm) its own furthest limits, its frontier 
(where I end and otherness begins), since it is this very 
frontier that is the site of the trauma.  
For Bishan Singh, the territory of trauma is the darmeeyan, 
the space between borders. For Keith Neudecker it takes a more 
subtle form, one described by Falling Man’s climactic moments 
and the language in which DeLillo describes them. It is also in 
these moments that the two texts, DeLillo’s and Manto’s (like 
Camus’ and Daoud’s in the moment their two murders align), seem 
to reach across time and recognize each other.  
Falling Man’s antagonist, a negative image of Keith’s 
perspective, is the viewpoint of a fictionalized version of one 
of the 9/11 hijackers, Hammad, written in omniscient third 
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person. The two subjectivities are oppositional and yet 
inexorably linked. The novel is in a sense a description of the 
space between their polarities and its resolution the violent 
closing of this distance. Hammad, though, is more conflicted 
than a generic fanatic. That role is performed by Amir, his 
overseer of sorts, a direct rendering of lead 9/11 hijacker 
Mohamed Atta82. Soon after we are introduced to him, we also 
encounter Hammad’s ideological ambivalence, his doubtfulness 
about the coalescing plot. His wavering faith, which is 
repeatedly checked by Amir’s single-mindedness, manifests itself 
as a failure to observe sexual prohibitions (and his ensuing 
guilt), as well as other concerns about the dependence of a 
‘pure’ faith on the purification of the body. He examines his 
inner conflicts and his public visage, unsure that he and the 
person meant to carry out the attacks are one and the same (“He 
spent time at the mirror looking at his beard, knowing he was 
not supposed to trim it”) (82). His mind wanders during sermons, 
drifting toward sexual opportunities (“he kept thinking that 
another woman would come by on a bike, someone to look at, hair 
wet, legs pumping”) (78). Amir reprimands him for maintaining a 
relationship with “a shameless woman” (83), whom he must disavow 
in order to quiet his anxieties about himself, the disharmony 
                                                             
82 “His full name was Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir el-Sayed Atta” (80).   
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between his impulses and performative ideology83. Strict 
doctrinal observance and self-monitoring function as Hammad’s 
ritual sanctification, measuring himself against a 
fundamentalist ideal his sacrament. “The beard would look better 
if he trimmed it,” he ruefully reflects, “But there were rules 
now and he was determined to follow them…He had to fight against 
the need to be normal. He had to struggle against himself, 
first” (83). 
DeLillo’s rather paint-by-numbers psychological profile here 
is of a would-be terrorist who is clearly not impervious to 
internal contradictions simply by virtue of belonging to a 
terror cell. He is able to maintain his grasp on the ontological 
(dogmatic) enactment of his persona only by sublimation, i.e. by 
confirming the self as fundamentally an effacement and therefore 
a trauma whose nascence must be forgotten84. Hammad is thus a 
complicated ‘antagonist’, if indeed he can be called one at all. 
                                                             
83 This rather unimaginative, depoliticized rendering of the terrorist as essentially sexual repression 
personified is a significant weakness of DeLillo’s novel, yet one that appears more or less unchanged in other 
novelizations, such as, for instance, John Updike’s Terrorist, published a year earlier. The latter’s drawing of a 
Muslim American teenager who becomes embroiled in a plot to blow up the Lincoln tunnel driven by his 
sexual inhibitions is a near template for DeLillo’s Hammad.   
84 In chapter two of Civilization and its Discontents, Freud defines sublimation, especially of the sexual variety 
thusly: “Another method of guarding against pain is by…transferring the instinctual aims into such directions 
that they cannot be frustrated by the outer world. Sublimation of the instincts lends an aid in this” (33). 
Similarly, in The Ego & the Id, he more or less explains DeLillo’s depiction of the ‘uncertain terrorist’ as 
sexually self-abnegating: “The transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido which thus takes place 
obviously implies an abandonment of sexual aims, a process of desexualisation; it is consequently a kind of 
sublimation. Indeed, the question arises, and deserves careful consideration, whether this is not always the 
path taken in sublimation, whether all sublimation does not take place through the agency of the ego, which 
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His opposition to Keith is asymmetrical, in that he represents 
not refutation but a tacit confirmation that the self is a 
(contested) ontology, requiring constant and ritual affirmation 
to be precariously sustained. “What is the difference” Amir 
chastises Hammad about his transgressions, “between you and all 
the others, outside our space?” (83) DeLillo seems to ask this 
question to the wider world, the unspoken and disquieting answer 
perhaps only that Hammad and his co-conspirators have chosen an 
explicitly violent ideology to repress the contradictions that 
are always inherent to the doubt-laden enterprise of self.  
Falling Man’s narrative is, in a manner of speaking, 
hermetically sealed; it begins, ends and is distended by the 
same traumatic event. Hammad’s story is obviously driven through 
by grim inevitability, both ideologically and narratively 
oriented deathward. Keith, too, seems propelled by something 
unseen towards a reckoning, back to the moment of violent 
collision with the other. Having survived the attacks to begin 
the novel, he remains emotionally adrift throughout its pages. 
Lianne’s recollection of him after the attacks is that of a 
disembodied figure, “floating in reflected light, Keith in 
pieces, in small strokes” (127). If the collapse of the towers 
represents Keith’s alienation from his own body, his 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
begins by changing sexual object-libido into narcissistic libido and then, perhaps, goes on to give it another 
aim” (21-22).  
157 
 
rehabilitation exercises are a way to restore him to it, to the 
extent that they bring him back to a direct relationship with 
(and control over) his own form, limbs, breath. The distance 
that his psychic injury introduces between mind and body is 
ritually arrested, in an attempt to resurrect the body as the 
site of confrontation and injury. The exercises, Keith 
discovers, impel him not away from but toward the other, in his 
strangeness, as he practices them “four times a day”, like “an 
odd set of extensions and flexions that resembled prayer in some 
remote northern province, among a repressed people” (59). 
These two internally unstable subjectivities ultimately 
confront each other at the novel’s conclusion, in a bifurcated 
flashback of the attacks wherein Keith and Hammad’s viewpoints 
virtually dissolve into each other. Hammad’s narrative, from 
aboard one of the planes, disappears mid-paragraph into a “blast 
wave…that [sends] Keith Neudecker out of his chair and into a 
wall” (239). The viewpoint ostensibly shifts, oddly without 
interruption, to Keith’s perspective, but with the exclusive use 
of pronouns concealing any clear point of demarcation or 
narrative transfer, as if the characters briefly lose recourse 
even to their own names85. As the tower staggers from the impact, 
                                                             
85 An interesting variation of this device appears in one of Falling Man’s contemporaries, Cormac McCarthy’s 
The Road (2006), whose unnamed characters occupy a traumatized world—and text—that reduces them to 
simply “the man” and “the boy” for the novel’s entirety, as if to use a name in such a world would be to utter 
an obscenity. 
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the reader strains to understand whose perception of the turmoil 
is being described, whether the traumatized body being glimpsed 
in the maelstrom is Keith’s or Hammad’s (“He found himself 
walking into a wall…[t]he floor began to slide beneath him and 
he lost his balance…[h]e thought he saw the ceiling begin to 
ripple…[h]e was losing things as they happened”) (239-240). The 
world around the two seems not to clearly ‘belong’ to, or be 
intended by, either consciousness, as if the text itself has 
shattered and lost track of its subjects as they twist violently 
around each other. This final obnubilation, the losing of 
distinct narrative threads, or more accurately, their entwining, 
intensifies the novel’s traumatic impact. Falling Man’s world 
loses form and distinctness not because of the inherent sameness 
of its components but rather the dissipation of their distinct 
characteristics. The enervating effect of the novel’s anemic 
prose is thus itself the result of the near featureless world 
left behind by the attacks.86  
I argue that this resolution is a moment where I am I is 
overcome by which one am I?, an “indeterminateness”…[of] no 
determined being [where] anything can count for anything else…” 
                                                             
86 As Alessandra De Marco writes, “the collapse of the towers produces a physical vacuum, a spatial 
correlative of the psychic emptiness generated by the loss of thousands of lives” (16). 
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(Existence 58-59).87 The final image of the empty shirt, falling 
from heaven without the man who wore it, represents this 
dematerialization most clearly, and in doing so returns us to 
the il y a. The site of the ruined towers observes these very 
tenets of the il y a, and the other, symbolically rendered most 
radically as terrorist, invades, penetrates, and destabilizes 
the boundaries of self, not merely with imminence, but with the 
possibility of an immanence. The violence of the act of terror, 
in other words, not only threatens an over-proximity, it calls 
into question the very survival—and assumption—of an always 
autonomous, self-determining subject at the center of 
consciousness, i.e. from whose perspective terror is perceived. 
This, perhaps, is why DeLillo chooses to “gut” his style, why 
the novel’s prose is so emaciated: it is the sound of the muted 
voice of the lost subject in the middle of perception. 88  
                                                             
87 Recall Levinas’ description of “indeterminateness” I cited in chapter one, an “obscure invasion [in which] it 
is impossible to take shelter in oneself [and] what we call the I is itself submerged by the night.”  
88 A good part of Samuel Beckett’s middle period oeuvre , in particular Watt and The Unnameable (both 
published in 1953) can be read as a literary experiment in similarly desiccating both the empirical and ideal 
center at the heart of narrative origination. As P.J. Murphy has extensively detailed, Beckett was a careful and 
thorough reader of Kant during the 1930s and engaged Kant’s Critique in much of his writing from the period, 
in particular the latter’s “Copernican Revolution” which inverted the order of perception from object (things-
in-themselves) to subject. Watt’s titular character becomes an unlikely servant in the house of the elusive and 
absent Mr. Knott, whom Murphy reads as a clear reference to Kant, “a double negative whereby Beckett 
punningly sorts “can’t” from “cant,” the knowable from the unknowable” (199). Beckett describes Watt’s vain 
search for something to center himself in Mr. Knott’s allegorical house; on the house’s many peculiarities, 
such as the strange exchange between the Gall piano-tuners, Watt’s condition seems especially Kantian: “Watt 
did not know what happened...But he felt the need to think that such and such a that had happened then, the 
need to be able to say, when the scene began to unroll its sequences, Yes, I remember, that is what happened 
then” (61). Failing that, he considers the possibility of the world contained within the house as a priori, but 
without any faith in the transcendental enterprise, this does not take hold either (“Watt could not accept 
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The retreating of the mind into its deepest reaches and 
reserves as a self-preserving response to the rupture caused by 
an overwhelming experience naturally brings to mind Immanuel 
Kant’s formulation of the experience of the sublime. In his 
third critique, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, Kant 
describes the ‘sublime’ as not simply an experience that exceeds 
the imagination or the senses, nor as delimited to the feeling 
of being in some sense overwhelmed, but rather as a peculiar 
pleasure or displeasure ensuing from the relationship of 
consciousness to the world it perceives, or perhaps of self to 
not-self.89 Kant compares the distinction between a 
“disinterested” appreciation of beauty and the more sensual 
gratification that may be derived from it (the latter being too 
informed by and devoted to desire to allow for dispassionate 
aesthetic consideration), to a parallel differentiation between 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
them for what they perhaps were”). In The Unnameable, which dispenses entirely with a differentiation 
between phenomenal and noumenal, Beckett takes up Kant’s proposition directly, only to find the 
transcendental subject impossibly entangled in language. The subject at the center of synthetic a priori 
judgement, Beckett seems to imply, is an impossibility, at least as an expression in language. Murphy 
summarizes: “The Unnameable asserts that he is at the center and does not move…But as this novel spirals 
away from any would-be authorial control, it is excruciatingly obvious that there is no way to speak in a 
‘transcendental’ manner about an originating self since the very nature of language itself in its imaginative 
capacities ineluctably generates a host of fictional projections which need somehow to be accommodated” 
(204). Murphy reckons this Beckett’s “endarkenment” (207), ostensibly a turn away from reason and toward 
“pure imagination”, as evidenced by the author’s own admission in a 1956 interview to being a “non-knower, 
a non-can-er”, an author who was “not master of [his] own material” (“An Interview with Beckett” 148).    
89 This is admittedly a specific reading of Kant largely informed by traditional phenomenology, which 
significantly differs from structuralist, empirical or myriad other readings. To these possibilities as well as the 
many other aspects of the sublime in Kant (such as the distinction between the mathematically and 
dynamically sublime) I have little to usefully contribute, and as they do not directly interact with my 
discussion, except perhaps tangentially, I do not take them up herein.   
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fear and the sublime. Where fear primarily elicits the instinct 
to survive (fight-or-flight etc.), the sublime experience is one 
that occurs at a contemplative distance, from a posture that 
allows the rational mind to ‘witness’ the senses. “Just as we 
cannot pass judgment on the beautiful if we are seized by 
inclination and appetite,” Kant explains, “so we cannot pass 
judgment at all on the sublime in nature if we are afraid” 
(120).90 The feeling of sublimity, for Kant, is borne of this 
detachment, by confirming to the subject the presence of a 
rational, ineffable mind—irreducible to the senses—which is able 
to contemplate the danger, that is, rationally examine its own 
fear. The same experience that overwhelms the senses is made an 
object of study by the reasoning mind, which thus perceives 
itself as standing above nature.  
Kant’s examples, like his view of the sublime in general, all 
concern nature: hurricanes, volcanos, thunder and lightning, an 
overhanging rock (120). Yet he maintains that it is not the 
threat posed by these phenomena in and of themselves, i.e. some 
quality they possess or threshold they exceed, that produces the 
feeling of the sublime. The sublime is the distance (and the 
distancing) from the senses which experience these events and 
                                                             
90 Whether Kant intends to privilege exclusively nature or God as agents of the sublime, as most of his 
examples at least suggest, or more broadly any phenomena that can induce such feelings is difficult to 
ascertain. I take the latter position in my reading, as most phenomenological scholars have done.  
162 
 
the mind that considers them. The terms Kant uses to describe 
this higher mind seem to me to almost disembody it (though this 
would contradict a phenomenological understanding), as an 
infinity witnessing finitude:        
Compared to the might of any of these [natural 
phenomena], our ability to resist becomes an 
insignificant trifle…[yet] we like to call these 
objects sublime because they raise the soul's 
fortitude91 above its usual middle range and allow us 
to discover in ourselves an ability to resist which is 
of a quite different kind…For although we found our own 
limitation when we considered the immensity of 
nature…yet we also found, in our power of reason, a 
different and nonsensible standard that has this 
infinity itself under it as a unit; and since in 
contrast to this standard everything in nature is 
small, we found in our mind a superiority over nature 
itself in its immensity. In the same way…it reveals in 
us at the same time an ability to judge ourselves 
independent of nature, and reveals in us a superiority 
over nature that is the basis of a self-
preservation…(120-121) 
                                                             
91 Kant uses the word “Seelenstärke”, literally, “strength of soul”.  
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What is essential in this understanding, in spite of Kant’s 
focus on nature, is that although it may have catalysts in the 
world, the feeling of the sublime occurs in the subject. The 
particular awesome aspect in the world is thus largely 
subjective, decoupled from the feeling it produces which is 
instead a result of the mind ‘retreating’ from the inundated 
senses. As Richard Kearney has written, reading Kant, “it is 
because our mind discovers unsuspected depths within itself in 
the face of some immeasurable menace outside of us that we feel 
‘sublime’… The sublime may be understood, consequently, as an 
experience in the mode of the imaginary rather than of the real” 
(38-39).  
We must thus at least entertain the possibility of the 
sublime that is not induced by nature, but may arise from any 
event that produces for the senses the feeling of being deluged. 
Kant himself states flatly that “sublimity is contained not in 
any thing of nature, but only in our mind”, and that the sublime 
realization is “[when] we can become conscious of our 
superiority to nature within us, and thereby also to nature 
outside us” (123). Furthermore, the question of whether 
detachment from or “disinterestedness” in the event actually 
requires physical safety, or whether it can elsewise manifest is 
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one Kant also considers, as (for instance) in the case of war92, 
or as Kearney does, mass terror. These possibilities effectively 
further isolate the sublime at is most basic as a certain 
response of the ‘witness’ to preserve itself from what is 
overwhelming whether or not it is directly threatened, as by 
imminent injury or death, especially on an awe-inspiring scale.  
A more layered, though not necessarily contrasting, 
interpretation of the traumatized figures of Keith Neudecker 
here comes into view, not as consciousness simply shattered by 
the overwhelming act of terror, but as one that has retreated in 
the face of the (terribly) sublime. We catch a glimpse of him, 
walking numbly through the rubble of the collapsed towers, in 
Kearney’s description of “uniformed soldiers marching through 
the valley of death…their sublime indifference stemming from an 
uncanny detachment from the violence all around them as they 
evince an almost superhuman endurance of suffering” (39-40). In 
his rehabilitative rituals—the silent repetitions of which allow 
him to retain a distance from suffering, or rather, to observe 
himself suffering—we perceive what Friedrich Schiller, following 
Kant, described as a “sublime composure”, an “independence of 
                                                             
92 “Even war has something sublime about it if it is carried on in an orderly way and with respect for the 
sanctity of the citizens' rights. At the same time it makes the way of thinking of a people that carries it on in 
this way all the more sublime in proportion to the number of dangers in the face of which it courageously 
stood its ground” (122). 
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spirit in a state of suffering” (59).93 And, moreover, it is this 
very independence of the mind that perceives and bears witness 
to its own experience that is the position from which art, i.e. 
aesthetic consideration, is made possible.  
Kearney explains that, at least so far as Kant’s formulation 
of sublimity is concerned, the composure of the independent 
spirit “in the very midst of terror” (39) is not unlike the 
“aesthetic distance” from which we behold a traumatic event from 
afar, as in the case of “fictional or theatrical accounts of 
terror.” The occurrence of events or existence of phenomena from 
which one is at a “safe” distance, but which nonetheless engulf 
the senses and imagination incite a similar contradiction 
between sensory and the aesthetic experience. The experience of 
those who witnessed the events of September 11 on television is 
instructive therefore, as an instance of being thuswise at a 
safe distance from what is still traumatic to the imagination, 
as Kearney describes, a “double experience of: (1) suffering ‘as 
if’ [we are] present to the terror…and (2) detachment by virtue 
of [our] real absence from the scene itself” (41). Similarly, 
DeLillo’s fictional New Yorkers, like their real life 
                                                             
93 Literary attempts to depict this inner fortitude in the face of the gravest dangers are innumerable; one is 
reminded of Langston Hughes’ war poetry, certain of Hemingway’s characters, perhaps, as in Lieutenant 
Henry’s emotionally detached non-response to Catherine’s death in A Farewell to Arms (297), or Robert 
Jordan’s stoic death at the conclusion of For Whom the Bell Tolls [“holding onto himself very carefully and 
delicately” (490)]—dispassionately calm centres in the storm.     
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counterparts, seem to all experience the event from the same 
direction and distance, to be collectively and simultaneously 
within its orbit in a way which does not necessarily rely on 
their individual proximity to it. All senses, whether belonging 
to victims or witnesses, are confounded at once.  
Further, there is also the level at which we, as readers, 
recall the event in our own memories and the dread, almost like 
vertigo, that we feel at being returned to it even if we lived 
it only through media. Falling Man thus also raises important 
questions about the relationship between experience and feeling, 
whether and to what extent the latter is as tied to the former 
as we might typically believe. Though Kant maintained that the 
sublime exists only in the subject, his attribution of nature as 
the primary source of the sublime feeling leaves the matter 
somewhat unresolved. The idea of a subject who experiences the 
sublime within him or herself also again broaches the question 
of ‘where’ aesthetic discovery is located (i.e. in subject or 
object), whether it is an act of discovery, reflection, or 
realization through interaction and negotiation with the world. 
And, if the considering of art is, as it is often described, a 
sublime experience, is art itself then a twin of nature, capable 
of assailing and overwhelming our faculties without actually 
destroying us as well? Or is it that art is the harnessing of 
what is unimaginable or incomprehensible in nature, and indeed 
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the world, and that what separates it from everyday experience 
is its potential to trespass on consciousness, to transgress and 
disarm us? Might this be what separates ‘good’ art from ‘bad’, 
or consecrate moments in lived experience that qualify as 
‘artistic’, a sort of unmapped semi-distance between the 
objective (embedded) and subjective (phenomenological) aspects 
of reality? 
And what of the other, who simultaneously confirms and 
threatens the sanctity of self? The other’s incursion (as 
Falling Man’s final encounter most violently shows) results in 
the self seeking out a safe vantage point which appears 
identical, or at least adjacent, to the place from which the 
mind witnesses the sublime in nature or the aesthetic distance 
from which we contemplate art. Is otherness then a lost sibling, 
the third panel of a triptych (with art and nature) that folds 
into a single truth about experience?           
 Or maybe, it is more correct to think of art as messenger or 
prophet, the bearer of many terrible secrets that reveal to us 
the strangeness of nature and the otherness of the other. 
Perhaps the accumulated lesson of The Stranger, The Meursault 
Investigation, “Toba Tek Singh” and Falling Man is that the 
moment the self (as narrative ego) recoils from the encroachment 
of the other and discovers its inner defenses, i.e. the 
separation of body and spirit, is the very moment it experiences 
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the sublime. And this is the feeling that art seeks to explore 
and lay bare but is not separate from, as a triptych folds into 
itself. In the chapter that follows, I probe these questions and 
others that arise from a consideration of the ‘artistic moment’, 
its scarcity or abundance and the impression it leaves on us. 
----- 
“We think of the key, each in his prison 
Thinking of the key, each has built a prison” (346) 
- T.S. Eliot, The Wasteland original manuscript94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
94 In the finished poem, Eliot replaces “has built” with “confirms” (70). Taking both meanings together as call 
and response (both the creation and perpetuation of the self) is especially revealing I feel, referring us back to 
Hegel’s double movement, i.e. the self that requires thinking of “the key” of otherness to stave off its own 
dissolution.    
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The Tiger and the Whale 
 
 
“Have I gone mad?” Piscine Patel—the eponymous “Pi” from 
Spanish Canadian writer Yann Martel’s inventive 2001 novel Life 
of Pi—suddenly asks himself (109), just as he is about to help 
aboard his fledgling lifeboat a drowning Bengal tiger. Both boy 
and tiger have just survived a shipwreck that sets them alone 
and adrift in the Indian Ocean. His realization comes too late 
however, as the tiger finds his way aboard and Pi, by his own 
doing, is left alone in the boat with a wild animal. 
The tiger, who vacillates for much of the novel between being 
menacingly present (as rendered in Ang Lee’s film of the same 
name) and being enigmatically symbolic, bears a very human name: 
“Richard Parker”. How he comes about this name is essential to 
what we might perilously call the novel’s ‘purpose’, as well as 
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to interpreting the tiger as a narrative device. The origins of 
the name also evince the allegorical universe within which the 
novel exists, one that stubbornly resists scrutiny and 
demystification especially regarding the tiger’s existence and 
symbolic function.  
The novel begins in a framing device with Piscine, now an 
adult Canadian, reflecting on his childhood in south India in 
the 1970s and the events leading up to his quasi-religious 
experience with the tiger. He remembers himself as a precocious 
child, vexing his Hindu parents with an early onset of 
pluralistic spiritual curiosity; confronted by his parents 
together with a pandit, a priest and an imam about 
surreptitiously attending services in each religious tradition, 
he replies with a kind of pantheological, many-sided truth which 
foreshadows the later episode with the tiger and its many 
possible interpretations: “Bapu [Mahatma] Gandhi said, ‘All 
religions are true.’ I just want to love God” (76).  
Piscine’s family is bewildered by this turn but not quite 
hostile to it. His father smooths over the episode with the 
three religious leaders with a more secular trinity of ice cream 
sandwiches (77). His mother hopes his unorthodox beliefs are a 
phase “like Mrs. [Indira] Gandhi” (84), but is nonetheless 
defeated by his logic [“If there’s only one nation in the sky, 
shouldn’t all passports be valid for it?” (81)] and humors the 
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boy even as far participating in his baptism (85). His brother 
Ravi is less sympathetic to this improvised unification of 
different symbolic and representative orders. “So, Swami Jesus, 
will you go on the hajj this year?” he chides, “Have you found 
time yet to get the end of your pecker cut off and become a Jew? 
At the rate you’re going, if you go to temple on Thursday, 
mosque on Friday, synagogue on Saturday and church on Sunday, 
you only need to convert to three more religions to be on 
holiday for the rest of your life.” (78) 
Prior to leaving south India for Canada mainly due to Indira 
Gandhi’s Emergency impositions, Piscine’s parents own and 
operate a zoo in which Piscine learns many formative lessons and 
where he also first meets “Richard Parker” the tiger. Early in 
the story, Piscine’s father warns him and his brother about the 
dangers of interacting with the wild animals incautiously, that 
is, of believing any of them to be tame or predictable (36-42). 
“I’m going to show you how dangerous tigers are” (37) he tells 
them, as they watch a different caged Bengal tiger devour a 
goat. What’s vital about this lesson, the same one Piscine later 
learns from Richard Parker, is that the danger posed by an 
animal is not simply physical. What his father means to teach 
him is that anthropomorphization is not to be mistaken for 
understanding and, moreover, that the temptation to understand a 
wild animal is itself at the heart of dangers both physical and 
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epistemological: 
Just beyond the ticket booth Father had had painted on 
a wall in bright red letters the question: DO YOU KNOW 
WHICH IS THE MOST DANGEROUS ANIMAL IN THE ZOO? An arrow 
pointed to a small curtain…Behind it was a mirror. But 
I learned at my expense that Father believed there was 
another animal even more dangerous than us, and one 
that was extremely common, too, found on every 
continent, in every habitat: the redoubtable species 
Animalus anthropomorphicus, the animal as seen through 
human eyes. We’ve all met one, perhaps even owned one. 
It is an animal that is “cute”, “friendly”, “loving”, 
“devoted”, “merry”, “understanding”….They are the 
pendants of those “vicious”, “bloodthirsty”, “depraved” 
animals…In both cases we look at an animal and see a 
mirror. The obsession with putting ourselves at the 
centre of everything is the bane not only of 
theologians but also of zoologists. I learned the 
lesson that an animal is an animal, essentially and 
practically removed from us. (34) 
The juxtaposition of these two lessons, that man is the most 
dangerous of all creatures save for the reflection of himself he 
sees in other animals, is the profundity at the center of 
Martel’s book.  
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Anthropomorphism, as David Hume (and Thomas Hobbes before 
him) charged in his critique of theism, is not only a means to 
make an animal or other inanimate object less alien by 
conferring human properties onto it, it also allows us to 
similarly put a human face on the divine. What is most dreadful 
and incomprehensible in our experience of the universe, such as 
the indifference of nature, appears less so the more it 
resembles our appearance or behavior. Anthropomorphosis, as a 
desire to disclose the unknowable in an animal, is in this sense 
only an episode in the human proclivity to strain towards 
demystifying many equally incalculable mysteries. Hume’s warning 
in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion seems prescient when 
considering the lesson Piscine’s father teaches him—they are in 
fact, essentially the same counsel, only with God’s infinite 
separateness from us in the place of the same absolute removal 
in an animal: “His ways are not our ways. His attributes are 
perfect, but incomprehensible. And this volume of nature 
contains a great and inexplicable riddle, more than any 
intelligible discourse or reasoning…by representing the Deity as 
so intelligible and comprehensible, and so similar to a human 
mind, we are guilty of the grossest and most narrow partiality, 
and make ourselves the model of the whole universe” (67).  
What is both terrible and deific about an animal is that, 
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like a God, it belongs to an order or mode of reality which 
cannot be readily made identifiable by human cognition, i.e. 
empathically identified as another who is ‘like us’.95 As his 
efforts to understand Richard Parker later reveal to Piscine 
more explicitly, Life of Pi can credibly be read as a parable 
about reducing God—and therefore everything unfamiliar—to a 
single (and finite) order of meaning.  
Martel has himself written about the connection between the 
animal and deific symbols he observed while travelling in India. 
In a short contribution to The Guardian in 2007, he writes about 
the trip he took to India in 1996 which inspired Life of Pi:  
I noticed the animals first. Not just the obvious 
sacred cows of India, or the loudly cawing crows, or 
the tribes of monkey, or the other living animals that 
openly go about India's urban density. In Hindu 
temples, entered because they were both bustling and 
peaceful, I became aware of the many animals of 
Hinduism: Hanuman the monkey, Ganesha the elephant-
headed, Nandi the bull, Garuda the eagle, and so on. 
The gods followed. The many Hindu gods, of course. But 
                                                             
95 Of course, this is by no means an obscure or secondary dimension of God as understood by most ancient 
and contemporary traditions. As Louis H. Feldman notes in his book Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World, 
monotheism as understood in Jewish law and philosophy expressly influenced Pythagoras and other Greek 
philosophers towards an unrepresentable God (201-203), and the Greek poet Xenophanes criticized the 
Homeric tradition on these same terms in the 6th century B.C.E, when he wrote of the “one god [who] is the 
greatest among gods and men, not at all like mortals in body or in thought” (Fragment 23, pg. 31).   
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round the corner from where the Hindu gods lived there 
was always a church or a mosque or a temple of another 
faith, each with its share of gods. So many animals, so 
many gods - what were we in that multitude? (“Into the 
Void”) 
As Jentsch tells us, whether animal, god or a shadow against 
the wall, the assigning of human properties to what is 
frightening makes us feel safer. Giving a tiger a name bestows 
upon it a level of individual acquaintanceship and assuages some 
of the fear it incites. The story of Richard Parker’s name 
further illustrates this point. We are told that, as a cub, the 
tiger who features in the story was captured along with its 
mother in the wild by a hunter—named Richard Parker—who named 
the cub “Thirsty” after it chose the water it was offered over 
food. A shipping clerk, however, errantly swapped the tiger’s 
name with the man’s on its official papers, and so the animal 
inherits the distinction of a proper name while the hunter, as 
the vanguard of actual and symbolic human violence, becomes the 
mononymous and aptly named Thirsty (147-148). 
Naming is of course one of the first epistemological 
resources we have, not only as regards fear but our desire for 
intimacy as well, as the naming of a child (or a pet etc.) 
begins a knowing of it—essentially the journey from ‘it’ to ‘he’ 
or ‘she’. But, as we have learned from Levinas and Trinh, the 
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power to explicate anticipates the power to dominate, in that 
what is other can only be reduced to our understanding through 
epistemic violence which begins with the associative properties 
of words. The danger inherent in such a method of divination is 
that (in addition to often being incorrect) it necessarily 
places at the determining center of the universe—knowable and 
unknowable—the reasoning human consciousness, for whom the 
desire to understand can never be separate from the desire for 
self-preservation. In a sense then, the process of 
familiarization always carries with it a great risk, the same 
one of which Piscine’s father warned: that we will forget that 
the names we have given to things are not inherent to them and 
do not encapsulate them. In short, that we will mistake the word 
for the world.96  
 
After finally washing up on a beach in Mexico and surviving 
his ordeal, Piscine’s experience at sea unsurprisingly undergoes 
trials of epistemic scrutiny that anticipate the readers’ own 
questions. Pressed by skeptical interviewers from the “Japanese 
Ministry of Transport” annotating the sinking of the ship, 
Piscine presents two versions of the story of his time at sea, 
                                                             
96 I borrow this lucid phrase from Garry Leonard and Deirdre Flynn, who observe: “The word can create a 
world that is not “the world” at all, but a thought-enchanted effect of words: charming no doubt, but also 
ephemeral, ultimately arbitrary, and with no real ability to alter the world that continues behind the tapestry 
words can weave” (Necessary Fictions Chapter 2: “Nothing to be Done”). 
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one with the tiger and one without (324-353). The latter 
accounts for some of the improbabilities of the former, but 
contains others of its own. “Doesn’t that make life a story?” 
(335) he rhetorically asks the agents, “You can’t prove which 
story is true and which is not. You must take my word for it” 
(352). And when the interviewers agree that, plausibility aside, 
the story with the tiger is the better one, Martel makes the 
allegory of the divine explicit (“And so it goes with God”).  
Still, though the tiger behaves like an avatar of God and the 
symbolic territory of the sacred, it lends itself to various 
other semiotic uses both religious and secular, and its actual 
relationship to any one of them in the text remains relatively 
oblique.97 What the tiger ultimately defies is the choosing of a 
“story” to the exclusion of all others. Through the advice of 
Piscine’s father, placed early in the bildungsroman, Martel 
seems to be warning us off attempting any stable reading of 
Richard Parker. Piscine himself never achieves one; Richard 
Parker’s true purpose, identity and fate, like the questions 
about truth and God which Piscine (as a child) does not believe 
have a singular answer, are not restrained by a single order of 
                                                             
97 A particular feature of an animal as a representation of the unknown in literature, for instance, is that it 
traditionally doubles as an avatar (of the divine incarnate) or as a symbol of the secular/ material world (of 
the Fall). In a sense, we are in an animal confronted not only with a duality of spirit and flesh but the 
possibility of all one or all the other. Martel’s novel here seems to clearly follow Melville, as I discuss later in 
this chapter.   
178 
 
‘truth’. The tiger instead enacts diffuse, though occasionally 
intersecting, strains of meaning.98 He oscillates between 
protector (166) (283), threat (155) (228) and subservient (183) 
(209), but Piscine’s tenuous control over him—both 
temperamentally and ontologically—lasts only as long as the 
moment they find land and their companionship is ended. “Richard 
Parker” then becomes a tiger again, disappearing silently into 
the trees but not before denying Piscine (and the reader) any 
sense of acknowledgement, vindication or even an expression of 
defiance. The tiger’s last act is to give no response at all, 
signalling only an animal indifference—to assert in other words 
itself as tiger and not “Richard Parker”: “At the edge of the 
jungle, he stopped. I was certain he would turn my way. He would 
look at me. He would flatten his ears. He would growl. In some 
such way, he would conclude our relationship. He did nothing of 
the sort. He only looked fixedly into the jungle. Then Richard 
Parker, companion of my torment, awful, fierce thing that kept 
me alive, moved forward and disappeared forever from my life” 
(315-316).  
Whether we read Martel’s tiger as an unassociated signifier 
or as a meeting of the sacred and the secular, what emerges are 
other, harder choices: all aspects of a symbol or none, nothing 
                                                             
98 Recall also Woolf’s simultaneous fugal voices in The Waves I considered in chapter 2. Unlike Woolf’s six 
narrators though, Martel’s tiger essentially contains many ‘voices’ within itself. 
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or everything, many (all?) truths or no truth. In a USA Today 
interview given after the success of Life of Pi’s film 
adaptation, Martel spoke directly to the similarity between the 
multifaceted nature of art and the many faces of the divine, in 
so far as they are each beyond our ability to make mean one 
distinct thing: “My background is very, very secular…” he 
explains, “Among the educated middle class, religion is sort of 
replaced by art. If you want to understand life, you don't pray 
to God, you consult with Mozart or Picasso or with Tolstoy or 
Voltaire.” In a very conscious and deliberate way, Life of Pi 
thus points us back to the question of literary/artistic 
symbolism and the extent to which they “contain” or are 
catalysts for the meaning that we take away from them. As in 
nature, in trying to decipher what is concealed in art, do we 
not both assume the presence of inner, excavatable (and 
therefore finite) truths which are ours to take away? And yet, 
if these are merely illusory, a creation of our fever dreams, 
what is it then in a particular book, painting or piece of music 
that compels us? For literature, art, or language itself to 
possess a life independent from us, must not it contain secrets 
it jealousy withholds? Or, perhaps is a there a third answer, 
some Solomonic compromise which is yet not simply arbitrary? 
 
In the second chapter of his book Plough, Sword and Book 
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(1988) on the transition of agrarian societies into modern 
industrial ones, the social anthropologist Ernest Gellner 
explains that the ‘evolution’ in question from one to the other 
was not limited to changes in social and economic organization, 
values, mobility etc., but also included more fundamental shifts 
in how meaning is apprehended and then communicated in language. 
The bedrocks of post-Enlightenment societies, empiricism and 
rational discourse (i.e. language based on statements of fact), 
are intrinsically co-dependent in creating and sustaining what 
Gellner calls a “cross-related…single logical space” (61). He 
names this threshold—through which human societies pass to 
become ‘modern’—“single-strandedness”, by which societies become 
rationally “coherent” and “[r]eason enters history” (45). The 
moniker is appropriate (if somewhat reductive). It describes a 
basic orientation towards the world and its patterns, as 
complicated but ultimately discernible through the labor of 
human reasoning. Such a conviction understands “meaning” as 
underpinned by a cross-referenced, consistent and reliable 
network of truths, which can pass largely unadulterated through 
human cognition and into language. Gellner attributes much of 
the advancement of ‘simple’ societies into ‘complex’ ones to 
this very recent epistemic shift.99  
                                                             
99It is interesting and perhaps appropriate that contemporary art (from the Modernists onwards) has often 
cut the opposite way, questioning the monolithic role of rationalism within the project of ‘modernity’—i.e. as 
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Gellner further explains that single-stranded societies are 
juxtaposed with and preceded by “multi-stranded” ones, in which 
the veracity of any linguistic expression—and therefore of the 
‘truth’ it contains—relies not on its relationship to 
reproducible observations of a stable world but rather on social 
contexts and relationships. In such societies, what meaning a 
text, a feature of the landscape or other shared symbology has 
largely depends on what is culturally or religiously agreed 
upon, a framework thus quite apart from empirical observation. 
The ‘truth’ in the sense that traditional societies have 
understood it is thus better understood as free-standing, in the 
sense that it neither belongs to nor is validated by a universal 
network of meaning that adheres to empirical rational 
discrimination. This truth, we might venture to say, has both 
many faces and none, being untethered from a one-to-one 
relationship with any experience or object outside its context, 
i.e. with whatever may originate solely in the world.100  
Yet, though it seems indispensable to the legacy of 
industrialism and modernity in general, this change in 
orientation was not necessarily specifically intended. In his 
interpretation of Gellner’s theory as it applies to the work of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
a belief that is not a belief, or perhaps a belief to end all beliefs.  
100 Whether experience without the intermediation of context to modify it is even conceivable, as Hegel, 
Derrida and others have argued it is not, is a separate though relevant and compelling question.  
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Ralph Waldo Emerson, Neal Dolan calls the emergence of “single-
stranded” thought “a cognitive-linguistic-by-product of the 
advance of natural science and the industrial-liberal division 
of labor” (223). Gellner holds that the incongruity of these 
worldviews is not only structural, it is also the result of 
pursuing different quarries, distinct ideas about ‘knowledge’ 
which lead to the application of very different perceptual 
tools. Gellner summarizes: 
An instrumental and more or less quantified rationality 
presupposes a single measure of value, in terms of 
which alternative strategies can be assessed. When 
there is a multiplicity of incommensurate values, some 
imponderable, a man can only feel, and allow his 
feelings to be guided by the overall expectations or 
preconceptions of his culture. He cannot calculate. 
Single-mindedness and cold assessment of options, by 
contrast, when it does obtain, requires a rather 
special social setting, and one that is generally 
absent from simpler societies. (45)101  
Dolan’s study of Emersonian liberalism and its influence on 
contemporary art and culture also explores Emerson’s call for 
                                                             
101 It is notable that Martel’s Piscine, as a framing device for his recollections, tells the reader that after 
reaching Canada he completed a double major in religious studies and zoology (3). “Sometimes I got my 
majors mixed up” (5) he admits, as if in his adult life he is still trying to reconcile two different worldviews, 
two “stories” to understand his childhood, the symbolic and the analytical.  
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robust and systematic meaning systems in the post-industrial 
era. What is arguably unique about what we loosely refer to as 
‘modernity’ is that its logical coherence rests in large part on 
the claim that it no longer needs to rest on such a framework. 
Emerson, as Dolan expounds—particularly in the former’s 
“Representative Men” lectures—was deeply concerned about that 
particular development, the absence of a symbolic 
systematization within modernity’s ethos. Symbols and icons, 
whether sacred or secular, were for Emerson essential for 
providing the masses a semblance of meaning in the new secular 
zeitgeist of the nineteenth century. A symbology, grounded in 
nature and the transcendent, were to his mind essential to a 
society’s spiritual and moral health. As Dolan illustrates, 
Emerson believed that without such a system, we are left to 
contend with our doubts that the “world is intelligibly ordered 
and thus not impossible to navigate and survive in” (226).  
The work of creating and promulgating a stable iconographic 
order, Emerson believed, was as essential for the secular age 
(single-stranded civilizations) as for earlier eras. In their 
most elementary forms, after all, ‘rational deduction’ and 
‘socioculturally derived meaning’ are not entirely different 
(i.e. as ways of meaning making). Each must begin, inarguably, 
by interpreting experience, so that it does not remain in a 
state of total disorder. Each subsequently constructs a meaning 
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system governed by its own rules, which is therefore self-
referential. And each is engaged, as Dolan writes of the work of 
the men Emerson chose for his titular “representative men”, in 
“transmuting the potentially infinite and thus overwhelming raw 
data of experience” (231). The difference, where there is one, 
perhaps lies then in the extent to which any approach is self-
reflexive, i.e. whether it considers itself to be an ontology 
and one amongst many such. If all we have is a choice of 
symbols, in other words, sorting through them is perhaps 
possible only to the extent of determining which symbolical 
architectures call attention to themselves. Roughly speaking, a 
“single-stranded” orientation, rather by definition, presupposes 
itself as transparent, a way to look not a symbol that 
represents an object in the world, but rather at the object 
world itself. It is a symbolic order whose founding ideology is 
that it is post-symbolic.  
These varying approaches to truth have interesting 
permutations as far as literary symbolism and metaphor are 
concerned, on at least two distinct levels, (i) the relationship 
of symbols embedded in the text to truth in the context of that 
text, i.e. to the ‘object’ for which they stand in, and (ii) the 
readers’ ability to take away meaning from these symbols, either 
by teasing it out from the text or attributing one to them. 
Emerson placed great faith and value in literature, as a pure 
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contemplation of nature, to not only perceive and convey truth 
but even to restore meaning to modern life, to undo the latter’s 
many distortions. In essays like 1844’s “The Poet”, he seems to 
describe literature in near sacred terms, capable of peering 
through or transcending the suffering caused by human 
misapprehension of God and nature. “[T]he evils of the world are 
such only to the evil eye.” he writes, “For as it is dislocation 
and detachment from the life of God, that makes things ugly, the 
poet, who reattaches things to nature and the Whole,—re-
attaching even artificial things, and violations of nature, to 
nature, by a deeper insight,—disposes very easily of the most 
disagreeable facts” (455). 
Here going beyond even “transmuting…the raw data of 
experience” into a meaningful symbolic meta-structure, Emerson’s 
trust in the poet’s contemplation, rooted in the indefatigably 
self-reliant subject, went as far as rediscovering the true 
nature of things, making them speak their truth and thereby 
revealing “evil” as rooted in misconception. He explicitly lays 
out this exalted purpose in the same essay, writing: 
the poet is he who can articulate [the world]…The poet, 
by an ulterior intellectual perception, gives [symbols] 
a power which makes their old use forgotten, and puts 
eyes, and a tongue, into every dumb and inanimate 
object…This is true science. The poet alone knows 
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astronomy, chemistry, vegetation, and animation, for he 
does not stop at these facts, but employs them as 
signs. He knows…why the great deep is adorned with 
animals, with men, and gods… (456)  
What is unsaid in these passages, perhaps being too obvious a 
supposition to declare, is that for poetry (and so literature) 
to have this power of divination, the truth it reveals and 
restores us to must somehow be within the bounds of human 
perception, visible in its nakedness—single-stranded. 
Colloquially speaking, we must be able to ‘know it when we see 
it’ if indeed we really commit to looking (as does a poet).  
This foundational confidence of Emerson’s Transcendentalism 
was undoubtedly grounded in his theological orientation and 
background as a pastor, but I argue it also underwrites a 
significant strain of our thinking on how to approach art. For 
is not art, approached as an extrasensory perception that can 
“articulate” the deepest truth, then posited as the sharpest of 
our empirical tools, making knowable what is otherwise radically 
other? What relationship would art so conceived have to what is 
inarticulable (sublime), to multi-stranded meaning which 
purports to be beyond empiricism, as in the nature of God? Or is 
this actually what Emerson means by “truth”? 
The exaltation of poetry is consistent with Emerson’s wider 
project of recovering the sacred in modern life through 
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introspection and self-discovery. These ideas were for his 
contemporaries and successors deeply influential, even those 
that did not always agree. Herman Melville, who once after 
hearing Emerson speak paid him a high compliment in one of his 
letters [“I love all men who dive. Any fish can swim near the 
surface, but it takes a great whale to go down stairs five miles 
or more” (“To Evert” 121)] nonetheless deeply disagreed with 
Emerson on the grounds of truth, evil and the sacred in art. In 
his letters, Melville admits to forming at first a rather low 
opinion of Emerson without having read much of him, but later 
discovering a new respect for him after having done so. Still, 
as William Braswell researched for American Literature in 1937, 
though Melville was often struck by Emerson’s sincerity and 
integrity, he found much to criticize in what he read of the 
latter’s essays. Beside the last line of the aforementioned 
passage in “The Poet”, for instance (“He knows…”), Melville 
wrote in the margins of his personal copy of the essays, “Would 
some poet be pleased to tell us ‘why.’[then]…Will Mr.E.?”102  
This discord, in my estimation, is a useful way to think 
about the symbolic in literature, as it reiterates approximately 
the same dispute we encounter in Martel, namely: what is the 
                                                             
102 Like Emerson, Melville’s position was probably informed by his own life, famously tumultuous as it was. As 
Braswell explains, the “unhappy result of Melville’s search for some purpose in the universe explains…[why] 
he did not share Emerson’s enthusiasm over the poet’s ability to reconcile man to the deepest mysteries” 
(324).     
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relationship of symbols to truth, and relatedly, does reaching 
for that truth through art bring us closer to truth submerged 
(the sacred, sublime, the other etc.) or push it further away? 
Life of Pi’s spiritual ancestor, Melville’s Moby Dick (1851) was 
in many ways the most profound and direct text to ask these 
questions. Though a deep dive into that text’s multitudes is far 
beyond the scope of my discussion here, I do specifically want 
to consider the whale in the context of Melville’s disagreements 
with Emerson.  
There is nothing approaching a critical rubric to understand 
the whale as a symbol. Its confounding effect on the imagination 
of most readers can (and has) been read as alternatively 
nihilistic or epiphanic. Far from Emerson’s vision of the 
oracular poet, Melville’s text, as innumerable critics have 
observed, is permeated, even ruled by doubt; its ‘spiritual’ 
territory is the space that lies between revelation and despair. 
This is partially attributable to the ambivalence of the quest 
itself, being at once a search for the divine and a hunt for it. 
Ahab is at once a zealot and a profaner, as Daniel G. Hoffman 
has noted, a Faustian figure rebelling against God all the while 
on a quest to find Him and to slay evil on his behalf (206-207).  
Melville’s careful delineation of the whale’s pantheological 
nature, partially a function of the author’s nineteenth century 
secular sensibilities, nonetheless exists alongside his overt 
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references to the Book of Jonah. Though it casts significant 
doubt on the accessibility of truth, Moby Dick—as an allegory—
seems to provisionally fulfill Emerson’s desire for a secular-
literary reinvestment in symbols of the divine, i.e. the sacred 
within the structure of the secular. In this sense, the book on 
its surface sits comfortably in the tradition of nineteenth 
century American popular scholarship, which, as Dolan points 
out, was deeply invested in the same synthesis of the sacred and 
the secular of which Emerson was a vocal proponent.103 In 
providing an oracular symbol, Melville seems ostensibly to take 
up Emerson’s project. Yvonne Sherwood writes “Moby Dick…may 
‘hear’ the book of Jonah from the perspective of the-man-
(Ishmael)-in-the-pew, but it’s a sign of the times…the-man-in-
the-pew is now an (a)gnostic, prone to subversive readings of 
biblical literature. In Moby Dick, the God of Jonah mixes, as he 
could never have done before, with Egyptian and Hindu deities 
and the gods of Greek mythology to become the ‘universal thump’ 
(Moby Dick 28)” (191-192). Melville’s Ishmael is dogged in his 
descriptions of the whale, laboring to rise to Emerson’s 
challenge to see what is hidden in nature. The whale (unlike 
                                                             
103 The renowned “lyceum movement” of public debates, performances and lectures by public intellectuals in 
nineteenth century America doubled as a means of public education and—in a formal sense—a secular 
oracular tradition. Emerson was deeply enamored by its possibilities for a public discourse that included all 
the many strains of intellectual and spiritual contemplation, wherein a lecturer could give all of himself to an 
audience that was left changed by what Dolan incisively calls “linguistic transubstantiation” (229).  
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Martel’s tiger) is made by Melville’s exhaustive descriptions 
more flesh than apparition.  
Yet the whale as symbol is both laden with meaning and 
meaningless, i.e. a vessel for both the presence and absence of 
the sacred. Even as he attempts to truly see the whale, to make 
it ‘speak’, Ishmael repeatedly runs up against the impossibility 
of this task. He decides first that the whale conceals its face, 
and then that it has no face at all. Like Piscine haunted by 
Richard Parker’s unreadable body language on the edge of the 
trees, Ishmael writes of the whale: “in his general body, full 
of strangeness, and unaccountable to his most experienced 
assailant. Dissect him how I may, then, I but go skin deep; I 
know him not, and never will. But if I know not even the tail of 
this whale, how understand his head? much more, how comprehend 
his face, when face he has none? Thou shalt see my back parts, 
my tail, he seems to say, but my face shall not be seen…hint 
what he will about his face, I say again he has no face” (366). 
Elsewhere he elevates and even exalts the whale’s same lack of 
distinct facial features and utter lack of speech (“Has the 
Sperm Whale ever written a book, spoken a speech? No, his great 
genius is declared in his doing nothing particular to prove it. 
It is moreover declared in his pyramidical silence”) (338). The 
change of heart, between veneration and condemnation, of course 
ultimately anticipates Ahab’s death at the hands of the god he 
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ventures too far to see, the disinterred symbol that, when it 
speaks at last, utters only the word death.  
Both tiger and whale are thus, to my mind, ultimately united 
as the residue of the sacred rather than the sacred itself, not 
the face of God as much as God’s face turned away. Ishmael hints 
at a divine indifference in chapter 41, as if he has ultimately 
deemed the allegorical power of the Book of Jonah on the whale 
to be wanting. He looks upon Ahab and, instead of a prophet, he 
sees now the “ungodly old man, chasing with curses a Job’s whale 
round the world” [italics mine] (188). The crucial shift (though 
unassuming, occurring in the text proper only once until the 
epilogue) from Jonah’s whale to Job’s Leviathan104, recasts not 
only Ahab but the whale as well. The symbolic whale twists and 
contorts, hiding and then changing its face, and each time the 
meaning it quickens escapes along with it.  
Hoffman reads Ahab’s condition as essentially human, defined 
by the space between these two creatures, the two whales: the 
whale as a Revelation of God’s purpose and the Leviathan as the 
withholding of it. Jonah’s whale implies the voice of the God 
who spoke, while Job’s Leviathan is a primeval (and originally 
                                                             
104 See Job 40:41, which describes a creature Leviathan beyond human understanding and control. Of the 
finitude of human knowledge God asks Job at the end of his many torments: “Canst thou draw out leviathan 
with a fish-hook? (40:25) and “Who can uncover the face of his garment? Who shall come within his double 
bridle? Who can open the doors of his face?” (41:5-6). As if speaking to Ahab himself, these are asked of Job to 
remind him of all that lies beyond his ability and rights to know, i.e. to warn him off the sort of quest Ahab 
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pagan) creature of an earlier, more terrifying view of the 
cosmos. Ishmael’s specific invocation of Job turns Ahab’s quest 
inside out, from search to hunt. But the lesson of Job is that 
God cannot be hunted, and it is this same lesson Ahab refuses to 
learn: to restrain in himself the desire to make the whale 
speak, to demand the tiger turn around, to make God explain 
himself.  
Moby Dick is thus not just concerned with what is radically 
other about an animal, but also about the limits of what nature 
and its symbols can teach us about God. Melville’s view of the 
natural word, unlike Emerson’s, seems to be that nature and 
therefore natural symbolism cannot be taken for truth—they are 
the works of God, both good and evil, but provide few if any 
hints about His purpose. Lawrence Buell similarly asks: “shall 
we say that Melville works with a different yet equally 
legitimate conception from Emerson of what it means to acquaint 
men at first hand with the Deity?…What Melville sought to 
acquaint men with was a different yet equally salient attribute 
of the divine: the Deity as mystery, the experience of Job” 
(68). Like Richard Parker, Melville’s whale is truth submerged, 
a creature of God and not God, an instrument of the divine 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
undertakes to learn the nature and workings of God. The line is explicitly and severely drawn in 38:11:  “And 
[God] said: 'Thus far shalt thou come, but no further; and here shall thy proud waves be stayed'.” 
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rather the divine itself.105 In deifying the whale, Ahab 
effectively mistakes a symbol for a truth (the signifier for the 
signified). I am inclined to agree with Hoffman when he 
summarizes the novel’s great insight into human exasperation 
standing before the gates of divine knowledge or, just the same, 
in reading the symbolic: 
Ahab mistook God's power for God’s essence…All of 
Ishmael's explorations of the attempts made in art, 
science, folklore and myth, to define the whale are a 
contradictory labyrinth of suppositions which only his 
own experience can verify. And that experience proves 
the white whale unknowable to the last. If, then, we 
cannot know God's greatest handiwork, how can we know 
the God that made him? On this reef many an interpreter 
of Moby-Dick has foundered…Moby-Dick is no more the God 
of Moby-Dick than Leviathan is the God of the Book of 
Job…Melville's God lies beyond even the Gospel truths. 
(217) 
Again, we are left doublevisioned about the symbol and the 
sacred; reading Melville it is as if the former can only point 
at the latter when it is no longer there. The space between 
                                                             
105 Emerson seems to agree, after a fashion, when he writes: “Things admit of being used as symbols, because 
nature is a symbol, in the whole, and in every part. Every line we can draw in the sand, has expression; and 
there is no body without its spirit or genius” (452). The difference with Moby Dick of course, is that it never 
becomes possible to determine what the “expression” is.     
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Emerson and Melville appears as vast as the “howling infinite” 
(117) of Melville’s ocean, Emerson’s inspired poet seeing 
clearly through the veil while the Pequod founders in an ocean 
which is “shoreless, indefinite as God.”  
Melville may have reconsidered his view of Emersonianism as 
“oracular gibberish” once he had acquainted himself with 
Emerson’s writings, but their disagreement takes place on no 
less hallowed a territory than ‘what is truth, how do we find it 
and how do we then describe it to others, i.e. with what signs?’ 
This problem is explicitly considered within Moby Dick, but 
where Emerson saw the profound untapped potential of human 
contemplation and introspection, Melville seems to find only the 
limits of these. The self-reliant (and determining) subject at 
the heart of meaning making, Moby Dick implies, is still all 
alone with that meaning, a creature of his own imagination with 
no lasting recourse to any truth outside of it.  
 
Symbols are meaningful to the extent that we tacitly (even 
unconsciously) acquiesce to their encroachment, to allow them a 
second life within us. In other words, they don’t simply ‘mean 
what they mean’. The meaning of a particular symbol is like an 
incomplete sentence we must finish. Each symbol lives myriad 
lives, profound or cheap, obvious or obscure, meaningful and 
meaningless, without materially changing of itself. Naturally, 
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symbolic meaning is informed to a great extent by the context in 
which it is experienced and by our changeability as an audience, 
our sociocultural background, our mood, what other symbols we 
have consumed etc. Whether one takes the Emersonian view of the 
subject who discloses the secrets within the symbolic or the 
Melvillean, of one who is defeated by them, meaning and meaning 
making are necessarily mediated by consciousness and then by 
reflection, as a great novel is recognized as great only 
retroactively, once contextualized with its peers (and perhaps 
if enough readers consider it so). What is imperative to realize 
is that we often do not experience meaning in this sense, as a 
series of subjective associations and choices. We are ‘moved’ by 
art, ‘struck’ by a great painting, overwhelmed by a great piece 
of music. We feel viscerally exposed by a great literary insight 
or metaphor. Art seems alive in this sense, scheming to catch us 
unawares, invade us when our guard is down, and the symbolic in 
art seems thus to exist independent of us, not on its surface 
(as artifice) but inside, in the strange, deep waters of Job’s 
Leviathan.  
Yet art is made of stuff, word, watercolor, the drawing of 
bow across string. Speaking matter-of-factly, it emerges not out 
of the ocean or a dream but from under the editor’s knife or 
photographer’s darkroom. In some sense then the deep symbolic 
territory of art must still have a surface; Melville’s whale may 
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turn its face from Ahab and Ishmael, but the reader of Moby Dick 
still has before them the text as face. We are implicated in the 
event, in making or trying to make the text speak, in much the 
same way as Ahab is with the whale. As readers, we must decide 
how much attention we pay to the underworld of symbolic meaning 
within vs the sleight of hand on the surface, i.e. whether we 
focus or unfocus our eyes. Richard Lanham has called this a 
matter of noticing a “style”, which we either look at or 
through, i.e. at the surface or through it at the deep. Both 
possibilities exist at once, of course, and can closely follow 
each other. We can focus or unfocus—in a manner of speaking, 
hear the music of the orchestra or the creaking of the players’ 
chairs etc. Emerson’s oracular poet, who “traverses the whole 
scale of experience” (448) for meaningful moments asks us to 
look through the refraction and see the source. His art is a 
keyhole into truth, an opening into the universe. Each symbol is 
a portal directed aslant at the same unifying truth, as the full 
truth of nature is expressed in each of its signs. As Emerson 
puts it “there is no fact in nature which does not carry the 
whole sense of nature” (454).  
Melville meanwhile tells us, quite unambiguously, that way 
madness lies. Having exhausted every available resource to make 
the symbol speak we are left with only the symbol itself, like 
Ahab, looking at a surface through which we cannot see. Which 
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one does art, in portraying nature and otherness, ask of us? To 
try to understand or to forswear understanding? The world 
revealed or the world that is beyond revelation? Or are these 
choices again only choices in retrospect, after the moment has 
already been lived?  
The answer, unsurprisingly, is always incomplete (recalling 
Hegel), since it refers to a process that is always ongoing. 
“‘Clarity’,” Lanham explains, “can only indicate a reader’s 
decision, for whatever reasons, to look through a style rather 
than at it, to concentrate on content and ignore style. And my 
reasons for doing this may not coincide with yours. My opacity 
may be your transparency. The whole apparatus depends entirely 
on a previous assumption of shared norms” (189). The key word 
here is “apparatus”, which emphasizes neither subject nor text 
but the moment in which one encounters the symbolic. The 
experience of art (and artistic insight), in a sense, is a 
simultaneous act of looking at and looking through. It lies 
neither in a stable work nor in a stable subject but in the 
approach, which destabilizes both. It is in interacting with 
at/through that we allow ourselves an experience of the full 
spectrum, the canvas and the painting, or the music and the 
noise.  
The binary idea of meaning as lying either in the symbol/ 
work or in the determining subject is thus inherently flawed as 
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point of departure, an “Aristotelian scheme” as Lanham calls it, 
which “introduced a fundamental distortion into Western 
thought…[which] radically confused the relationship between 
reader, text and reality” (213). The scheme alleged here is 
single-strandedness, the “self-standing idea and the transparent 
verbal surface.” Lanham’s point gets at the heart of the 
difficulty the symbols pose, the way they wrong-foot us by being 
both a thing that stands in for something else and a thing in 
and of itself. To read a text either as a surface or to look 
through it at its ‘meaning’ is thus a false choice, in that it 
does not reflect (or even entirely ignores) the actual act of 
looking, making “the continuing oscillation between At and 
Through vision seem to be an either/or choice only, slicing the 
full wave-form in half…[and] a dynamic interchange seem a static 
tableau.”  
I briefly discussed Woolf’s novel To the Lighthouse in 
chapter two with regard to language and signification. As it 
takes up the key concern, through Lily Briscoe, of what Lanham 
calls an “interchange”, I want to return to it for a moment 
here. Like Piscine and Ahab, Lily Briscoe must contend with an 
ostensibly opaque symbol, the lighthouse, whose ‘essence’—or 
lack thereof—and how it responds to depiction seems to shift 
with each appearance and viewpoint. Though it lives, unlike Moby 
Dick, above the waves and in full view, we are never told what 
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the lighthouse means. Each character seems to perceive it 
slightly differently, and every trick of light seems to change 
its face, bring it closer or further away (211; 246). It 
responds unpredictably to memory; in part three James Ramsay, 
(the youngest of the eight Ramsay children), looking upon it 
across the water, reflects on it being very different in his 
recollection than the sight that now lies before him: “The 
Lighthouse was then a silvery, misty-looking tower with a yellow 
eye, that opened suddenly, and softly in the evening. Now…[h]e 
could see the white-washed rocks; the tower, stark and straight; 
he could see that it was barred with black and white; he could 
see windows in it; he could even see washing spread on the rocks 
to dry. So that was the Lighthouse, was it?” (251).  
He comes then to a great realization, one which might perhaps 
have saved Ahab from his fate: “No, the other was also the 
Lighthouse. For nothing was simply one thing. The other 
Lighthouse was true too.” Towards the end of the novel Lily 
Briscoe arrives, as if on the reader’s behalf, at a similar 
understanding, that looking through a symbol is impossible 
without first (and also) looking at it, and thus the looking 
itself implicates us in interchange. She settles ultimately for 
painting a “vision” (281) of the lighthouse, i.e. a record of 
the encounter with the symbolic rather than the symbol 
explained. “It would be hung in the attics” she reflects, “it 
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would be destroyed. But what did that matter?” The lighthouse, 
once painted, is thus neither Emerson’s higher truth evinced nor 
Melville’s truth turned away; what distinguishes Lily Briscoe 
from Ahab is her recognition that the symbol is always many-
faced, a wave-form, and becomes particle only (and as long as) 
we engage it. This is the meaning of Lily Briscoe’s “vision”, 
and I contend is also the redemptive moment in our relationship 
with art, when we are both enlivened by our experience and by 
the knowledge of that experience being ephemeral and forever 
limited by our perspective.     
By itself, the suggestion that we as readers (or listeners, 
viewers etc.) participate in making symbols meaningful is not 
especially controversial. What is more sobering is the 
possibility that, if meaning is manifested not ‘in’ art (as an 
object) nor in us, the evaluating subject, but in the way we 
experience objects in the world, then in what sense do symbols 
mean anything in and of themselves? And, moreover, what then 
materially distinguishes one symbol from another (besides prior 
acculturation/ expectation), ‘good’ art from ‘bad’, or even art 
itself from any other phenomena? The concluding pages of this 
chapter and dissertation are devoted to thinking through this 
complex question, and to considering how it informs and overlaps 
with my discussions about otherness in earlier chapters. 
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The American philosopher Monroe Beardsley, in his noteworthy 
work on art and aesthetics, once posed the above question 
(simplified: ‘what is art’) in similar terms, i.e. what 
distinguishes art (“aesthetic objects” 106) from anything else in 
the world. In the 1980 postscript to the second edition of his 
1958 book Aesthetics, Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 
Beardsley settles on a definition of art that attempts to bring 
together the phenomenal and the ideal: “an artwork is an 
arrangement of conditions intended to be capable of affording an 
experience with marked aesthetic character…in the fashioning of 
which the intention to enable it to satisfy the aesthetic 
interest played a significant causal part” (xix). There are 
intriguing co-dependencies here; the use of “intended” and 
“causal” indicates that art is not simply that which produces an 
aesthetic feeling or response, but that which does so (to a 
“significant” degree) on purpose. Though Beardsley leaves room 
for the aesthetically evocative as a secondary purpose (such as, 
for instance, a building that is both functional and beautiful, 
or a sacred artifact), he delimits art broadly to the 
“intentionally produced”. This of course has the effect of 
eliminating both everyday and naturally occurring phenomena, 
                                                             
106 Beardsley includes in the category of aesthetic works not only tangible objects but also performances, 
what he calls “phenomenal” objects or “presentations” of aesthetic objects, such as a particular rendering of a 
song or play (44).  
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which can induce profound aesthetic feeling but cannot be said 
to have been expressly created for such a purpose, be it primary 
or secondary.  
While preserving the indispensability of the “presentation” 
of an artwork, Beardsley’s definition also excludes an 
experience of the immaterial (is a rollercoaster, as an object, 
aesthetically evocative? Is it meant to be?) It also places upon 
us the burden of defining “aesthetic object” in a reasonably 
stable, limited way, since Beardsley specifically states that an 
“aesthetic object is not identical with any particular 
presentation [experience] of it” (44).   
What is intriguing, for the purposes of my analysis, about 
this schema is not that that it attempts to create more 
stringent criteria for art than others have done, or even 
whether that criteria is coherent or appropriate. Instead, I 
chose to highlight Beardsley’s delimitation because—perhaps 
unavoidably for any attempt to do thuswise—it seems to infer a 
life of the “aesthetic object” independent of experience, i.e. 
that art is art even when we are not experiencing it. For an 
aesthetic object to be distinguished from any other on the basis 
of artistic intent (rather than, or in addition to, on each 
individual experience of it), invariably draws us into a 
discussion about essence, great art vs mediocre art etc. For if 
we must know an artwork’s past and purpose to understand how it 
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makes us feel, what do we do when such information is 
unavailable? Or, more significantly, when we have an “aesthetic 
experience” under other circumstances, brought on by something 
we do not recognize as art? We can separate classes of objects, 
but how do we distinguish between qualities of feeling? 107  
Or perhaps, should describing instead the nature of the 
feeling, the aesthetic response to art take precedence over 
scrutinizing the artwork and so form the basis of our answer to 
‘what is art’? Such a focus would not be concerned with—and 
would in fact forego entirely—evaluating the aesthetic object in 
terms of what it is outside the experience of it (and thus would 
not run afoul of Beardsley and Wimsatt’s “affective fallacy”). 
Rather than submit a new definition for art (virtually any 
attempt at which tends to lead us away from, or lead a parasitic 
existence on, the “raw data” of experience) I wish instead to 
propose a shift in posture. Namely, that we begin any 
conversation about art from the position of art as other, and 
                                                             
107 Beardsley himself, in a 1946 paper co-authored with William Wimsatt Jr., described an “intentional fallacy” 
when reading poetry, which ensues from trying to bring an artist’s intentions to bear on his/her work. The 
authors conclude that “[c]ritical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle” (487). They also however, 
imply that artistic intent can manifest within the work if it “succeeds”, in which case the “poem itself shows 
what [the artist] was trying to do” (469). Considering an artwork is not so different then, Beardsley and 
Wimsatt claim, from “judging a pudding”, the inference being the existence of certain free-standing qualities 
to an artwork which can be ascertained as a matter of judgment. This suggestion anticipated a 1949 essay by 
the same authors in which they detail an “affective fallacy”, which (as the name suggests) confuses a work for 
the feeling it produces—“what it is and what it does” (31). “The outcome of either Fallacy,” they summarize, 
“the Intentional or the Affective, is that the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, tends to 
disappear”, thus suggesting again the existence of an artwork in between its creation and consideration, in 
which it is still art.  
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with the same suspension of any other prejudgement as in the 
approach to otherness.  
As I have discussed in earlier chapters exploring Levinas and 
Trinh, the other is distinguished from any ordinary object we 
experience by the very aspect of being beyond one’s ability to 
use to satisfy one’s desire to understand or otherwise possess 
(and therefore subsume). An ‘artistic moment’ then, in my 
estimation, would be a purely phenomenal experience of being 
similarly visited, i.e. by something in experience that does not 
respond to delimiting or comply with stable contextualization 
vis-à-vis other objects or aspects of our experience.  
William Desmond, in his reading of Kant’s sublime, describes 
a “disturbance” that “great art” visits upon us which undermines 
the “radical autonomy” of the Kantian self (56-57). That is to 
say, our self-confidence (as transcendental subject) in being 
the determining center of everything we experience (see chapter 
3), which also thus allows us to assume the position of original 
from which otherness is then mediated, is undermined, even 
confounded by art as other-being. We feel the middle suddenly 
shaking, becoming uncertain, by encountering something not only 
unassimilable but which originates in radical otherness. Though 
Desmond also privileges good art over bad, what’s compelling 
here is the idea that art’s intervention is in destabilizing 
rather than in ‘succeeding’ aesthetically (or at least that the 
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latter imbues art with the power to realize the former). 
Further, if this de-centering is what we take to be the 
‘artistic moment’, then to my mind we dramatically compromise 
any definition of art (or exclusion thereof) that tries to go 
beyond experience, since we can only be thusly affected by art 
in the encountering of it.  
Attributing to any individual artwork or class of art that it 
inherently—when we are not looking—has such an effect would by 
definition null that affect, i.e. to claim that we have 
understood and therefore assimilated it. In this sense, quite 
perversely, declaring that a work of art is ‘great’ consumes its 
strangeness; by attributing to it qualities not typically found 
elsewhere, we are also saying that those qualities and their 
presence are within our ability to adjudge, by which we thereby 
reassert our position as the center.108 No, an “artistic moment” 
that truly intrudes is one which, like the other, begins and 
must in some sense remain one from which we are completely 
alienated. And, again like the other, this alienation from art 
as other-being is felt on the most immanent level—like Victor 
Frankenstein before the monster—within the epistemology of self. 
We “seem haunted”, Desmond writes of this feeling, “by an 
                                                             
108 Levinas makes a similar point in Totality and Infinity about otherness when he writes, “if the same would 
establish its identity by simple opposition to the other, it would already be a part of a totality encompassing 
the same and the other” (38).  
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elusive, often overwhelming power of origination that does not 
seem to belong to us univocally. In the very heart of self-
determination a strange immanent otherness seems to arise again 
and again…[which] disturbs our being at one with ourselves.” To 
be visited by an artistic moment, in a sense, is to momentarily 
lose not only a claim to the center, but one’s identification 
with the self at the center.109 
The effect of this visitation ultimately, to the extent that 
one can say anything meaningful about it as a definition that 
always holds, is that brings us out of our everyday, unconscious 
mastery of the world around us and back to an awareness (of 
objects, otherness, our bodies etc.), and to a sense of our own 
inadequacy to comprehend what we encounter. As far as a 
traditional medium like literature is concerned, art so defined 
would rely neither on understanding authorial intent nor on 
considering the meaning of the text independent of it. We would 
instead read literature to interrupt our otherwise utilitarian, 
object oriented desire to integrate objects into a stable frame 
(which we can manage and refine). A world consisting solely of 
what we have fully assimilated places no demands on our 
                                                             
109 Gayatri Spivak, critiquing from a postcolonial standpoint Hegel’s framework of art as a pathway on the 
spirit’s journey to self-knowledge (in his Lectures on Aesthetics), describes art again as the terrain of non-
knowing, which reveals the gaps in the “situation of the spirit” (referring to Hegel’s untranslatable Geist). Art 
is the disruption that is paradoxically a measure of how far the spirit is from self-knowledge; as Spivak puts it, 
“’Art’ is the name or the sign of the lack of fit between the two axes of the graph-spirit and its knowing” (40). 
207 
 
awareness to acknowledge it—we scarcely ‘experience’, in a 
formal sense, that world at all. The Russian formalist art 
critic Viktor Shklovsky called this process within experience an 
“algebrization”, the “over-automatization of an object [which] 
permits the greatest economy of perceptive effort…so [that] life 
is reckoned as nothing”” (9). Objects once habitualized within 
perception grow indistinct, and their relationships to us become 
so familiar as to be nearly invisible. In amongst what is known 
and habitual, we spend most of our time in unconscious 
arrogation and accumulation.  
This conceptualization figures art as beginning with that 
which is particularly ‘inefficient’ and uneconomical to 
recognize (and thus look past).110 It is also comparable to role 
the other plays within consciousness, i.e. confronting being by 
evading appropriation as another object. As the other pre-empts 
ontology with metaphysics, art forestalls automatized 
familiarity with defamiliarized perception. It should be noted 
that it is not that art or its content must substantively be 
something which is heretofore unknown to us or even be apart 
from the nondescript or commonplace; art can also make the 
familiar seem strange, to make us look at it curiously again so 
that, as Shklovsky evocatively writes, “art exists that one may 
                                                             
110 Inefficiency is critical to Shklovsky’s ideation; a work of art introduces a temporal lag in the habituated 
movement of perception, a “slowness” (12), which “increase[s] the difficulty and length of perception” (9).   
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recover the sensation of life…to make the stone stony.” An 
experience of art is to be repelled, jarred back into awareness. 
What is art is therefore not necessarily always so; what 
challenges us as outside the limits of our understanding on one 
occasion may not do so on the next, and might over time become 
so normalized as to cease to do so entirely. This again does not 
make any claims on what is objectively a work of art or not, 
only what is experienced as one—that is, I am suggesting not 
that a particular play or performance is art one night and not 
art the next, but rather that we may experience it on one 
occasion as art and as familiar the next, and that is all that 
we may finally say about it. The artistic moment is singular and 
unrepeatable precisely because it is not a causal result of or 
replacement for what instigated it. It exists in the 
“meanwhile”, and is unrecoverable afterwards. To return to 
Melville and Emerson for a moment, such an approach would find 
its inspiration in the symbolic not in terms of the obscure 
against the oracular, but rather in the anxieties and 
exhilarations we feel as readers in the strangeness of the 
symbolic which lies beyond our ability to make speak or stay 
silent. Put differently, this moment is tethered neither to the 
keyhole (to use my earlier metaphor) nor to what lies past it, 
but rather to the act of looking through. As Lily Briscoe might 
say, neither to the lighthouse nor whatever lies beyond it, only 
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to the vision. 
 
Along with these possibilities, it must be acknowledged that 
this conception has significant potential pitfalls. Most 
notably, it takes a radically broad view of ‘art’, so as to make 
the category seem rather superfluous, even empty. In doing so it 
flirts with veritable chaos, removing all controls on the 
category and absorbing innumerable equally valid test cases. By 
moving far beyond art as either aesthetic object or as 
performance, it opens up the natural, the everyday/unremarkable 
and the accidental/incidental as all potentially capable of 
being artistically valuable. More ominously for art criticism 
perhaps, it virtually discards any conversation about essence, 
dispensing with any meaningful distinction between good art and 
bad, except in the very loosest of terms, i.e. that some 
artworks may bring together elements that tend to be more 
provocative to the average person (based on their preparedness, 
cultural norms, prior expectations etc.).  
These questions are consequential, even intimidating; art 
theorist Arthur C. Danto was prompted to declare the post-
Warholian age “the end of art” for similar reasons. Echoing 
Hegel’s declaration in his Aesthetics111 for somewhat different 
                                                             
111 Hegel’s famous thesis, crudely summarized, was that romantic and post-romantic art heralded the end of 
art as far as being the highest way (compared to religion or philosophy) to point to something above and 
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(but not unrelated) reasons, Danto described the condition of 
modern art as having no way forward after Warhol except radical 
pluralism (i.e. almost anything can be art). Danto reasoned that 
if Warhol’s famous Brillo box replications and Marcel Duchamp’s 
urinal could legitimately be art, then art has reached the end 
of its quest to “understand itself philosophically” (134) and 
“there is no mark through which works of art can be perceptually 
different from the most ordinary of objects” (139). Danto does 
not claim that this end represents a death, but the possibility 
seems there. To so radically open ourselves to art as that which 
is other in experience threatens to render the category itself 
defunct; if everything can be art, in a sense, then is anything?   
Yet the central premise here again is at a distance from 
experience. Warhol’s replications are problematic mostly because 
one cannot distinguish them from the objects they ostensibly 
represent—from actual Brillo boxes. As I have noted, a 
foregrounding of experience over an essentialist inquiry into 
the properties of the object averts this discussion; an 
experience of disruption, a “slowness” in Shklovsky’s terms, is 
equally possible with a Brillo box or with its replica. If we 
relentlessly focus on experience, art is quite literally 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
beyond itself (such as God). Danto, referencing this ‘end’, explains that Hegel believed post-Romantic art “had 
become an object rather than a medium through which a higher reality made itself present” (130). Compared 
to classical art, the Romantics chose increasingly secular subjects—art which self-consciously focused on 
itself as subject, i.e. on its own interiority. 
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pluralized past any breaking point, since the ‘artistic moment’ 
can never lead us back to its own inception in any material way. 
Art is therefore, I contend, only a name for a visitation, an 
experiencing of oneself as displaced from the center of one’s 
own perception in a way which cannot be afterwards recreated. A 
‘great’ (or ‘powerful’ etc.) work of art would be so defined by 
what it induces in us that we are not masters of, that we cannot 
control. Whether this is the intent (or more accurately, the 
aesthetic purpose) of the artwork for which it has been 
intricately arranged or is by us completely imagined is not only 
impossible to say, as Beardsley argues, it is also 
insubstantial, as we cannot with any confidence anticipate such 
a feeling—even with a work we know intimately. To do so would be 
to accommodate ourselves to it, to make it familiar, an 
automatized object of aesthetic pleasure. Art exists on the edge 
of the familiar and confronts us with the unknown that lies 
beyond it. When we lose perspective of this edge we feel the 
world buckle, as the strange and unfamiliar—the other—make 
themselves acquainted within the known of self.  
To encounter art and to be moved by it then is to be made 
momentarily a stranger in one’s home. The contemporary Canadian 
philosopher John Russon has recently described the most basic 
nature of experience as “a kind of exposure, a contact with an 
outside” (3). The outside begins and constitutes all that is 
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beyond what we perceive as our selves, and we live therefore 
always at the “point of contact between one and another, between 
“I am I” and “there it is” (61). This description is 
particularly insightful, I feel, because it invokes not only the 
idea of a threshold (whereupon we mediate the familiar and the 
unfamiliar) but also the vulnerability we feel there, at being, 
in the most literal sense, exposed. The I is the coordinates 
from which we look upon the world outside and the being that is 
exposed by it. It follows then that the feeling of being exposed 
is the very realization of an irreducible otherness at the edge, 
an outside that lies at the doorstep of what Russon calls 
home112, “simultaneously a place of refuge and a site of 
exposure.” 
In the final measure, I contend, art is the most acute 
experience of being entangled with that which exposes. We may be 
culturally acclimated to particular forms, mediums, styles etc., 
which may insulate us from acknowledging or elevating others. We 
may make prejudgements about what we expect to be great, and 
that may influence us. We may recognize certain forms as 
artistic and disregard others. We may construct and enact 
extremely intricate and internally consistent metrics of what 
                                                             
112 Similar to Shklovsky’s “algebrization” Russon explains that what defines home is by definition its 
familiarity, both to us and of us. It is “deferential to me and I to it” (65). What lies beyond home is marked in 
contrast by its “indifference”, a “nondeferential space”. In other words, that it does not depart from or answer 
us.    
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constitutes a great novel, a beautiful piece of music, a 
masterful painting, a provocative poem. In short, we may have 
innumerable predilections and expectations for what is ‘good’ 
art, what is art and when we are experiencing art. But none of 
these prepare us for the moment of being exposed, which is an 
involuntary feeling and which is what makes our relationship to 
art a twin to otherness. That which arrives at our doorstep as 
alien and demands entry into home does not call ahead, and 
afterwards leaves just as quickly. And this is perhaps all that 
we can say to hold art up as substantively separate from any 
other aspect of experience. We may not in any meaningful way be 
able to distinguish art from any another phenomena that has a 
similarly defamiliarizing effect to wake us up to the world. But 
we can distinguish the ‘artistic moment’ from the ordinary, in 
the same way we can recognize the other as unlike the mundane 
objects we encounter. And perhaps that is enough.  
 
The American literary scholar Giles Gunn once described the 
limitations in the collective “imagination” of otherness 
throughout American history as a “national Emersonian 
inclination to either withdraw back into the private sanctity of 
the self or to relinquish that sanctity in favor of fusing with 
the All” (178). Gunn alleges that owing perhaps to the legacy of 
the early Puritans and then to westward expansion against a 
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perpetual physical and psychic frontier, the spectrum of how 
Americans have conceived of and oriented themselves to the other 
has long been exceptionally narrow, something akin to the 
pursuit of individual actualization vs a desired ‘oneness’ with 
the ‘American people’. The meta-narrative of American national 
consciousness, Gunn writes, “depicts a single, solitary self… 
transplanted from another culture (and hence unfinished), or 
essentially unformed and uncultivated (and hence innocent), 
falling, so to speak, into experience and encountering there 
that ideal “Other” in response to which he must, at the minimum, 
redefine himself and, at the maximum, virtually recreate 
himself” (191). The geographical landscape of the New World, 
along with the cultural-religious background of the early 
settlers meant that ‘frontier’ was from the outset primarily 
cognized as that which tests, tempers and delivers the American 
‘self’ from the corrosive legacy of old European values.  
The ever-moving frontier and Frontierism, as Frederick Turner 
described it in the late nineteenth century113, was thus the 
symbolic site where the contradictions of isolation and 
belonging were most palpable. In essence, expanding further 
                                                             
113 See Turner’s influential 1893 essay “The Significance of the Frontier in American History”, in which he 
writes: “American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This 
perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its 
continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American 
character…In this advance, the frontier is the outer edge of the wave, the meeting point between savagery and 
civilization” (2-3). 
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westward the national “all” was simultaneously an enactment of 
frontier self-reliance and paradoxically a persistent 
counterforce to the definition of the self as a solitary unit 
constituted and sustained by its inner resources. Following 
Gunn’s thesis then, the frontier represented the farthest 
reaches of American “imagination”, where the “all” that 
comprised the known/familiar ended, as well as the belief that 
what lay beyond was a territory that, once civilized and 
integrated, would remake the “all” by infusing it with what was 
formerly—but no longer—other. A simpler and more recognizable 
metaphor for this conviction is, of course, the “melting pot”, a 
phrase popularized by British playwright Israel Zangwill’s 1908 
play of the same name which portrayed America as an endless 
project of recreation through assimilation, in which the “all” 
would eventually include within itself every antagonism that 
presently lay beyond it. Journalist John O’Sullivan in 1845 
entered into the American lexicon a more virulent version of 
this same conviction in the lead up to the Mexican-American war, 
the pernicious “Manifest Destiny”. Again, the suggestion was 
clear: all that is now outside will soon be inside, the frontier 
will push ever forward until no darkness remains.114     
                                                             
114 An evocative visual representation of this ideology can be found in Emanuel Gottlieb Leutze’s famous 1861 
painting Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way, which depicts hardy settlers progressively cultivating 
a hostile and mountainous landscape on their way to a golden coastline. The painting is today prominently 
displayed in the US House of Representatives.    
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Although each of these propositions seem to regard the 
meaning of the frontier in the American case as singular and 
unique, I am less convinced. Frontierism is at its core, after 
all, an extension of the premise that home is demarcated from 
the rest of the world on the basis of familiarity. What is 
missing from the whole schema, as I have tried to explore in 
this dissertation, is the possibility of frontier as the site 
for encountering that which cannot be appropriated; the other is 
that that which always and irretrievably lies past the frontier, 
for otherwise it ceases to be other. The central metaphor of 
Heart of Darkness is that beyond the light there is always 
darkness, a last frontier that marks what cannot be illuminated. 
The name for that darkness is the other.  
To experience art is to live, for a moment, on this frontier. 
Gunn writes of an American culture “inured…to strangeness” 
(179), echoing Shklovsky’s “over-automatization”, by which we 
similarly inure ourselves to what is alien all around us. Gunn 
contemplates the value of being awakened, however briefly, to 
what he calls “wonder”: 
[I]t would appear that we [now] wonder, if at all, only 
about what is left to wonder at or wonder about. The 
imaginative capacity for wonder…requires a special 
openness to the unanticipated, a certain susceptibility 
to surprise, and most of us can no longer allow 
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ourselves to be so vulnerable. Instead of remaining 
receptive to novelty, we have become rotten-ripe with 
knowingness as the imagination’s last defense in a 
world which, if experienced directly, might stun us 
back into the Stone Age.  
As I have discussed herein, art is neither a specific object nor 
the act of uncovering the meaning of an object, but rather a 
moment in which we are able to briefly live again in an 
unfamiliar world. Through it, we are able to glimpse not light, 
but look into the darkness—not at the other of our imagination, 
but the one who forever lies beyond it. We are reconciled with 
wonder. 
----- 
 
 
 
“Can you picture what will be, 
 so limitless and free? 
Desperately in need of some stranger's hand 
In a desperate land (The Doors 181) 
-Jim Morrison 
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 Final Thoughts 
 
I began this dissertation with an exploration of otherness in 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and Forster’s A Passage to India. I 
would like to conclude it with a brief return to these texts in 
light of the concerns I have raised in these pages.  
The central events of Forster’s novel, the false rape 
accusation and trial of Doctor Aziz, are set into motion by 
Adela and Mrs. Moore experiencing in the Marabar caves otherness 
as a primordial challenge. The confusion about what actually 
happened in the caves propels the story and its characters 
towards potential tragedy, the conviction of an innocent man as 
a victim of colonialist injustice. But this outcome is averted 
when, at the outset of Doctor Aziz’s trial, Adela (Aziz’s 
accuser), has a “vision” of the caves which causes her to doubt 
her version of events and, instead of testifying to Aziz’s 
guilt, she exonerates him instead.  
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We are presented here, at the trial, with a second moment of 
confusion to match the one in the caves, where truth and 
recollection come into question, though this one corrects the 
distortions of the first. This second moment is more subtle in 
its origins. In place of the cave system, in which what happens 
is literally lost in darkness, Adela’s crisis of conviction at 
the trial seems to ensue from a particular sight she beholds 
just as the proceedings begin. As if like an omen, the first 
thing she notices upon entering the courtroom is a solitary 
figure who operates a punkah, a handheld fan (204). This 
“punkah-wallah” (fan operator), though he remains entirely mute 
through the trial proceedings and has nothing whatsoever to do 
with them besides, is the first and last image Forster chooses 
to frame the trial episode.  
The terms he uses to describe the man are at once overtly 
deific and extremely Orientalist, as if under the Occidental 
gaze the hyper-sexualized subaltern body is assigned an opacity 
that nonetheless, as an object, renders it transparent:  
Almost naked, and splendidly formed, he sat on a raised 
platform near the back…he caught her attention as she 
came in, and he seemed to control the proceedings. He 
had the strength and beauty that sometimes come to 
flower in Indians of low birth. When that strange race 
nears the dust and is condemned as untouchable, then 
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nature remembers the physical perfection that she 
accomplished elsewhere, and throws out a god…Pulling 
the rope towards him, relaxing it rhythmically, sending 
swirls of air over others, receiving none himself, he 
seemed apart from human destinies, a male Fate, a 
winnower of souls…he scarcely knew that he existed and 
did not understand why the Court was fuller than usual, 
indeed he did not know that it was fuller than usual, 
didn't even know he worked a fan, though he thought he 
pulled a rope. Something in his aloofness impressed the 
girl from middle-class England, and rebuked the 
narrowness of her sufferings. (204-205) 
Like a master of ceremonies, the punkah wallah’s presence in 
the courtroom seems both unconnected to and above everyone else. 
His vantage point overlooks the diorama, yet without seeing it. 
Adela pauses to consider him at some length before her 
testimony, and his presence seems to cast a pall over her. He is 
there before we arrive at the scene and when the trial concludes 
he remains behind, as though he had always existed there. He is, 
in short, a living embodiment of the Marabar caves (and, 
equally, of Conrad’s anthropomorphized Congolese jungle), in 
that he is similarly positioned against the anxieties and 
excitations of the English protagonists as a silent and eternal 
witness. His indifference, or rather his radically inaccessible 
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alterity, seems to swallow up Adela’s confidence in her own 
narrative perspective, and looking upon him she loses control 
over her recollection of what happened in the caves.   
There is a crucial paradox in this, a cohabitation of 
seemingly opposing meanings within the figure of the punkah 
wallah. He is on the one hand literally and symbolically defined 
by Orientalist objectification and desire. He plays no actual 
part in the drama in the courtroom and has no agency even in his 
own actions. As Jenny Sharpe has commented, he is written as the 
silenced other who does not intend the world around him in the 
same way as those around him whose gaze constitutes him. Though 
he seems to awaken something in Adela’s memory, Sharpe rightly 
argues that the punkah wallah “has no access the paths of truth 
along which he guides her, for he cannot cognize what is 
transpiring around him, not even his own activity of fanning” 
(150). If Forster’s titular passage represents in a sense the 
distance between the colonizer as subject and the colonized 
object (as Aziz’s struggle in the novel suggests), the punkah 
walla surely resides on the far end of this passage.  
On the other hand, in diametrical opposition to this 
interpretation, the same figure also most directly marks the 
limitations of the Orientalist gaze, i.e. the point where its 
domain ends (and the proverbial darkness begins). The punkah 
wallah exists at (and signifies), in Russon’s terms, the “site 
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of exposure”, the edge where familiar (home) encounters the 
alien (outside). He is the boundary between Marlow’s river and 
the forest beyond, or the treeline through which Piscine watches 
Richard Parker disappear. For Adela, he demarcates the extent of 
her ability to consume otherness, the end of the ‘passage’ and 
the marker where radical alterity begins. The coexistence of 
these aspects within the same figure, I believe, is what 
unnerves Adela to the point that it precariously subverts her 
self-assuredness. She sees suddenly a multi-stranded truth, an 
infinitely unassimilable subject within an entirely totalized 
and automatized object. The familiar affixed to the 
defamiliarized. She has had, we might say, an artistic 
experience, a forestalling of automatization.  
Passage anchors itself on these two disruptions, which create 
and then resolve the novel’s narrative tension by the same 
means. In the courtroom, as in the caves, the narrative and 
ontological authority that underwrite the very project of 
colonialism are interrupted by an alterity which, as Levinas 
tells us, does not in itself satiate a lack nor bend to the 
outthrust of desire. Conrad’s river similarly carries Marlow 
beyond his purview as a self-determining subject, further away 
from epistemological control over the other, i.e. as either the 
likeness or antithesis of the self, over darkness as the mere 
opposite of light. Indeed, Adela’s anxiety is voiced not only by 
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Kurtz’s “horror” but also by Victor Frankenstein disavowing the 
“wretch”, somehow both more and less than human. Ahab, in the 
guise of Job, is confounded by the same refusal of the other, 
the whale, to answer for itself, as Piscine is by his failure to 
achieve a familiarity with the anthropomorphic Richard Parker 
which burns away the tiger’s animal obscurity.  
Each of these texts, as I have argued, position otherness at 
its most fundamental as an outlier within experience, in the 
sense that it subverts the autonomy of the self. As Hegel’s 
dialectic describes, the dual movement of the self as I emerges 
from and is contingent upon the imminence of otherness. But, 
moreover, this also implies that otherness is an enduring trauma 
felt within the tautology of self, whose immanence alienates the 
Kantian subject from a stable delimitation of its own 
boundaries. Manto’s Bishan Singh and DeLillo’s Keith Neudecker 
are so visited by an other not only counterpoised to the self, 
but one that unties the latter’s hold on I am I.  
Kamel Daoud’s complex response to Camus’ The Stranger, which 
sets out to refute the latter but finds itself reliving its 
predecessor’s self-destructive impulses, raises further 
questions about the other as a colonial subject. Meursault is a 
novel that exists in the negative space opened up by the 
collision of two polarities, its action and protagonist drawn 
over the contours of its opposite number. Daoud’s protagonist, 
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in writing ‘back’ to the colonizing world, reaches the 
uncomfortable realization that he cannot orient himself in 
opposition to something without being connected to it. Desai’s 
Baumgartner similarly embodies Bhabha’s notion of hybridity, as 
well as the indivisibility of identity and alterity, which is 
possessed by neither of two halves but is rather a surplus 
created by the separation.                 
I have focused in these conversations on contemporary 
literature, ‘western’ and ‘eastern’, while also broadly 
considering art as discourse, as conduit. The basic intervention 
of art, I have argued, is in obfuscation rather than 
explication; art (the image) points at its referent object 
without replicating it, which both separates art from analytical 
essentialization and, paradoxically, preserves what is ineffable 
and indescribable within experience. The realization of Woolf’s 
Bernard, the desire for a “howl” that expresses without 
mediation or signification, is echoed by Trinh’s documentary and 
narrative technique of sidelong looking, speaking not about the 
other but “nearby”. Maurice Blanchot’s contemplation of an 
“essential” language of art, which eschews the crude 
utilitarianism of everyday speech, similarly reaches for a way 
to speak about the nocturnal world of Levinas’ primeval il y a 
without the trappings of self-referential ontologization.         
Art, in the specific sense to which I have delimited herein 
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(of the phenomenological object that introduces, in Shklovsky’s 
terms, a “slowness”), performs this very same role in amongst 
the economy and familiarity of otherwise habituated objects. To 
come into contact with art is to be disarmed of the ability to 
allocate objects into an economized continuity, to be re-
awakened to the strangeness of phenomenal experience. A more 
robust (or stable) definition of art would thus become 
immediately obsolete and ossified; the nature of the artistic 
experience is that it is always experiential, living in the 
unaccounted interstices between subject and object. Art is, in 
Russon’s phraseology, an experience of exposure, and its 
parameters are therefore continually contested and in flux. What 
is unfamiliar on one occasion might suddenly—or over time—become 
commonplace, its power to compel us disappearing without warning 
or gradually ebbing away. As Danto correctly surmised, such 
drastically pluralized and inclusive metrics essentially render 
art a redundant category, so far as questions like ‘what is art’ 
and ‘what is good art’ are concerned. However, what is purchased 
at this admittedly steep price is the possibility of an infinite 
number of small epiphanies within experience—art as a persistent 
check against the benumbing of consciousness. In being intruded 
and thus displaced, we are by art, as by the other, impelled 
toward awareness. We are alive, for a moment, for the other.  
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